

A
A
0
0
0
4
9
3
1
1
0
1



SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

D. D. Jackson

Nov. 1919.

PROF. JOHN F. ZIMMERMAN
DEPT. OF HISTORY
CAL STATE L.A.
LOS ANGELES, CAL. 90032

1/19



D. D. Jackson

Nov. 1919.

PROF. JOHN F. ZIMMERMAN
DEPT. OF HISTORY
CAL STATE L.A.
LOS ANGELES, CAL. 90032

1/79

RUSSIA'S MESSAGE



THE NEWEST BORZOI BOOKS

ASPHALT

By Orrick Johns

BACKWATER

By Dorothy Richardson

CENTRAL EUROPE

By Friedrich Naumann

RUSSIA'S MESSAGE

By William English Walling

THE BOOK OF SELF

By James Oppenheim

THE BOOK OF CAMPING

By A. Hyatt Verrill

THE ECHO OF VOICES

By Richard Curle

MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY

By Alexander Kornilow

THE RUSSIAN SCHOOL OF PAINTING

By Alexandre Benois

THE JOURNAL OF LEO TOLSTOI (1895-
1899)

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SUPER-
TRAMP

By William H. Davies

Preface by Bernard Shaw

RUSSIA'S MESSAGE

The People Against The Czar

BY
WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING



New York · ALFRED · A · KNOPF · MCMXVII

COPYRIGHT, 1908, BY
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE COMPANY

COPYRIGHT, 1917, BY
ALFRED A. KNOPE

All rights reserved

PREFACE

I have not written historically for the benefit of the academic student, nor sought to dwell on the picturesqueness of those sections of Russia and aspects of Russian life that are most strange; I have not dwelt on personal experience, as the situation is too large to be presented in all its aspects in any personal narrative. I have sought rather, through the personal acquaintance with a majority of the most important leaders of all parties and elements of the Russian nation, to put myself in the most immediate contact with the inner ideas and spirit of the great struggle and to present this struggle to the reader as seen through the eyes of its leaders themselves. Finally, I have written not for the casual reader or for him who draws from this tragic and inspiring situation a mere interest in the chances of the fight or in its melodramatic aspects.

The greater part of two years I have spent in Russia in order to gain a rounded view. My attention was first drawn to the absorbing interest of this great struggle by Polish and Jewish Russian exiles met while I was living among them in the University Settlement in New York. Leaving the United States shortly after the massacre of January 22, 1905, I spent several months in London, Paris, Geneva, Cracow, and Vienna among leaders of the revolutionary parties of all factions and races. Within a week after the Czar issued his October Manifesto I was in Warsaw, and a few days later in St. Petersburg, where I at once met Witte and the chief members of his ministry, and at the same time put myself in touch with the most conspirative of the revolutionary organisations. I spent the larger part of my time in that country from this date until the opening of the third Duma. Near the close of my last visit the press of the United States, and the leading European countries, announced the arrest of myself and wife and her sister and our detention for twenty-four hours in prison through the acknowledged mistake, or perhaps in consideration,

the Russian Government. It is not true, as was suggested then in a few papers, that the Russian Government made either a direct or indirect request through the American ambassador that we should leave the country. We had wished to follow Russian events closely only until the meeting of the third Duma, and we left St. Petersburg on the day on which we had previously arranged to go. It was explained by the Russian political police that our arrest was due to our friendly relations with certain revolutionists. I have certainly had such relations with hundreds of leading persons of this movement, as with an almost equal number of their opponents.

To some extent I made use of articles that I have written for various magazines — particularly the Independent. I have also made some use of articles published in Collier's Weekly, the Outlook, the World To-day, Charities, the American Federationist, and Moody's Financial Magazine.

Realising the immensity of the task that lay before me, I have confined my attention in the present work largely to the Russian part of Russia, leaving aside entirely all Asiatic Russia, the Caucasus and the Baltic Provinces, Poland, and Finland. The Polish and Finnish situations are of such exceptional importance in relation to the Russian that I spent several weeks in visiting both countries, but I have not made them a part of my work.

One feature of the book needs perhaps a special explanation. The crimes of the Russian Government are so monstrous and so manifold that I have quite despaired of giving any satisfactory picture of them as a whole. In my first chapters I have dwelt at some length with this subject, but I have devised the economical measure of taking the Jews as my central theme, not because I consider that their persecutions are any worse than other peoples' in Russia, nor because they are more important than other nationalities, as for instance the Tartars or the Poles, but because they have themselves been selected by the Government as the centre of the whole persecution system. In other parts of the book I have tried to portray not merely the central feature but the whole situation.

If I had cared to burden my work with footnotes showing the source of all my information I could readily have done so; but this would have increased very largely the bulk of the volume, besides interrupting the attention of the average reader, interested rather in the

facts themselves than in the source from which they come. I am prepared, however, to give my authority for every detail, just as much as if I had been writing a history or a scientific sociological work.

I owe little to writers of books and much to active leaders in the movement. Of these I have met hundreds. It would be impossible in a few pages to mention even their names. To a few persons, however, I am especially indebted. Among the foremost are: Prince M——, who introduced me to the Czar's ministers, Witte and the rest, as well as to several of his most important generals and who kept me for the whole period of my visit in close touch with the situation in court circles and the ministry; to Mr. David Sosskis, the able correspondent of the London Tribune; Mr. Harold Williams, correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, a valued friend of the Constitutional Democratic Party; to Madame Turkova, one of the most active and important leaders of that party; to the Countess Bobrinsky of Moscow, one of the organisers both of the Constitutional Democratic Party and of the Peasants' Union; to Professor Milyoukov, whose high personal qualities are appreciated even by his severest critics; to the poet Tan (Borgoraz), a founder of the Peasants' Union and of the National Socialist Party and an active leader in all the most revolutionary but non-partisan movements; to Aladdin, the most active and valuable, if not the most influential, of the Labour Group; to Volkovsky, Tchaikovsky, Gershuni, Chisko, Shidlovsky, and Madam Breshkovskaya, founders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party; to Isaac Hourwich, Nahum Stone, and James M. James, leaders among the Russian Social Democratic Party in New York; to Vladimir Simkhovitch, of Columbia University; to Prince Dimitri Hilkov, one of the most gifted and popular leaders of the whole revolutionary movement, and most of all to Bielevsky, Staal, and Mazurenko, founders of the great Peasants' Union.

I have selected these names somewhat at hazard and do not wish to imply that the list of those to whom I am most indebted is exhausted. I cannot leave the question of my indebtedness without expressing my gratitude to other prominent Russians with whom I have had only single long interviews or brief meetings. Among them are Tolstoi, Gorky, and Korolenko; the conservative leaders, Gutchkov, Maklakov, and Michael Stachovitch; the Social Democratic leaders, Parous, Dan, Lenin, and Alexinsky; the brilliant leaders of the Polish

Socialistic Party who make their headquarters at Cracow — not to speak of innumerable others, especially Duma members, editors, elected members of local government boards, and active organisers of all the popular parties, labour organisations, and of the Union of Unions.

CONTENTS

| | |
|------------------------|----|
| PREFACE | 5 |
| INTRODUCTION | 13 |

PART I

OPPRESSION

| | |
|---|----|
| I. NICHOLAS, CZAR | 25 |
| II. HOW CZARS GOVERN | 36 |
| III. THE CZARISM STRUGGLING FOR EXISTENCE | 44 |
| IV. CREATING THE "INTERNAL ENEMY" | 55 |
| V. AUTOCRACY'S LAST HOPE | 66 |

PART II

REVOLT

| | |
|--|-----|
| I. THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE—A MYSTERY | 83 |
| II. THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE—THEIR TRUE CHARACTER | 91 |
| III. HOW THE PEASANTS LIVE | 104 |
| IV. HOW THE PEASANTS TILL THE SOIL | 118 |
| V. FROM SLAVES OF THE LANDLORD TO SLAVES OF THE STATE | 130 |
| VI. HOW THE PEASANT BECAME A REVOLUTIONIST | 146 |
| VII. THE VILLAGE AGAINST THE CZAR | 156 |

PART III

REVOLUTION

| | |
|---|-----|
| I. THE WORKINGMEN | 167 |
| II. THE POSITION OF THE WORKINGMEN | 176 |
| III. ORGANISING | 189 |
| IV. HOW THE PRIESTS ARE BECOMING REVOLUTIONISTS | 198 |
| V. THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION | 208 |
| VI. THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION | 219 |
| APPENDIX | 233 |

ILLUSTRATIONS

- A Typical Bureaucrat, *opposite page* 38
- House Arrest, 46
- The Village Czar, 56
- The Village "Pope," 79
- The Store, 92
- Child Sufferer in a Famine District, 106
- Cottage Interior, 106
- Peasant's Cart, 120
- Wooden Plows and Harrows, 120
- The Main Thorofare, 132
- Peasant Court Yard, 132
- Village Street Scene, 144
- Building Operations, 144
- Women Mixing Mortar, 154
- Women Plastering, 154
- A Landlord's Mansion, 162
- After a Visit of the Red Cock, 162
- Houses of "Rich" Peasants, 178
- The Village "Intellectuals," 190
- A Liberal Priest, 200
- Duma Representatives, 220
- Leaders of the First Duma, 228



INTRODUCTION

THE revolutionary struggle of the Russian people against the Russian Government reached its first climax in 1905, 1906 and 1907. The Russians had proved for many years that they were ready to make any sacrifice to get rid of the incubus of the Czarism. But a favorable opportunity did not come until 1905. The Czarism was not overthrown. But it was modernized. The General Strike of October 1905 forced the Czar to create a Duma and to institute a pseudo-constitutional government, both on the Prussian model. As in Prussia in 1848, the monarch, forced to grant liberal institutions by a popular upheaval, repudiated his "sacred" promises within a few days and reinaugurated absolutism. But in each case the absolutism was placed upon a new foundation, and a system of legal order largely replaced the purely arbitrary personal rule that had come down almost unchanged from the eighteenth century—for the French Revolution, which had swept away the regime of the landowning nobility in France, had failed to produce any such radical result in Eastern Europe.

The year 1905, to use an expression employed by Tolstoi in a conversation I had with him in 1906, witnessed the first scene of the First Act, the year 1907 closed the Act. But why did a movement, which had been smoldering for half a century, break out in these particular years? To answer this question correctly is to state the key to all Russian history, and to the whole Russian situation of to-day. Russia is, and always has been, in a very large measure, dependent on other countries, geographically, economically, and politically. The disastrous war against Japan, favored by Germany, was the spark that lighted the fires of 1905, the huge French loan of 1906 (850,000,000 roubles) quenched these fires, re-inforced the Czarism, and made further liberal progress impossible for many years. So closed

the First Act. The Second Act will beyond question be played out at the end (or shortly before the end) of the present struggle with Germany and Austria.

So the key to all the gravest Russian questions lies—outside of Russia. The huge sums loaned by France were to be used largely to strengthen Russia's military power against Germany. But the money loaned by France also went in large part into industrial enterprises. More than anything on earth, Russia needs capital, and a huge amount of it, to develop her colossal resources. More than anything on earth France needs a lucrative foreign field for the investment of her immense savings. On the industrial side also the bargain seems bilateral and comprehensible. The result is that—as the leading Russian newspaper, the *Novoye Vremia*, pointed out—the real Duma of Russia is not in St. Petersburg but in the great banks of Paris and London. The *Novoye Vremia*, a supporter of unrestricted Czarism, protested against such foreign rule. But it may be asked whether the control of these able and highly modern financiers would not be preferable to that of the Czar. If France and England had invested billions of roubles in the Russian army and other billions in Russian industry would they not see to it that this army was modernized, in order that it might be of the highest service in case of war, and this industry made effective so that it might yield the maximum returns on the investment? Would not both objects require that Russia should replace the corrupt and arbitrary Czarism by an efficient modernized form of government, a democratic republic like that of France or a democratic monarchy like that of England?

I spent the larger part of the years 1905, 1906 and 1907 in Russia seeking in vain for an answer to this question, the basis of the whole Russian problem. Why did Paris and London decree the failure of the democratic movement in 1906 by lending nearly a billion roubles to the Czar? There was no disagreement in Russia among my hundreds of informants that it was this loan that ended the revolutionary movement—and not the reforms or repression, the threats or promises, of the Czar—which would have been futile without this enormous subsidy.

Why, then, did France and England rescue the Czarism from the Russian people? Gradually the full truth has appeared. The

French and English financiers could not and did not desire to perpetuate the Czarism, they would infinitely prefer a genuinely constitutional, and at least semi-democratic, government—both for military and for financial reasons. But *they feared the temporary international weakening and disorganization of Russia that would accompany the change*. For months, and perhaps for years, they would lose a military ally that was *absolutely indispensable if Europe was not to fall, at least potentially, under the dictatorship of Germany*. But this was not all. The potential supremacy of Germany would have defeated the very object, the democratic transformation of Russia, which had made such a dictatorship possible. A dominant autocratic Prussia would not allow a democratic Russia to come into existence. As all the monarchists on both sides of the border constantly proclaim, the fall of one Absolutism, would threaten the other. Indeed all Russia and Germany believed that the Kaiser gave assurances to the Czar that in case the Czar's power was menaced he would send troops into Russia to restore it.

As Professor Uebersberger of Vienna has written since the present war (Modern Germany in Relation to the War, p. 381), "Austria-Hungary and Germany during the unfortunate war with Japan and the resulting disturbances, strove to uphold the tottering throne and the threatened solidarity of the Russian state. Indeed, it is the opinion of the Russian radical parties, especially of the Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionists, that the Russian revolution was defeated primarily through Germany's attitude." The Professor is far from denying that the German Kaiser and not the French financiers were at the bottom responsible for the defeat of the movement for constitutionalism and democracy in Russia. And the fact that he claims the credit for the Kaiser is doubly significant because the above expression appears in the most important collection of German opinions since the war, together with articles by Professors Hintze, Delbrueck, Schmoller, Meinecke, Troeltsch, Oncken, and others of the highest authorities. Indeed, it is the accepted view—held, for example, even by the nationalistic wing of the German Socialists, represented by August Bebel, who said at the time that he would shoulder a gun if Germany was attacked by the Czarism, but that the German people would revolt rather than attack the

Russian people and defend the Russian Czar. Events have proved that there is little if any spirit of revolt in Germany; but Bebel was undoubtedly sincere, and nobody has ever successfully questioned the soundness of his information. He made this important statement because he had good reason to believe that German intervention in Russia was imminent. *Thus France and England had no choice.* If their financiers had dealt with the Russian people instead of the Czar they would still have been powerless to overthrow the Czar, backed as he was by the Kaiser—and they would have lost an indispensable ally. By dealing with the Czar they might hope to modernize Russia after they had used the Czarism for their purpose and at the same time had assured the prosperity of their financial dependency by making it safe against the only enemies that have ever seriously menaced its development. For, while France wished an ultimately modernized, progressive and strong Russia—and feared only the temporary weakness of a Russia in the process of change—Germany preferred a weak and backward Russia for a double reason. It was only such a Russia that would either tolerate monarchic institutions, or allow Germany a free scope to the Near East. Thus while the numerous Germans in Russia were helping to develop the country in detail, they were aware that the German government did not wish Russia to develop too much as a whole—at least until it should fall under German control. For this last mentioned result there were many solid grounds of hope—but only in the future.

The Kaiser desires a weak Russia but a strong Czarism. Literature issued since the war has finally demonstrated what was already clear. He wishes Russia to be economically weak, unable to secure financial aid from without or to improve economic relations unless in a way to create economic dependence on Germany. So while defeat by Japan did not create a revolution and so failed to furnish an excuse for invasion, it did allow Germany to force on Russia, through the pro-German Witte, the notorious pro-German trade treaties of 1905, which are widely held to have been one of the causes for the present war. The Kaiser wishes a Russia strong enough to aid him against Japan, China, and England in the Far East, but not strong enough to dream of interfering with his aspirations (legitimate or illegiti-

mate) in the Near East. He wishes a Russia too pacific to hope to rival German militarism, but military enough to maintain an absolute monarchy—which always and everywhere rests upon militarism. He wants Russia to be divided against itself, especially along racial lines, and—when such divisions are not sufficient—on class lines also. All internal divisions have the double value of strengthening the monarchy against its own people and of weakening it as against other governments.

The Kaiser wants the Czar to be absolute. But in order to maintain his power a certain degree of efficiency is indispensable—and for efficient Absolutism Prussia, of course, is the model.

Here we have the German Government's attitude to the Russian opposition movement. A purely arbitrary mediaeval Czarism, such as that which prevailed before 1905 might not be able to resist democracy effectively. Then let it be replaced by a system of "legal order." The mediaeval reactionaries in Russia held that the Czar cannot be bound even by his own declarations of policy. Let him declare himself so bound and gather his policies into a permanent system. The law would then rule instead of the Czar—though all this law might be entirely in the interest of the Czarism.

And, indeed, the change brought about in Russia was along these lines. Absolutism was not compromised in the smallest degree; it was modernized, that is, Prussianized. The change was almost identical with that which took place in Prussia in 1848, and the two constitutions are now in every essential respect similar. No law is put into effect without the consent of the Duma or Landtag. But administrative orders may be put into effect, and these are far more important in Russia and Prussia than are laws. Moreover, the Duma and Landtag are elected on a suffrage that gives absolute control to that 10 per cent of the population that is most directly dependent on the monarch for its livelihood. To make doubly sure, Russia and Prussia have established two vetoes, one for the aristocratic Upper House, and another for the Crown. And lest any influence, however slight, should be secured over bureaucracy, army, and foreign affairs, these are left entirely in the control of the monarch.

The Kaiser was successful in preventing the evolution of Russian political institutions beyond the point fixed by Prussia—

as a suitable limit for political evolution—in 1848, and successfully maintained to the present day. As Von Buelow, who was German Chancellor at the time, says in his *Imperial Germany*, “the dividing line between the rights of the Crown and of Parliament was immutably fixed.” Both Witte and Stolypine, the Russian Ministers in this period, frankly took Prussian institutions as their model, as do nearly all the ultra-monarchists in Russia, at the same time advocating the most friendly relations with this brother monarch. Indeed, three of the ministers of the Czar—holding the important ministries of the Interior, Justice, and the Holy Synod, were of this view for a whole year after the present war had begun, and were only turned out after the tremendous scandal following the Russian retreat from Poland.

But the Kaiser attained his ends in other directions also. The pro-German Witte said, in my presence and that of another person, that the first Duma would be almost unanimously anti-Semitic. No doubt the wish was father to the thought, for the Germans in Russia are the leaders of the anti-Semitic, anti-Polish, and other movements aiming to keep Russia divided along racial lines. But the first Duma *almost unanimously* decided to give equal rights to the Jews and other races. The second Duma was of the same opinion, until finally in June, 1907, a new election law was promulgated which secured a suitable anti-Semitic majority. But it had been demonstrated that 90 per cent of the Russian people are opposed to all racial discrimination.

Nor was this the whole of the successes gained by Germany in Russia as a result of Russia's defeat by Japan. Not since the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance in 1892 had the highest Court circles contained so many German noblemen. The Czarina's influence (as a German princess) was for long periods preponderant over the anti-German influence of the Empress Dowager. The state police, the secret service, the diplomatic service, were all very largely German. An astonishingly large number of the highest generals were German, and it took months of the war before they were all cleaned out. Most of these individuals were born in Russia, but they have preserved their German connections, have often married in Germany, and were cultivated by the German court. I have already spoken of the Russian reactionary groups, including ministers who, though of

Russian descent, always have been and still are strongly pro-German. Besides these there is a large German landholding interest, and loyal Germans born in Germany furnish a large proportion of the superintendents of large estates and factories.

Perhaps even more amazing than the German influence in Russia's army and diplomatic corps is her hold upon the Russian police. Not only have many of the highest officials been German—for examples, the two highest in Moscow at the time of my visit, whose photographs appear in this volume, both publicly accused of corruption after I had selected them as typical and published their photographs.

The co-operation between the German and Russian police has been strangely complete. Let us trace the possible bearing of this co-operation on the murders of von Plehve, the Czar's Prime Minister, and the Grand Duke Sergius, the Czar's chief adviser, at the time of the Japanese war. These murders were committed with the aid of one Azev, ostensibly the head of the conspirative organization of the Socialist Revolutionists, but later proven—and acknowledged by all parties in Russia—to have been, at the time of the murders, one of the highest officials of the Russian secret police. Why were von Plehve and Sergius murdered? I have never heard an explanation that was even plausible. But it is certain that the wonderfully efficient German police allowed Azev to sojourn in Germany for long periods after his complicity had been proven and publicly confessed. The murdered statesmen were the two most powerful personalities in Russia. The Franco-Russian alliance had withstood the test of the outbreak of the war with Japan as well as the Russian defeat. These statesmen were largely responsible for this result. It is not surprising, then, that the German secret police, who had arrested innumerable Russian Socialists and even German Socialists hostile to the Czar, on the slightest suspicion and without any specific Russian demand, allowed Azev to go free. But if they were accomplices *after* the fact, is it likely that Azev, on his frequent visits to Germany *before* these deeds, had failed to keep in touch with his German intimates?

At any rate it is certain that the Kaiser made known his interest in the war against Japan, and while he could not fail to be pleased at the weakening of Russia that resulted, German

publicists are practically unanimous in deploring the fact that the defeat was so crushing as to turn back Russia's attention from the Far East to the Near East. In the same way the Kaiser could not be displeased to see enough revolutionary movement in Russia to seriously weaken the government and make it dependent upon German aid, or at least on the suspension of German hostility. Such a degree of revolutionism might well have been fostered by the ever alert, efficient, and aggressive agents of Germany. But only an *unsuccessful* revolutionary movement was desired, which would weaken the Czar against foreign foes, while strengthening him in two ways against democratic forces at home—by forcing him, first, to adopt the efficient and legal governmental methods of Prussia, and second, to maintain intact the Russian-Prussian system of police repression.

We are now in a position to see why all educated Russia, outside of two classes, the highest governmental circles and their satellites, and persons with German connections, is so bitterly anti-German as to be willing, apparently, to stand almost any losses in the present war. The educated Russian nearly always knows the German language, has usually travelled and visited in Germany, has often been educated there, and has a more profound admiration for German science, industry and philosophy, than any non-German in the world. But he has nothing but the most extreme dislike for the German Government, not only because of its hostility to Russian foreign interests and its extremely pernicious influence inside of Russia, but also because it represents the model of his Russian oppressors, the ideal of efficient repression they strive after but never hope to attain. Moreover, it does not embody a single one of the great aims of the Russian people as formulated by the first Duma in 1906 by a vote of more than 100 to 1. The Duma demanded equal suffrage. The unequal districts in the Reichstag elections and the fact that Prussia, which contains two-thirds of the German people and exercises the dominating part in the government, has no approach to equal suffrage, show that the Russian people ten years ago rejected with contempt institutions with which a majority of Germans are still satisfied. The Duma demanded by a vote of 100 to 1, in its first public expression (the Speech to the Throne of 1906), a ministry responsible to the Duma and

not to the monarch. A part of the German Reichstag has expressed the same desire, but not a majority. Moreover, the President of the first Russian Duma and a large part of its members went to prison—and some died in Siberia—rather than accept their monarch's arbitrary acts. Nothing of the kind has occurred in Germany in two generations. The Duma demanded by a vote of 100 to 1 that the Members of the Upper House should be elected instead of appointed. If there is such a demand in Germany, it is not put in the foreground by a single one of her political parties.

And finally the first Duma Russia ever had at once demanded, by the same vote of 100 to 1, the overthrow of the landlord nobility, which is the foundation upon which every absolutism is founded. It demanded that the State use the right of eminent domain to hand over all large estates to be used by the agricultural population, whether these estates belonged to the Czar, the State, the Church, or the landowning nobility.

And when the Czar refused to grant any of these demands and dissolved the Duma a majority of its members called upon the people to refuse to furnish soldiers, to pay taxes, or to pay the interest on any further foreign loans to such a government. This measure, the Viborg Manifesto of July, 1906, led to the trial and imprisonment of its signers.

The line of action called for proved to be impracticable. Nevertheless, the Russian people overwhelmingly endorsed the first Duma by electing an even more radical second Duma. And were it not for police violence and governmental interference in the elections it would have been still more radical. Instead of the half-hundred outright revolutionists of the first Duma, the second Duma sent over two hundred—nearly half the whole body. At the same time the radical but non-revolutionary parties were also numerically increased. As a consequence the Czar, finding he could do nothing with a Duma which in any large degree represented the masses and middle class, promulgated, in June, 1907, a new election law by which 90 per cent of the Duma was to be elected by the nobility, the bureaucracy, the clergy, and the wealthy class—an election law very similar in effect to that of Prussia.

The outbreak of the present war undoubtedly closed the First Act of this revolutionary democratic struggle. The Second Act

has already begun. The extreme democratic forces are not much in evidence. But the Liberals of every shade are many times stronger than ever, as the growing power of the leagues of municipal councils and of provincial or rural councils (or zemstvos) demonstrates. Whether Russian defeat or Russian victory or a long drawn out war would most hasten enforced evolution of the Russian Government is the great problem. A too easy or too great victory would certainly be disastrous to the democratic movement, a crushing defeat would certainly cripple Russia economically for many years, and she is poor enough as it is. But neither of these results is to be expected. France and England, as I have shown, will be in a far better position to encourage and assist the Russian Liberals than before the war. There remains, finally, the possibility that monarchism in Germany may be so weakened either externally, internally (or in both directions), that it will be unable to continue to give sufficient aid to the Czar to enable him to maintain his power.

However the war may turn out, the chances are overwhelming that the great democratic movement, the foundation of which is described in these pages, will, as a result of the present international struggle, advance even more rapidly than it did ten years ago — as the result of the far smaller conflict with Japan.

PART ONE

OPPRESSION



CHAPTER I

NICHOLAS, CZAR

Russian People, who journey sad and trembling,
Serfs at St. Petersburg, or at hard labour in the mines,
The North Pole is for your Master, a dungeon vast and sombre;
Russia and Siberia, O Czar! Tyrant! Vampire!
These are the two halves of your dismal Empire;
One is Oppression, the other Despair!

—VICTOR HUGO (*Les Châtiments*)

NICHOLAS II., though born heir to the vast Empire of the Romanoffs and absolute master of a hundred and forty million people, was a most ordinary child. But he was not long allowed to remain normal or ordinary. All the unlimited resources and powers of a Czar's educators from infancy to manhood, were used to convince him that he is the God-born superior to every man in his Empire, and that he has been given the right by God to regulate to the last particular the lives of each one of his one hundred and forty million subjects. Such an education can lead to only one result — with ordinary children.

"I knew a promising young princess," a well-known old courtier told me, "who had inborn progressive ideas. She was given to asking most interesting questions. Her teacher was of course changed, and when I saw her again, a few years later, I did not know her, she was so much like the rest. It is impossible that anything good should come out of that poisonous and misanthropic atmosphere of the Court. I have abandoned hope." So with the Czar. He is a product of his environment. Or, better, he is part and parcel of the whole of the old system. For now that he is on the throne, he is daily creating his environment and his environment is daily creating him.

That Nicholas II., by nature an ordinary, normal man, should have developed into a perfect and willing tool of reaction and an enemy of progress, is a sign that the day for expecting liberty from Czars or benevolent despots has passed. The sustainers

of autocracy have read history and studied revolutions aright. They are now taking no chances with their despots. To prevent his becoming better than those around him, Nicholas, like his uncles and cousins, the notoriously dissolute grand dukes, was scientifically corrupted in his youth. He was allowed several mistresses. A Jewish girl whom he is said to have really loved was torn away from him by the Court. True love is dangerous to despotism, above all love for a member of a persecuted race. His notorious affair with the ballet-dancer, Kshesinkaya, which lasted to the very day of his marriage, was more after his uncle's heart. He was allowed to endow this woman with a palace and a fortune in jewels and gold.

And while his body was being corrupted by fast living and drink, his soul was under the sinister and misanthropic influence of fanatic old Pobiedonostzev, or the half-crazy mysticism of Father John of Cronstadt, who, while still preaching massacre, has now set himself up for a Russian Christ. It is natural that a mind so beclouded should shower honours on the necromancer Phillipe, and, as God-appointed head of the Russian Church, canonise the monk Seraphin, dead now for fifty years, for having interceded with God to send him a male heir.

Nicholas is by education an ordinary absolute monarch, as he is by nature an ordinary man. If he has lightly glorified war, so has William II. If he has publicly announced his hatred of millions of his subjects, has not the German Emperor called a party of three million of his subjects "dogs"? He differs from other autocrats not in his ideas or in his nature, but in his actual crimes. Unfortunately for Nicholas, history offered him the choice either to rise above the monarch to the true man, or else to sink from the level of inhuman feeling and opinion to the definite degradation of criminal acts. Nicholas chose as a Czar, and not as a man. As a consequence the Czarism has been preserved, but at this price, that the Czar has become an accessory before the fact to a policy as black as anything ever dreamed by Machiavelli, and to crimes more horrible than any that have been perpetrated in Europe since the religious wars.

It is said that Nicholas II. is not to be known or judged like ordinary mortals, that he is helpless against the grand dukes,

his family, and the court. But, as was pointed out to me by one of the most honoured and best-informed men in Russia, the Czar has long selected his own court and chosen his own family favourites. "An autocrat can be formed by his environment for a few years," said this man, "but since the age of thirteen Nicholas has himself created his own environment." Nicholas loved the old reactionary advisers left him by his father — his Uncle Sergius, Minister Sipiaguine, and Count Ignatiev. The revolutionists have taken these terrible persons away. He feared Von Plehve, who, before the Czar had yet obtained a secure control of the reins of government, had got a firm hold on the secret police, a position impregnable in a despotism. The revolutionists also solved this problem for him. But he has replaced the reactionaries he loved by new reactionaries.

He became jealous within a few weeks of the popularity of a successful liberal minister like Sviatopolk-Mirski. Witte he always hated, but held to him long because he better than all others could procure gold in billions from Germany and France. His present favourites are all either discreet reactionaries, men of blood and iron like Stolypine, or shameless reactionaries like Kaulbars. Noble leaders of the black league formed for massacres, Bobrinsky, Sherebatov, Apraxin, Konovnitzin, General Bogdanovitch, have constant access to the court. Men of relentless violence, like Prime Minister Stolypine, Deduline, and Durnovo, are given the ministries that hold the real power. Kaulbars, Skalon, Herschelman, and Meller-Zakomelski are entrusted with the fate respectively of Odessa, Poland, Moscow, and the Baltic provinces. They are all cynical, violent, and open reactionaries. It was Herschelman who upset even the military law of the realm by reversing the sentence of a military court, which had let off with a light punishment four drunken peasants who had insulted a policeman. Herschelman had them hanged. When new laws are being prepared it is the reactionary jurists, old Goremykin, Stichinsky, and Durnovo, not real experts, who are taken into the Czar's personal confidence. But above all, to swing the destiny of the tortured and suffering peoples and nations called Russia, one must win the favour of the Czar's boon companions, the extreme reactionaries Prince Orlov and the Queen's Secretary, Prince Putiatin.

Prince Orlov is the Czar's drinking companion, Prince Putiatin is endeared to him as a heritage from his late beloved Uncle Sergius.

Talents for despotism, flattery, and intrigue, these are all of value in securing a commanding position and power in the land of the Czar. "But the only way to succeed permanently," said one of the most trusted and best-known of my informants, "the only certain road is reactionism — open, active, and bitter hatred of progress. Nicholas sometimes tolerates a progressive person for a short time. But he is never really pleased with anything but reaction, movement backward toward his father's régime. All his sympathies are for reactionary things, all his feelings are for reactionary men. This is why we are governed by reactionaries, why Russia may have to go through far worse trials and horrors in the next few years than in those just passed. The Czar is oppressed and weighed down by superior intelligence, because it dwarfs his own ordinary powers. He can't bear it around him. His real favourites have always been, and doubtless always will be, dull and stupid men." Other opinions equally to be respected are in entire accord with this.

"The keynote to the Czar's character," said another authority, "is an inflated hypertrophied self-love, as is natural and almost inevitable with an irresponsible and absolute monarch. This self-love was consciously created in his youth and is purposely developed by all who approach the throne. It is the explanation of every important act of the reign. For instance, it was nothing but the Czar's self-love that brought us the Duma and a few months later took this Duma away."

At enmity with the people, surrounded by dull and brutal persons of his own choosing, endowed himself with a clearly expressed love for violence and the "good old times" of his father Alexander III., what is the use of seeking further Nicholas's political ideas? They are, of course, most rudimentary. His leading idea, expressed in every public utterance, is that his personal desires and the welfare of his immense empire are one and the same thing — that the preservation of his own unlimited, irresponsible, and absolute personal rule, and the maintenance of the riches and irresponsible power of his family and his friends, of the grand dukes, the high officials,

the high clergy, the high nobility and the court, are all entirely consistent with the welfare of the vast and varied peoples of the realm.

It was to the supposed interest of the grand dukes, the Czar's mother, the Russian police, the heads of the army and the court, to declare war against Japan. The nation, almost wholly opposed to the calamitous and terrible enterprise, was not consulted. But the Czar, justly certain that he was acting in accordance with the wishes of his family, his friends, and everybody he respected, entered into the bloody and unprincipled business with a light heart. He said, writes Prince Urussov, that he considered the Japanese attack "like the bite of a flea" and that he was "fully satisfied with the progress of the war" because it would call out an increase of the patriotic spirit, *because the agitation against the Government would cease and it would be easier to maintain order in the State.* This unjust, bloody, unpopular war was brought on, then, by the common human frailties of a single individual — the desire to please his friends and relatives and the determination to maintain his control of his inherited property, Russia, at any cost.

Nicholas happens to be absolute master of the lives and property of one hundred and forty million people, and that they are "the submissive servants" of his will is agreed by all defenders of the autocratic system. Imagine the wrath of such a master when the slaves are in revolt. Rebellious slaves have never been treated as human beings, and their revolts have usually been put down without stint of the utmost cruelties. In Russia, where not even the highest of the nobility have any rights against the Czar, a revolution is quite incomprehensible to the supreme power.

A certain Russian prince, internationally famed for honesty, moderation and public spirit, complained in person to the Czar about the frightful Bielostock massacre. After having shown that the massacre was carried out almost entirely by the soldiers and police, the prince said, "This thing simply cannot continue. It is wrong."

The Czar hesitated long, but finally answered: "Yes, it is wrong. It is wrong. But what can you do? These people are republicans and revolutionists."

The loyal prince excused himself in hopeless despair. "The people of Bielostock are republicans and revolutionists; that justifies any crime against them," thinks the Czar. But nine-tenths of the Russian people are, broadly speaking, revolutionists. The Czar is then simply at war with his own people — unhampered by any usage or principle of civilised humanity or of civilised war.

"What is the exact relation of the Czar to the crimes and horrors that are perpetrated in his name? Is the Czar himself primarily responsible, or are others more to blame?" I asked these questions of the men in Russia best able to answer, and had for my literal replies: "The court is the centre of the 'pogromists' and 'Black Hundreds.' The Czar himself is the chief of the 'hooligans.'" And I found such to be the almost unanimous opinion of Russia's most reliable men.

Prince Urussov, recently governor of Bessarabia, places a full share of the responsibility for the wholesale massacres of 1905 directly on the Czar. "A word from the authoritative mouth of the Emperor or any action would have extraordinarily facilitated the maintenance of order," he writes significantly. But every effort failed to obtain from Nicholas either any kind of declaration condemning the pogroms, or even the suggested manifestation of unspoken sympathy with the victims through some slight monetary present for their relief. "From 1903" writes the prince, "it became plain to all the world that the Czar himself, if not in action, at least in thought and feeling, was an enemy to the Jews."

A recognised enemy to the Jews, yes, but none the less an enemy to the Poles, Armenians, Finns, Letts, and Lithuanians, as the most credited representatives of all these races have testified, and to all the fifty million non-Russian peoples that constitute a full third of his subjects. For the actions and policies that have shown the Czar's attitude to the Jews, the most powerful of the "subject" peoples, have been repeated, almost exactly, toward the rest. A recognised enemy also of the overwhelming majority of the common people of Russian stock, the hundred million peasants and workingmen, as their representatives in the Duma testified. Friend only of the officials, the landlords, the very rich, the few hundred thousand

pampered Cossacks, spies, and police, who altogether constitute the only real foundation of the throne. Friend, also, of the murderers who have carried out the massacres that have drenched the land in blood. Nicholas is no mere onlooker. To be sure he has not taken part in the shooting, as did Charles IX. in the massacre of St. Bartholomew, but he is literally throwing open the prison doors for all who have murdered "in his name." The pogromists at Kertch, at Volsk, at Nijni Novgorod, in Volhynia, in Bessarabia, at Tula, and a dozen other places, though sentenced by the local courts, have all been fully pardoned by the Czar. The Czar's pardon for three Kharkov assassins who murdered a lawyer in his home, carried with it an even more open excitation to a repetition of the act in the words, "A pardon is extended to X, Y, and Z, the men who killed the miscreant *revolutionary Jew*."

One of the chief organisers of the great Odessa massacre of October, 1905, when nearly a thousand were killed and wounded, was at last got behind the bars. The circuit court could not declare him innocent. It sentenced him, however, to only eight months' imprisonment. He soon received the full pardon of the Czar. Numerous other pardons followed, until the daily massacres in that city increased to the point that brought a diplomatic disgrace to the Russian Government. The combined foreign consuls felt impelled to raise a protest; it, however, accomplished nothing. Nearly every day shows one or more open and cold-blooded murders to be attributed directly to the unmistakable approval of the Czar. The chief of police, Novitzki, was finally forced to telegraph Stolypine: "It is not possible for the police to fight successfully against secret leagues which are *led by persons who guarantee the members impunity for crime*."

In Odessa the Government and the murderous League of Russian Men have become practically one. The local president of the league, Count Konovnitzin, is the aid-de-camp of the governor-general, Kaulbars; the latter is a member of the executive council and its meetings are often held in his palace. Nicholas himself is an honorary member of the League. A delegation, headed by the mayor, recently sent by desperate Odessa to the court to complain against the league's atrocities

was received by the Czar wearing on his breast the emblem of the League of Russian Men. That emblem was significant of his answer: he has delivered the great port of Odessa, with its half million of inhabitants, to the tender mercies of the League.

To the delegation which presented him his badge (and one for his little heir), together with an address setting forth the "loyal" and anti-semitic purposes of the organisation, Nicholas answered: "Thank in my name all the Russian people who have joined the league." Stolypine reported recently to the Czar that 60 per cent. of this notorious league was recruited from the criminal classes and scarcely $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. were educated persons. On Stolypine's report Nicholas wrote: "The league is the most loyal of all the parties and the most useful to the Government. It would be well to be patient and to give it time to improve and correct itself."

Dr. Dubrowin, president of the league and editor of its St. Petersburg organ, the *Russian Flag*, was asked recently the practical way out of Russia's difficulties. The justly notorious doctor replied: "It is necessary to hang eleven foremost leaders whom I could name, two hundred secondary leaders and three thousand party workers." To the question as to who could be found to execute such a cruel sentence, he answered: "The League of Russian Men would have the courage to do it." Dubrowin has made it clear that he reckons among those to be killed not only beloved popular leaders like Anikine and Aladdin, but also moderates like the economist Herzenstein, already assassinated by the league, if not by Dubrowin's own personal order. No Russian revolutionist has ever made a proposal of wholesale butchery — their victims are the victims of a guerilla war. It is not the revolution for freedom that has produced the Russian Marat. It is the criminal counter-revolution personally patronised by the Czar.

At first it was proposed to make Nicholas himself one of the three members of the league's executive board. Later the position was given to the Czar's new favourite and spiritual adviser, the priest Vostorgov. This "orthodox Christian" fire-eater stirred up race-wars in the Caucasus until he was forced to flee from the enraged people. Though only a common priest, he has now taken the place of sinister old Pobiedonostzev as the

theorist of arbitrary autoocracy and reaction and the spiritual consoler of the court — while at the same time he guides the league for massacre. The Czar in appreciation has heaped exceptional ecclesiastical honours on his head and has given him a place in the Holy Synod. With the coming of Vostorgov it can at last be said that the League's end, the fusion of the "true Russian people" with the "Most High," has at last been accomplished.

The title "Most High" sounds almost blasphemous. But in the eyes of the advocates of absolutism the Czar can be guilty of no blasphemy, just as he can be guilty of no crime. What he does is not only right, but sacred. The heads of the Church are his servants, as much subject to his orders as any peasants. The Czar has been given by God the care also of his subjects' souls. Every important ukase, even if on a purely political subject, is read from every village pulpit along with the rest of "God's word," likewise emanating from the whims and dictation of Nicholas and other Czars. Every expression and activity of life, every book, every newspaper, every school, every church or private society, must be forced and distorted to express absolute obedience, submission, subjection, and servility to the Czar.

If a man in whom such a megalomania is cultivated from early childhood is not engaged personally in hunting down his subjects like Charles IX., it must be attributed to court custom rather than to anything in the conscience of the Czar. Young German barons around him who have led man-hunts against peasants they have harried into rebellion, receive his full sympathy, approval, and even promotion for their actions; while those who do not take a lively interest in such work are quickly marked with imperial disfavour and disgrace. This bloody business has gone so far that many who in the past have been reactionary or circumspect enough to rise to the highest rank, are now drawing back in horror and disgust. Not so the Czar, and no titles such a renegade may bear, no services rendered, can save him from the imperial wrath.

To an officer reporting a rather bloodless "pacification" in the west, the Czar replied after a long meditative silence: "Just the same, you have killed too few, you have killed too

few." To General Kazbek, reporting a similarly bloodless success against the revolutionists, the Czar listened without a word. After having given his report, the general was leaving and was already near the door when he heard a low, harsh voice behind him. He turned immediately round; the Czar was following him with a wolfish stride, and hissing through his closed teeth: "You ought to have fired just the same, general! You ought to have fired just the same!"

The famous General Subbotich, a member of the general staff and recent governor-general of Turkestan, not only did not shed any blood in his province but scandalised the court by making several speeches in which he promised that the Czar would carry out his promises expressed in the October Manifesto and soon begin the work of reform. He was removed from his office and robbed of his dignities and pension without any statement of the cause. He demanded a trial by courts-martial, and was refused. He was told only that he had not taken measures to suppress the revolution, and that the Emperor "had deigned to refuse to let him know the tenor of the accusations against him." He announced himself as a candidate to the Duma from the most conservative class of St. Petersburg, consisting of 2,000 members carefully selected by the Government, and received more than eight hundred of their votes. This vote is an evidence of the fact that the bitterness of all classes has reached such a point that only a bare half even of the most favoured and privileged can be persuaded to stand for the bloodthirstiness of the Czar.

The Czar has also his minor heroes of violence. A certain cadet heard disrespectful words about his sacred Majesty on the street. He struck the speaker two blows on his head with his bayonet and the latter sank to the ground. The Czar wrote with his own hand on the war minister's report to express his thanks for this "praiseworthy action" as he called it. A certain cavalry officer, a passenger on a local steamer, called the members of the Duma "rascals," entered into a quarrel with his fellow-passengers and finally opened fire with his revolver, seriously wounding a waiter before he was disarmed. His term was shortened by his Majesty's favour to three months' police arrest. A soldier shot a girl prisoner dead through the head for looking

out of the prison window against the rules. He was sent a present of five dollars by the Czar. Since then this act has been repeated by the wholesale in all parts of the country.

Nicholas II. is a criminal in the eyes of his people. In all sections, among all classes, among rich and poor, townspeople and countrypeople, the educated, the business men, and priests, there is one dominating opinion about the Czar — that he bears to the full his share of the responsibility for the monstrous system of crime and plunder called the Russian Government, that he is neither better nor worse than the average of his predecessors, and that nothing better is to be expected from his successors since even the Czars themselves are products of the Czarism it is sought to destroy. The people have no desire to wait until the Czarism produces a ruler who is not a Czar.

CHAPTER II

HOW CZARS GOVERN

IT IS not permissible to dip far into Russian history in the course of this review of present-day conditions. But we can thoroughly grasp the deep-seated and almost unconscious feeling of Russia about her rulers, only when we recall what kind of Czars the Czarism has actually produced. The first great Czar was Ivan the Terrible. He was a successful Czar and did Russia the inestimable service of driving out the Tartars and more than doubling the extent of the realm. But when he was not crushing the Tartars he was literally crushing the souls and bodies of his own people. He was trained purposely in his childhood to make what was then considered the strongest type of Czar, a man whose very name was to cause fear and submission among his subjects — and this principle of government not alone by the strong arm, but by fear of it, by “terror,” remains a leading principle of the Czar’s Government to-day. We have seen that Nicholas still demands bloodshed instead of unconditional surrender, and we shall see that this principle is not merely one of the chief policies of State but the very basis of the whole governmental system.

Ivan set an example of Czarism that has never since been equalled — though, to be sure, most of his actions have been repeated frequently since his time. When as late as the middle of the sixteenth century Ivan wiped the half-free and the half-democratic towns of Pskov and Novgorod off the map, he did not ask for surrender, but practised deliberate and continuous tortures for the space of five weeks, in which time, one chronicle says, he put to death in one of the towns, men, women and children to the number of sixty thousand. Moscow, in 1570, was treated to similar tortures, at which Ivan as usual assisted in person, piercing many to death with his hunting spear. The scene was on the great sacred place in Moscow, afterward

christened the Red Square, in front of the famous sacred church erected after Ivan's own plans and clearly announcing his insanity, but which has served ever since as a cherished model for the Czars, like so many of the traditions of this age.

Ivan's practice was to make a public spectacle of his "executions," but on this great occasion the instruments of torture and pots for boiling people alive frightened the public away, and they had to be brought back by main force to witness the performance. Men were tortured by the wholesale in all ways known to human ingenuity, and, what is rarer in modern history, a show was made of the disgrace and tortures of women and girls, a feature entirely in accord with the wild and cruel private orgies of this Czar. After torture and disgrace the women and girls were killed either by having red-hot spears thrust into their bodies, or by Ivan's own instrument. Philip, metropolitan of Moscow and head of the Church, he had burned to death for refusing to bless him after his debauchery and crimes, the court chancellor was cut to pieces, the treasurer boiled alive, and a certain prince lingered impaled on stakes for fifteen hours while his mother was shamed by the soldiers before his eyes.

Ivan's cruelties doubtless somewhat exceeded what might be calculated even by the most cold-blooded despot as useful to the maintenance of his power, but the fact remains that he was successful in increasing the might of the Czarism both at home and abroad, and his example has not been without its influence on later Czars. To Peter the Great also, who ruled more than a hundred years later, human life was nothing. He repeated almost exactly several of the tortures devised by Ivan, as well as the executions "in person." He also caused the death of his own son Alexis. Fortunately, however, Peter the Great was a man of ideas. If the building of St. Petersburg cost as many unnecessary lives as the destruction of Novgorod, there was at least a more positive result. Peter also had less time for cruelty than Ivan, since he was busied with what he considered, often rightly, to be real affairs of State. But like Ivan he governed by execution, torture and terror, enjoyed the cruelty in person, and indulged in as bestial and wholesale debauchery

as the world has known. In one respect he went farther than Ivan, insisting on forcing on all the nation every detail of his arbitrary and sometimes even whimsical "will." By regulating every detail of his subjects' lives, even to the cut of their beards, he reduced every individual of the nation to the position of his personal servant or serf.

Catharine II. was scarcely less debauched than Peter, and scarcely less cruel to the great mass of her subjects. But, though she undoubtedly caused the death of her husband and many others for whom she felt enmity, she showed as a rule a woman's gentleness to those immediately about her. However, as these last were her companions in luxury and debauch, the nation had little benefit from the descent of the great Empress to this ordinary virtue of the human race. Her successor, Paul, reverted to the arbitrariness of Peter. It would be more interesting to show the disastrous effects of this reversion on the people, which finally led to his assassination, than the ridiculous forms it took in his personal behaviour. But it is personal character than concerns us for the moment, and nothing reveals his character better than his compelling his subjects to kneel, in dust, rain, mud, or snow, to his holy person when his carriage passed; and he even snatched a cap from an infant's head when a nurse did not know how to honour his presence.

There can be little doubt that Alexander I. was privy to the murder of his father, and his reign, thus begun so thoroughly in the tradition of the Czars, was in perfect accord with his predecessors'. Europe, always densely ignorant of all things Russian and most hopelessly in the dark about the true character of the Czars, for some time took Alexander I. for a liberal, as it had taken Peter and Catharine, and has since taken Alexander II. and the present Czar. The original basis for this conception was slim; later the conception became absurd, for Alexander formed the Holy Alliance to battle against every great idea the French Revolution had introduced, and Russia became the mainstay of the reaction in Europe until her defeat, fifty years later, in the Crimean War and her replacement at this post of honour by Prussia and the German Empire of to-day. It was Alexander who added the Prussian military discipline and servitude to the other burdens of the nation. In his military



A TYPICAL BUREAUCRAT

Nominally a city police chief, in reality a Vice-Czar.



colonies the new militarism was combined with serfdom, till it became a full penal system of forced labour.

Nicholas I. brought the new military serfdom to its perfection, to the envy of Prussia and other "military" powers; and he went even further and applied this system to the post-office and other public service, to several industries and to the mines. When Nicholas's army crushed the liberties of Hungary in 1849, his generals, Haynau and others, were so cruel that even Turkey refused to give up the refugees, and America finally felt impelled to carry Kossuth away on a frigate of the Government.

Alexander II. again, who was forced to emancipate the serfs by the failure of the Crimean War and the impossibility of creating a modern army or raising the taxes under the old régime, was known as a liberal in Europe until his barbarous suppression of the Polish insurrection. It was only because he had taken away the very slight liberties he had granted that a group of revolutionists robbed him of his life. This revolutionary act in turn stirred the reactionary forces in the Empire to make a "martyr" of him, and gullible Europe, which for years had turned away from him in disgust, again took up his cause and still does honour to his memory as a "liberal" Czar. Alexander III., the present Czar's father, was a typical Czar, without any special talents, blindly devoted to reaction, absolutism, and the narrowest conception of the Church, surrounded by dull and servile flatterers and leading the narrowest personal life, absorbed in trivialities and drink. It was this stagnant, suffocating atmosphere that produced the "heroes" of the present reign — its half-crazy or sinister fanatic priests; its demoniacal and all-powerful police heads, von Plehve and Trepov; the organisers of the statesmanship of persecution of subject races, Ignatiev and the Grand Duke Sergius; the first theoretical defenders of absolutism, Absakov and Leontieff, who sought to keep out of the policy of the Russian State the new and "obnoxious principle of seeking the material and moral welfare of the human race."

Russia has learned something from her Czars. She has learned that it is one-man power itself that is wrong. Nearly all thoughtful Russians feel that the concentration of govern-

mental power in the hands of a single man is the worst curse that can befall a people. They know that the only possible defence of such a system is based on a lie, a radical misconception of the nature of the human individual and the race. And they know that the first result of this lie is to distort, corrupt, or pervert the mind and character of the ruler himself, so that there can be no benevolent despot unless by chance, and that such a despot, if intelligent, would have to deny despotism itself, and, if honest, put it to an end. In Russia there is no Napoleonic worship, no "great man" theory, no demand for, and no blind faith in, all-powerful leaders. There is too much similarity, as far as the masses of the people are concerned, between the reigns of the Czar-genius Peter and the lunatic Ivan the Terrible, between the reactionary "liberal" Nicholas II. and the conqueror of Napoleon and the French Revolution, Alexander I.

The present revolutionary movement of the Russian nation must have arisen under any Emperor. It is directed against Czarism rather than against any particular Czar. But in so far as the Russian ruler is really Autocrat and Czar, that is, in proportion as he rules by his own will and not that of the people, he is the living embodiment of the despotism. The present Czar, all future Czars, must stand or fall with the system of which they are a part. Since Nicholas II. remains head, or at least centre, of the old system, since he refuses to abdicate or share his power, and since he is neither a degenerate nor a weakling under duress, he must bear his share of the great crimes of the system of which he is a part.

This is the judgment of the Russian people. It is the judgment of their leaders and noted men: of writers like Tolstoi, Gorki, Korolenko, and Andreief; of public men of international fame like Kovalevski, Roditchev, Prince Dolgorukov and Milyoukov; of conservative leaders like Shipov, Stachovitch, Count Heyden, Prince Trubetzkoi, and Prince Lvov; of the liberal parish priesthood and its leaders, Father Petrov and the Archimandrite Michael; of recent governors and ministers and generals like Urussov, Kutler, and Subbotich—in fact, of practically every public man of the first rank outside of the Government service. Not only the masses of the Russian people, then,

but its best brain and soul are in revolt against both Czarism and against Nicholas II., because he is Czar.

This slow-witted, self-centred reactionary and blood-loving tyrant is recognised by the Russian nation as its most deadly enemy, not because he is stronger or more vicious than many others in high places in the State, but because he is on account of his position and his power the centre of the system that it is costing the country's best life-blood to destroy; not because he is any worse than his predecessors, or because his successors can be expected to turn out any better than he, but just because there lives in him and breathes in all his actions the very spirit of "the Czar."

But if Nicholas is no better than the machine by which he "governs," certainly the machine is no better than the Czar. In every-day life the Czarism exists only in the form of millions of irresponsible officials directing every detail of life even to the commonest business affairs — officials who get their directions either from the senseless, confused, and lifeless orders of irresponsible and neglected bureaus, or from the protégés of the court, who without the slightest thought given to their capacity or achievement have caught the eye of a favourite, or of the favourite of a favourite, of the Czar.

The court is the first and most indispensable support to the throne. Here is the mother, here are the uncles, the father's advisers and all the sure and tried supporters of the former Czars — the only channel in a Czarism or purely personal government through which the ruler can get even a slight idea of his nation. Nearly all the members of the court are of course also members of the bureaucracy. Some to be sure are merely rich idlers, such as ornamented the court in France before the revolution. Others hold sinecures, are called assistant ministers and appear at the bureaus a few times in a week, or attend the occasional meetings of some very honourable commission without any real function or power. Whether they are suited for it or not, those persons nearest the Emperor are usually given positions of exalted power. One grand duke is head of the army, another of the navy. The Russian Supreme Court, called the Senate, is filled with such men alone as happen to have been in the most intimate relations with the Czar, his father, or some grand duke.

The Czar must have some system or machine by which he expresses his power, and carries out the details of "government." This system, before the days of Peter the Great, was a sort of despotic feudalism; since that time it has been a bureaucracy of the Prussian type. This bureaucracy had to be made an integral part of Czarism, and this was accomplished not alone by sending the court into the bureaucracy, but by bureaucratising the court. Now the court and bureaucracy are inseparable. The court represents the unlimited and arbitrary power of the Czars over the lives and property of the people, the bureaucracy the only method by which it is possible for the Czar and the court to profit from this power. The army, the police, all governors and vice-czars, all those who have the right to exercise to the full the Czar's arbitrary power — that is to say, all the human tools necessary for defending by force the hated bureaucracy — all these are under the direct control of the Czar, subject neither to Dumas nor to bureaucratic ministries. On the other hand, all the tax-gathering, borrowing from abroad, all the banking, railway, and other business for supporting the arbitrary power of the court and the Czar, are necessarily systematised under the Government bureaus.

Peter's new bureaucratic machine of course immensely increased the work of the Government. New departments arose one after another, until finally the biggest businesses like railroads and banking fell into the hands of the State. Some of the most costly departments, the political courts, prisons, and police, the army of rural guards, the censorship, could not prove of any possible service in an intelligently organised and democratic society. With industrial development new sources of taxation were discovered; sugar, tobacco and petroleum were made to produce immense sums, and the entire profit of the liquor industry was taken over in the form of a monopoly by the State. Such of these profits and taxes as finally reached the central treasury were again the source of innumerable easily earned incomes in the "administration." Modern equipment, for instance, must be supplied and applied in the army and a modern fleet created. "Self-made" bureaucrats began to accumulate fortunes in plunder, with the aid of which they became irresistible in the most aristocratic society. Soon there

were more rich and successful bureaucrats in the court than there were pampered courtiers in the bureaucracy. Now, indeed, most of the ministers and chiefs of departments come from the former class. But the distinction is only superficial. In the long run the successful courtier must know how to make his way by means of the bureaus, must understand how to "govern" as it is understood by the loyal supporters of the Czars; while a successful bureaucrat can only meet a miserable end if he is not at the same time a true courtier, a believer in the reactionary principles of Czarism and a proved expert in the practice of irresponsible despotism.

The corruption of the court from the grand dukes down, the inefficiency of the bureaucracy, are proverbial. But this corruption of individuals is a commonplace, hardly worse than what exists in many other countries. If the Czar should ever succeed, as he no doubt desires, since it is the Czarism itself which is being despoiled, in developing a rigid system of inspection and control of Government bureaus irresponsible to the people, there would still remain the wholesale legal robbery and oppression that arises from the Czarism's mere existence.

The present Russian Government is a product of historical evolution. The main determining factor in its development from the beginning has been not the welfare of Russia, but that of each privileged class in exact proportion to its nearness to the throne. Every bureau of the Government is based on this principle; all are more or less anti-social in the very foundation of their methods and organisation, and in the training of their personnel. A high position is attained only through the sacrifice of many elementary principles of personal honesty and of reasonable, not to say legal, administration. It is held only by a complete abandonment of every principle for that of the mere preservation of the power of the Czar, the bureaucracy and the court, the maintenance of the Czarism.

CHAPTER III

THE CZARISM STRUGGLING FOR EXISTENCE

FULLY to picture the Czarism as a single whole and realise its life-principle, one must see it at the moment of a death-struggle to preserve its existence. Such a struggle began with the present revolutionary movement just before the war with Japan, reached its culmination with the Czar's Manifesto, and has by no means entirely subsided at the present time.

The negation of autocracy is constitutional government. If a constitution places any essential part of the Czar's power finally in the hands of the people or of a given social class the unlimited "autocratic" rule of the Czar has disappeared, since he may always be forced to terms with the new power. The promises of the Manifesto were so broad that it seemed to many that the beginning of a constitution had been granted and that the autocracy was a thing of the past. The 17th of October, 1905 (October 30th Western calendar), was then an intensely critical moment in the history of the autocracy, and this was fully realised by nearly all the court, bureaucracy, and other defenders of the old power. In the desperate battle for its existence that ensued, not only the organisation of the Czarism and its policy, but its very soul is exposed.

At this supreme moment the Czarism pulled itself together as a single man, called to the aid of the court and bureaucracy the only other classes from which support can be safely relied on, the land-owning nobility and the dregs of the city population, and fell back on the traditional policy of the Czars — i.e., to promote civil war by official lying and the machinery of the Government, and then to step in and crush the divided forces of the people. For this purpose any line of cleavage will do, religion, race, or social class. "Patriotism" is the general term employed by the Government to rouse and justify all such conflicts. Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Mohammedans,

and Russian dissenting creeds are not patriotic because they do not belong to the Orthodox Church. Poles, Jews, Armenians, and Germans, though they speak Russian and have lived in Russia a century or centuries, are foreigners. College graduates, professional men, and factory workmen had no part in old Russia and are rarely inclined toward the Czar; they are suspected classes in the official propaganda — they, too, are unpatriotic.

But patriotism, Orthodoxy, and Czarism are not sufficiently concrete conceptions to bind the whole of the reactionary movement together. There was need of a common enemy — an arch enemy, present everywhere, always more or less active. This enemy has been found in the Jews. For notwithstanding the confining of the majority of the Jews in one section of the country, the Pale, the minority is scattered everywhere and is everywhere pressing into the newest occupations and movements, and like all others of the oppressed nationalities is in universal opposition to the Czarism.

The whole philosophy, character, morality, and programme of the autocracy is expressed, then, in the cry "Down with the Jews." When in the height of its prosperity the Czarism has no need of popularity, it announces no programme and no philosophy. But when it is in need of popular aid, of loyal support and sacrifice other than such as it can command always from the nobility bought with privileges, or from the dregs bought with drink, it has resort to the cry "Down with the Jews"; and as conditions vary it adds, "and with Poles," or "and with the intellectuals," or even "with the workingmen." This invariably brings together the reaction as a man, and appealing, as it will be shown later, to the lowest passions of the non-reactionary classes, almost invariably draws a few of their weakest and most depraved members. There is not a criminal or degenerate impulse of mankind that is not played upon to maintain the integrity of "Holy Russia" and the power of the "Most High." Personal revenge, lust, crazy fanaticism, incredible superstition and ignorance, depravity in drink, desire for social position, greed, or mere envy and prejudice fanned to a flame of murderous hatred, are all motives to which a Czarism struggling for existence makes its daily call.

The propaganda begins necessarily with the secretly spoken

approval of the Czar himself, but it is also openly manifest to all in the numberless laws specially directed against the Jews. When Prince Urussov was sent to Kishinev directly after the massacre there, in response to the world-wide demand for a more liberal governor, he was warned by the Czar's famous Minister von Plehve to show "less sentimental friendship for the Jews." In a long talk with the Czar at this time the prince was unable to get from him any expression whatever on the Jewish question and had to drop all reference to the recent pogrom on account of the manifest displeasure of the Czar. It was clearly agreed between Nicholas and Plehve that the latter was to handle this vital matter. But there was no reason then, and there has been none since, to suggest any discord on this subject between the two. The attitude of all high officials and those most likely to know the Czar's will was, says Prince Urussov, "either to remain silent or to justify the position towards the pogroms reflected in the Russian anti-semitic press, and which therefore appeared in a certain sense binding on all persons in public service."

The impression of the highest officials spread down through every servant of the Government to the least privileged elements of the population. "We have come to carry out the Czar's will that we should massacre the Jews," said a crowd of peasants when asked by an official at the time of the massacre why they had come to Kishinev. This interpretation of the "Czar's will" certainly had a plausible basis, thinks Prince Urussov, in the numberless legal and illegal persecutions of the Jews by the officials and their denunciation by the highest persons in the land. For instance, these peasants could have read in Krushevan's paper, which was permitted by the censor, and subsidised by the Government both before and after the pogrom, the following:

Down with the Jews! Massacre these bloody monsters wallowing in Russian blood!

Act so that they will recall the Odessa pogrom, where the troops themselves helped us. This time they will help too, inspired as they are here by the love of Christ!

Brothers, lend us your strong arms!

Massacre these vile Jews!

We are already numerous.

[Signed] THE PARTY OF WORKINGMEN,
Who are true Christians.



HOUSE ARREST

The mildest treatment usually allotted to progressive leaders

As a reward for this and similar work Krushevan was afterward elected to the Duma with the aid of the officials and the Czar's Bessarabian favourites, Pureschevitch and the Krupenskys. Indeed, when Governor Urussov complained against this paper to the chief of the newspaper censorship, Senator Swerew, a trusted adviser of the Czar, he had for answer that Krushevan's tendencies and activities had *a sound basis*. Did not the peasants have good reason for assuming that the massacre was the will of the Czar?

The semi-official massacres that accompanied the Czar's Manifesto of Liberty were not a chance outburst of reactionary passion. They were not dictated by a mere desire of the reactionaries for revenge, but by the old and deep-laid plot to create a counter-revolution. They were the one possible solution of the crisis accepted by all the extreme reactionaries of the Empire. Furthermore, they did not spring directly out of the Manifesto. Soon after the January massacre of 1905 in St. Petersburg, and many months before the Manifesto, public opinion had already brought Nicholas to promise the rather empty form of an elected but purely *consultative* national council. To counteract the danger of this concession, arrangements had already been made to give the autocracy a new basis in a popular counter-revolutionary uprising, or wholesale massacres of intellectual leaders, Jews and organised workingmen, with the aid of the police, the Cossacks, and a part of the priests, the black monks. But owing to the unexpected general strike and necessity of signing of the Manifesto, the date fixed for the massacres had to be set forward. The Manifesto granted, the signal for the postponed murder was given.

The day following the Manifesto, at a hundred different points at once, the wholesale and prearranged massacres of men, women, and children began. Everywhere the bloody work was carried on by small bands of ruffians organised and led by the police and protected by the troops.

Urussov, as assistant to Witte, unearthed and exposed to the Duma and the whole world the direct responsibility of Trepov, Ratchkovsky, the head of the police, and many others of the Czar's favourites, in these massacres. Conclusive evidence in incriminating the police is scarcely lacking in one of the hundred

places where the massacres occurred. Lopuchin, the chief of the police department at the time, has come out with his statement that "Government officials have systematically prepared Jewish and other massacres. The facts were given to Witte and verified by another official . . . and one proclamation was approved in writing by Wuitch, head of the secret police."

The prefect of Sebastopol received on the 17th of October, the very day of the Manifesto, a telegram, signed Trepov, enjoining him not to publish the Manifesto before receiving money for a "patriotic (reactionary) demonstration." A few days later he received sixty thousand rubles for this purpose and a suggestion that he should retire the police. Similar telegrams were sent in all directions by the highest officials and favourites.

These exposures in the Duma effected absolutely nothing. Trepov remained in office until his final sickness. The chief of the police is still in daily contact with the Czar. The court favourites are still the court favourites. The local governors and police who more or less actively took part in the massacres have largely been promoted and rewarded in person by the Czar. The actual murderers Nicholas is now letting out of jail by twos and threes and dozens, as a direct act of grace from the throne at a time when on grounds of public policy pardons are refused to all other persons.

At the time of the opening of the third Duma the country was quiet enough to bring some of the massacres and many of the revolutionary disturbances before the courts. It is significant to compare the wholesale sentences of revolutionists with the fate of the pogrom murderers. On December 7, 1907, to give a typical instance, there appeared in the same issue of the Russian papers two official telegrams, one about the trial and sentences of sixty-two sailors that had mutinied a few weeks before at Vladivostock, the other of fifty-four ruffians that had participated in the murderous pogrom of October, 1905, in Mohilev. Twenty-four of the ruffians were freed, twenty-four condemned to short terms of the mildest form of arrest, five to prison for less than eighteen months, and one to four years of forced labour. Of the sailors twenty were condemned to be shot, twenty were condemned to terms of forced labour far more severe than that of the one scapegoat ruffian just mentioned, and sixteen were

sentenced to arrest. Thus sharply does the Russian Government distinguish between a courageous revolt in the name of a high principle, and the cowardly massacre of unarmed men, women, and children in the name of racial hate.

The higher criminals, as I have said, were never even sentenced. Major Bugadowsky of the gendarmes was proved before the first Duma to have endeavoured to gain the favour of the St. Petersburg authorities by pointing out that he had caused to be widely distributed a proclamation calling on "all true Russian people, those who are for the Czar, the Fatherland, and the Orthodox faith," to gather together at the first alarm at a designated place "with arms, scythes, and pitchforks" and to hurl themselves under "the holy image and the portrait of the Czar" on the common enemy. The major, confident of approval, explained in his report that he had done "all in his power" to give the proclamations a wide circulation, as they would have "a happy influence on the peasantry." Stolypine explained to the Duma that the major had been called to St. Petersburg, but as the massacre did not actually take place he could not judicially be held responsible! "As to the rewards he received," added the Czar's mouthpiece, "they were for having reëstablished order."

Twenty-six provincial governors, all appointed in person by the Czar, were involved. Of these not one has been punished to this day, and the two or three that were removed from the reach of local vengeance were rewarded with high dignities elsewhere. The governor of Minsk, for example, has been made a member of the council of the interior with a large salary. On the contrary, all who did not aid in the massacres were removed by the Czar; as, for instance, the prefect of Sebastopol, Admiral Spitzky, who organised a militia to protect the defenceless population; the governor of Samara, who would not allow the lieutenant-governor to bring the massacres into execution; the governor of Ufa, who was removed for complaining to the prime minister against the preparations for the massacres; the governor of Terek, who, when asked by a personage he does not name but "too high to refuse" to prepare a massacre, preferred to be relieved of his office. These cases of forced resignations continue without interruption.

Before the whole Witte ministry was forced out, Ministers Kutler and Tolstoi had abandoned all hope of the Czar and thrown up their offices. Other self-respecting men, about the same time and since, have refused to accept these humiliating ministerial positions, including the new influential leader Gutchkov. These conservative leaders, among the strongest men in Russia, have refused to become ministers, as I learned from one in person, just because they know the Czarism and the Czar. The position is too humiliating for an honest and self-respecting man.

It is not necessary that a minister should himself be in direct relations with the "patriotic" leagues, as is usually the case. He may even be on unfriendly terms with them, but at least he must be tolerant. Often the right hand taketh not the responsibility for what the left hand doeth. Witte played the part of a liberal. His minister of the Interior, Durnovo, was the most reactionary the country has had since von Plehve. I was told by a minister that the two disagreed in every cabinet meeting. "But," he reassured me, "Witte gets his way in three cases out of ten." In the other seven cases Durnovo was arresting workingmen for mere membership in the trade unions, sending out Cossack expeditions in all directions among the peasantry to revenge the landlords for property destroyed, and exiling hundreds of persons a day into Siberia or the mines on the mere suspicion of the police. Lopuchin has proved that Witte was informed of the preparations for massacre and neither took effective measures to prevent them nor honourably resigned. Witte even claimed in my presence and that of a third person that it was not the Government but the whole nation that was aroused against the Jews!

Stolypine's brother, editor of the chief reactionary organ in Russia, although he finds inadmissible the permanent coöperation of the Government with the murderers, confesses that in a crisis there is "no other choice than an appeal to the League of Russian Men." To save the Czar and Czarism, then, the minister must always be ready to descend to the principles of the St. Bartholomew massacre, the Mafia or the Spanish Inquisition. This is why, since the beginning of the Stolypine ministry, a helping hand has been frequently extended to the League

from the Central Government, to say nothing of the intimate relations encouraged in almost every local government between the officials and the local leaders of the league. This is also why, in both Duma elections under the Stolypine régime, the league has been favoured in every possible manner. Its local branches all over Russia were twice endowed with large sums directly by the Government, its conservative rivals were appealed to by the St. Petersburg authorities to ally themselves with the league in the elections, and in many places all popular or liberal rivals were crushed by the arbitrary arrest of the candidates or the wholesale striking of electors off the lists.

After the great massacres following the Manifesto, there was a brief respite. There were two reasons for postponing further killings. One was the financial needs of Russia. Too much bloodshed would have made it difficult for Russia to borrow the billion rubles she obtained from France and other countries the following spring. Too many official crimes would have made the Duma elections impossible, or made them still less favourable to the Government, and would have destroyed the object for which the Duma was created, to give the Czarism an artificial credit abroad for money and military allies. Notwithstanding these weighty reasons, it was all that Witte could do to restrain the Czar's over-zealous friends in the bureaucracy and the court. The plotting and planning went on, as was exposed later in the Duma by Prince Urussov. Finally the "patriots," patience gave way and the world was treated to the grandiose massacre of Bielostock. In this three days' massacre nearly a hundred persons were killed and as many more seriously mutilated.

The Bielostock pogrom was foreseen, as pogroms always are, several days before it occurred, and the leading and most respected citizens did all they could to persuade the local authorities to stop it. They obtained little satisfaction. Governor Kister, when complained to, refused to do anything; and even after his brief visit to Bielostock by a special train during the massacre, the slaughter continued. He doubtless knew he would not be permitted to act. The chief of police, Rodetzki, who was opposed to the pogrom, resigned on the very morning of the massacre and was replaced by a "surer" man.

Shortly before the massacre one of the colonels stationed at Bielostock said to his soldiers: "You are defending the Czar and the Fatherland. The Jews want to kill you. They have decided to exterminate you to the last man. I announce to you that *the authorities give you the right to do whatever you please on the 21st of this month.*" This colonel knew his Government and his Czar. He knew he would be thanked for his bloody work and given other opportunities in the future to rise. He was not disappointed — as we shall see.

The Bielostock pogrom was fully investigated and exposed by the Duma, then in session. The Duma branded the official report as a tissue of lies. The investigators found that the troops were present, calm and impassible, at all the crimes of the massacre. While the police and ruffians murdered, mutilated and plundered, they swept the streets with volleys "to keep away the Jews." The Duma decided that the pogrom was not only due to the officials, *but solely due to them*, that, contrary to the Government report, there was no racial, religious, or economic enmity between the Christians and the Jews, that this hatred existed only among the police; that the police knew all about the preparation for the massacre, and they themselves murdered and robbed; and that the troops shot down peaceable men, women, and children without the slightest cause.

But the Czar knew how to show that he was pleased by the massacre and suited by the official report. The guilty troops were at once sent his special and public thanks, as was noted in the official army journal of July 9, 1906. The mayor of the town was removed for questioning the truth of the official report. The Catholic Archbishop Ropp; who reported a meeting of those who were preparing the massacre, has been followed by the imperial vengeance until this day. Only recently he was forced out of his office on a trivial pretext, even against the protest of the Vatican.

The penalties for the atrocious mutilations at Bielostock are significant. Here is the sum total for the punishment: One prisoner received a rather severe sentence at hard labour, eight years — which, of course, may be later shortened by the Czar. One received a sentence of eight months in prison. The penalties of the others were nominal. Six were let go, three

given three months in the disciplinary battalions. Two of the leaders, Popko and Peredo, along with several others, although under accusation were not kept locked up for the trial — “which circumstance,” laconically explained the gagged Russian press, “much favoured their escape.”

For a time the forces of reaction and massacre were somewhat frightened by the Duma's uproar about the Bielostock affair. But soon they were at work again. The first to act were, not unnaturally, the brave troops of Bielostock, one regiment of which was now transported to Siedlice in Poland. A frightful pogrom followed this transfer, this time entirely and solely carried out by the troops, as shown by two official reports. As is proved by one of these, Colonel Tichanovsky, the chief of the garrison, called a conference before the pogrom, in which he exposed his bloody plans, and answered every protest of one or two subordinates by a promise that he would assume full responsibility. This meant that he was sure of support higher up. The governor was complained to without result and the massacre put deliberately into execution. During the wholesale butcheries by the drunken soldiers in the houses and on the streets, Colonel Tichanovsky gathered together a soldiers' chorus “to raise the spirits of the troops,” and “their singing resounded amidst the noise of the rifles, the spilling of blood, the plundering and conflagration.” The colonel said that “in case he was killed he hoped the soldiers would honour his memory decently and bathe themselves up to the ears in blood.” Though the killed and wounded amounted to hundreds, while only a single soldier lost his life, the colonel complained that there were too few dead. This is how Colonel Tichanovsky at least, given supreme authority by his superior, interpreted the personal thanks of the Czar for loyal services at Bielostock.

But now Stolypine was in office. However humiliating the position he occupied along with all other ministers in the court, and however helpless he was against the Czar, Stolypine saw with the minister of war that this particular manner of conducting these campaigns against the “internal enemy” was a dangerous, disintegrating force of the army itself. Already at Siedlice there was a threatening minority of the officers against the massacre. The soldiers of a whole regiment scarcely took a

hand in the business. A little more and there could have been a mutiny and the military massacres would have turned into a revolutionary movement.

Siedlice was the last military pogrom. We have now in the place of this short-lived institution the cherished politics of the League of Russian Men, the arming of the dregs of the population, and the steady beating and murder under the protection of the police of all persons "unfriendly" to the Government. The new system, which prevails at a hundred different points at once, received the sanction of the Czar, this time so openly and clearly that he could be sentenced for participation in the crimes before any honest jury or court.

CHAPTER IV

CREATING THE "INTERNAL ENEMY"

IN A recent conversation with the Czar which was at once carefully written down by the Countess Tolstoi, Nicholas said:

"I am very sorry that in the course of the last revolts and the massacres of the Jews public opinion of that great country (America) has turned against me. I am not guilty of all those troubles. I think the Jews themselves incite the mob to attack them. The time will come when the Americans themselves will hate the Jews and regard them, not as a nation of great intelligence and isolated from the others through their religion, but as the worst type of business-men and money-makers. All the revolts of the last two years have been agitated by the Jews. A Jew in common life may be good, but a Jew in politics is worse than anyone else."

Before exposing the roots of the gospel of religious and race hatred here openly preached by the Czar, let us read what is clearly expressed between the lines. The Czar was talking not in the abstract but of the situation in Russia at the present moment, and we would lose half the value of what he says if we did not recall just what questions he is answering and what the situation is to which he refers.

To begin with, most of his remarks cannot apply only to the Jews. If he expresses himself fully Nicholas must say he is sorry that "in the course of the recent revolts and the massacres" of the Poles, Lithuanians, Esths, Letts, Tartars, Georgians, and Armenians, the opinion of America and of *the whole civilised world* has turned against him. Neither he nor anyone speaking for him has ever withdrawn the accusation constantly issued by the officials that each one of these peoples has also agitated revolts. Nor has is ever been denied that their rebellious tendency is the reason why all non-Russian peoples are more

or less disqualified in the new Duma and legally persecuted by the courts. In speaking of the Jews as if they stood alone then, Nicholas creates an impression the exact reverse of the fact by failing to state the "whole truth." Sworn before an American court he would stand convicted of the crime of common perjury.

This is a fine specimen of the kind of lie by which the Czarism is trying to save itself. If the Jews, as the Czar implies, are hated by all the peoples in Russia, it looks badly for the Russian Jews. But if all the non-Russian peoples in Russia hate the Government and the Czar, and do not hate the Jews, then the overwhelming presumption is against the Government and the Czar. All the other false impressions created by this little gem of falsehood are made doubly vicious by this first general lie of omission that underlies every word. The great Autocrat finds it inconvenient to mention the other "subject" races because had he done so his attack would have appeared on its face so vicious and absurd that it would have sufficed in itself to convince any thinking person of the malicious hostility of the Czar toward all who for any reason oppose him.

Who is guilty of the massacres according to Nicholas? The Czar says he is not. He says the Jews are partly guilty, not daring, as do many of his officials, to put all the blame on them. The accusation that the Jews are bringing about the massacres, of which they are often the only victims, is ridiculous on the face of it and a monstrous perversion of facts with which, as I have shown, the Czar himself is perfectly familiar. Did not the Czar excuse his officials for the Bielostock pogrom, not on the ground that the Jews had incited an imaginary mob to massacre them, but that the Jews were "republicans and revolutionists"? How are we to know when Nicholas speaks the truth? Does he hold that the Jews incite the massacres, or that the Jews are against Czarism and therefore ought to be massacred?

But if, as he says, to the Jews is due only a part of the guilt, where is the rest of it? The Czar does not assume for his own Government *any part of the responsibility*, and has not caused a single official of any consequence to be punished for these crimes. Where is the missing guilt? Does it belong to the



THE VILLAGE CZAR

A "uriadnik" or village police officer — with elastic functions.



mobs? But often there were no mobs, and in nearly every case where so-called mobs existed they were composed of the members of the League of Russian Men whom Nicholas has since pardoned, because such criminals are an indispensable element in what he considers to be "the best party" in the country.

Then comes the effort of the Emperor to stir up race hatred, the basis of his own power, in the United States. The Czarism is like an infectious disease, a sort of black death. It tends to spread its putrefaction in all directions, encourages by its military power the reactionary influence in Prussia, Poland, Hungary and even the horrible jacqueries of Roumania, corrupts with high interest on its loans the small bourgeoisie of France, and now hopes to defend itself by inoculating with its poison of lies and hatred England and the United States. Again, why does not Nicholas mention the other hounded and massacred peoples? Why does not the God-sent take the courage to tell us the unsuspected dangers of our Armenians, Lithuanians and Poles? All three races form numerous and valuable elements of our people, and the Poles from Russia are even more numerous in America than the Russian Jews. How does it come that they have received from the Czar the same treatment as the Jews and raise the same complaint against him? Why does not the Czar tell us that his officials are every whit as bitter against the Poles and Armenians wherever they are found in Russia, as against the Jews? Because Nicholas knows that to give the whole of his lying defences in a single statement would in itself be sufficient to convict him of falsehood.

We hear from the Czar's own lips that the Jews are a separate "nation" — that is, foreigners in his Empire. We know that this is the fixed view of the Russian law concerning both the Jews and the rest of the fifty million not of Russian race, but it is an unexpected frankness to have it so stated by the Autocrat himself. So there are fifty million foreigners in Russia, to be legally oppressed and on occasion enumerated among "the internal enemy"! And these same people are also "isolated" by their religion! Not in civilised countries, but in Russia we know that innumerable privileges are reserved for only the orthodox. Yes, once more and finally, we have from the

mouth of the Czar the secret of autocracy and the very foundation of all his power. Hatred, violence, war; these are the savage instincts in man by the development of which the Czar hopes to master. In the end always war.

The idea is very old. Every absolutism and every political slavery has so far been based on war. But Russia's mannner of waging war is new. She has invented a system of universal war within her own borders that for the purposes of despotism excels the most ingenious contrivances of Macchiavellian or Roman Imperial politics. Russia might well surpass her predecessors and has in fact done so. History has never known a power more absolute, more despotic, than the Czar's, and the world has never seen an absolutism with a tithe of Russia's population, resources, territory, and organisation, to say nothing of the thoroughly modern equipment of her army and the half-modern exploitation of her wealth. Russia's absolutism is more than a success—it is danger to civilisation. If the Russian system can survive in the modern world, it will be copied in neighbouring countries, and so on indefinitely. It is a standing menace to the freedom and progress of humanity in the coming age. No free people can afford to view it with indifference.

The great and novel feature of Russian statesmanship on which the Czar stakes his empire is civil strife. The Empire is already too large for imperialism. The people are satisfied with the extent of their country, as large as the average continent, touching on all the seas and embracing nearly every clime. The foreigner is too far away to hate. Besides, an attack on one enemy exposes to another some flank of the unwieldy country. Like Great Britain, Russia will be glad with the addition of some few small pieces of territory she can easily get by treaty to keep what she already has. The recent treaty with Great Britain showed that both are essentially peaceful powers. Russia can scarcely defend her purely military form of government on the ground of danger from abroad. But since absolutism lives solely by violence employed against the people there must be some pretext or other for military rule, government outside of any law. Fortunately for the Czar the fifty million non-Russian subjects are not yet thoroughly intermarried

with the Russians nor evenly distributed over the kingdom. The pretext has been found. In the case of some races, as the Tartars and Armenians, the officials have been able to produce an actual war. With others, as with the Jews, it has been necessary to subsidise a war between them and the secret police and criminal element. By these means the Czar remains absolute master. He does not need to risk a foreign war, nor to wait for a favourable occasion. He can have his wars, or what is equally useful for his purposes, his "states of war" or abolition of civil order and civil government, when and where he wishes.

The Czar in this statement, then, is busied with inventing an enemy. For without an enemy there is no hate, no violence, no open or latent civil war; and without civil war the Czar would be supported, of course, by just exactly the number of people he could buy. A part of the Russian people, the officials and landlords, the Cossacks and the dregs of the population, he has bought. But the money was not his own, and without an unpaid increment composed of other elements of the population, the investment is a bad one. *For not one of the elements* so far bought produces any noticeable income to the State. They are all parasites, and a greater number of such parasites will be needed to keep the people down every day the people advance in wealth-producing power. Every step forward in the wealth-producing power of the nation, which is the objective of the people who lend the money in Germany or France, is also a step forward in the intelligence, organisation, unity, and revolt of the people of the Empire.

The Czar's appeal to hatred is not a sudden inspiration of malice or an instinctive revenge. It is a deep expression of what has constituted the life principle of the Czarism since the dawn of history.

The Czar's civil war is stirred up by a campaign of lies of every kind, is conducted publicly by Government officials and by means of direct attacks on the property and liberties of the non-Russian subject races, the Russian intellectuals and peasants — these officials acting either through specific laws requiring such persecution, or under the arbitrary power placed in their hands, or under administrative law, or under martial law, or, since there

is never any responsibility to the people in any case, even directly counter to all these so-called laws.

The aims and hopes of the official persecution are best shown by the official propaganda. Witness the proclamation printed on the official press of the prefect of St. Petersburg, authorised by the censor, cynically defended later in an official investigation by the prefect on the sole ground of this authorisation, and defended by the censor himself because its printing had been ordered by "a man who had not been without value" —supposedly to the reactionary cause.

"Do you know, brothers, workingmen, and peasants, who is the principal author of all our ills? Do you know that the Jews of Russia, America, Germany, and England have concluded an alliance and decided completely to destroy the Russian Empire?" asks this shameless document. In West Russia just such proclamations are launched against the Poles, in the Caucasus against the Armenians, in the Baltic Provinces against the Letts, in the country against the workingmen, in the city against the students, the educated classes or "intellectuals" and the Jews.

"When these betrayers of Christ present themselves," continues the proclamation, "slash them to pieces, kill them, so as to take away from them all wish to come." The document is vicious, ignorant and at once both calculating and naïve — it breathes the very soul of the statesmanship of Nicholas, the ministers and the court. "The order has been given," it says to the people, "to elect men who will represent you before the Czar (referring to the Duma). Remember that your natural defenders are the landlords, manufacturers, and orthodox merchants." How ignorant these governmental hopes in Russian peasants and workingmen! Except where under coercion, they did not elect a single landlord. The valuable document then makes a complete exposition of the court's favourite measures for "settling" the Jewish question. They are similar to those that have been practised for twenty-five years by the Czar and his "sainted father," Alexander III., whom he claims as pattern. This document says that the Jews, who kept out of half the towns, are to be expelled not only from all the cities of European and Asiatic Russia, but also from ten

small towns of South Russia where they are now allowed to reside. Where permitted to live, they are not to be allowed to trade in grain, meat or wood, or to open banking or commercial houses or "similar establishments," or to own any real estate. All special Jewish schools are to be closed and the Jews are to be deprived of the right of entrance to all the Russian higher, secondary and technical schools. The author-officials recognise that it will take a complete sang-froid to execute these measures, but "the cause is holy," nothing less than "the lasting rescue of the people from the internal enemy."

The "holy cause" is at the present time especially "holy," not so much for the plunder the Czar's officials are used to extracting from the Jews and other "internal enemies," as for the hope that the people can be corrupted by a promise of a share in this plunder to turn their wrath away from the Government to the Jews. For this purpose all the legislation has been devilishly contrived from the outset. Whenever the country has become very quiet, of course the officials keep all the plunder for themselves; in other words, they allow the Jews to violate the law, or if paid enough they even moderate its provisions for a time. When revolutionary trouble begins again, the persecution takes the form of legislation and enforcement of the law, instead of secret blackmail. The purpose of the laws is not mere punishment or the satisfaction of an existing hatred, but an appeal to the greed and selfishness of all who compete in any sphere with the Jews and can draw a profit from the handicap set by the Government on their rivals in the race. There is no race hatred, but there is selfish and even criminal greed — in certain classes.

All during the last century the laws have been thus reversed according to the Government's varying need, either to let the Jew prosper and to plunder his wealth, or to ruin him to please his competitors and win an enthusiastic and aggressive support among certain elements of the population in behalf of the whole system of oppression that is called by the name of government. The law forbidding Jews to sell liquor was twice repealed and twice passed again; that forbidding them to deal in land was repealed, then passed again, then twice relaxed in practise, then strengthened until now it is absolute. The right to live

in villages was passed, repealed, passed again, and again strengthened. It was justified on what Prince Urussov brands as the pure hypocrisy of separating the Jews in order to protect them from the Christians!

The Jews, shut out of agriculture and many other occupations by law, are forced into petty trade and handwork. Here the wages and profit become so low from over-competition that other nationalities shun these occupations, until finally nearly all little shopkeepers and artisans are Jews. Then arises the cry for further persecution, in hope that it may drive the Jews from these occupations also. The cry arises, of course, not from the producers of raw material, since it is good to have many buyers, nor from the purchasers, who also profit from the competition, but from those non-Jewish little traders and artisans who remain. It is to these poor starving wretches that the Government appeals with its campaign of murderous plunder. Having artificially produced this desperate misery, the Czar and his servants turn part of these wretches against the others with a promise of their business when they are destroyed.

The relatively small but desperately needy class of Russian small shopkeepers has in many places succumbed to the poison, and wherever the Jews are numerous allows the Government to work them up periodically into a pitch of hatred, hardly murderous, however, since many Jews are their associates and friends. It is rather their wilder sons that furnish new recruits to the criminal and professional "patriotic" organisations. But the small merchants do enroll themselves, subscribe to the organisation and read its papers, and it is undoubtedly to the selfish interest of the small trader in the ruin of Jews that the Government makes its most direct appeal.

I talked with Tichamirov, the editor of the notorious Moscow organ of the League of Russian Men, who made clear to me at once the purely lower middle class basis of the league. He is close to the people, as he was a leader of the revolutionary party in the former reign. While an exile abroad he completely reversed his politics, and has written a book on the Czars which is said to be the most able defence of autocracy extant. He did not hesitate for a moment to acknowledge that anti-semit-

ism was the basis of the ultra-reactionary party and the hope of the Czarism. This anti-semitism he considers to be in its essence an economic movement, and it is by conservative economic reform, not political, that he hopes to preserve the domination in Russia of the autocracy, the Orthodox Church and the Russian nationality.

Politically, like all the leaders that stand with the Czar, Tichamirov favours inertia. All accept what the Czar has given without asking what it is, and all say that what the Czar has given, Duma or what not, the Czar can take away. Either they do not ask whether Russia has a constitution, or else they say definitely with Tichamirov that a pure autocracy still prevails. They accept the Duma, but they do not object to any of the innumerable limitations under which it has proven utterly powerless whenever opposed by the ministers of the Czar. The League of Russian Men and all extreme reactionaries are, nevertheless, in a certain peculiar sense democrats. They believe in the possibility of a mystical direct union of "the true Russian people" under their leadership with the Czar, and they profess to believe that no disagreement in this case is possible and that so autocracy and democracy can become one.

This peculiar union and harmony it is hoped to attain by purely economic reforms. The Czar is to favour those classes that are most loyal to him and his policies, and these classes are to grow and flourish until the whole people become the loving children of the "Little Father," the Czar. Naturally one must begin, not with the peasants, but with the small shopkeepers and the small landowners. The league has always bought for itself a fighting organisation of the very lowest social classes, but nowhere has it obtained any real foothold among the mass of the people, the peasants and workingmen. These classes are neither loyal to the Czar nor do they want small doles in land, but a sovereign people's Duma, expropriation of the landlords, and a social guarantee against accumulation of the land in the future in private hands. The league has definitely recognised that the workingmen and peasants, at least for the moment, have strayed off the true path. Tichamirov even confessed that he did not wish to see an extension

of peasant communal ownership, nor even of small farms, but only of those with from 132 to 266 acres.

Outside of the Government and nobility these small landlords and shopkeepers are almost the sole class from which the league gets the rank and file of its members, and that they succeed here is due solely to the diabolical machinations of the Government. An overwhelming majority, however, even of the small landowners belong to other less reactionary or even to merely conservative groups; while the larger landlords have a party of their own, the moderate reactionaries. The majority of the small landowners are probably conservative or reactionary, but certainly not very extreme since scarcely one out of ten took the trouble to vote. The small shopkeepers, on the other hand, took a lively interest. With the aid of the lower officials, everywhere openly or secretly connected with the organisation, and of the wholesale disfranchisements under the new election law, they carried many of the smaller towns. These small tradesmen, joined by the numerous class of landlords who are also officials, or officials who are also landlords, and by the higher clergy, elected over one hundred members or one-fourth of the third Duma.

To this anti-semitic party the peasants have contributed almost nothing. In eighty-four out of the eighty-six provinces (or states) they have refused practically to have anything to do with the organisation. Out of sixteen thousand township electors for the third Duma only fifty-one declared themselves members of the league, and of these thirty-three came from the one government of Volhynia, leaving several hundred even in that government in other parties. All unprejudiced observations agree with those I made personally in a score of Russian villages. Among the peasants there is almost no racial prejudice of any kind. Even in those governments into which the law has forced the Jews in abnormal numbers, there is scarcely a trace of hostility. Witness the Duma's report on Bielostock, already quoted, and Prince Urussov's conversations with Bessarabian peasants. These peasants did not understand why he should ask them such a foolish question as to whether they were hostile to the Jews, and simply answered with other questions: "What do you mean? What kind of hostility? Why any hostility?"

I learned absolutely nothing from the peasants about anti-semitism, because they don't know what Jew-baiting means.

It is all a question of plunder. The purely business reasons for the persecution are baldly stated by the "patriotic organisations" themselves. The Fatherland Union, of which Count Bobrinsky was chief organiser, states in its preamble, "If to give the Jews equal rights should prove to be detrimental to Russians, then no matter how convincing the arguments are, we shall be energetically opposed to it." This is as if we should deny rights of citizenship to emigrants, or to Americans who were not "Sons of the Revolution." For the Jews and other subject races have inhabited Russia for hundreds of years. "Russia is first of all for the Russians," says the declaration, apparently meaning those whose ancestors have been Russian for a thousand years; and further, "the more elements there are of foreign origin in the Russian Empire the stronger and more forcible must the real Russian nationality be represented in it." What if Americans were to say, the more foreigners we have the more we must restrict their privileges and those of their children to the last generation?

CHAPTER V

AUTOCRACY'S LAST HOPE

THE problem before Nicholas II., an ordinary man and an ordinary Czar, remains after the lapse of two centuries the same as the problem before the Czar-genius Peter the Great. It is an insoluble problem. The desire of the Czars at their best is to develop the people without giving up to them any of the autocratic power. The result is not mere paternalism, but a withering benevolent despotism that defeats even its own object.

Peter's system was to create governmental institutions and electoral bodies in a country where systematic organisation and the regular participation of any class of people in the Government were almost unknown. And, indeed, the people were forced for the first time, rather arbitrarily to be sure, to think about the best form of organisation of the country, to feel deeply over real questions of state. The policy of the first ten years of Nicholas's reign forms a striking parallel. Nicholas is not a genius, but perhaps Witte is. This is a business or economic age. It is not then merely political institutions that Witte has created, but railways, manufactures, gold currency, an enormous liquor monopoly, and banks. It is not of political questions that the people have been forced to think and feel, but of the great economic questions of modern life.

But the parallel holds good. "Peter was possessed by the abstract idea of state," says the Russian historian, "the people were only ciphers in the total." But the people could be forced into ciphers only by whips and the sword. Peter instituted for the first time an elaborate system of espionage, revived many of the tortures of Ivan the Terrible, and still failed. His great state machine became a Frankenstein and threatened its creator's existence. His new bureaucracy became corrupt

and rotten with bribery, and came to be an additional burden on the state.

Witte is possessed by the idea of the state as the universal capitalist, as the great owner, manufacturer, banker, and employer. His is a state socialism beyond the dreams of Bismarck. If the Russian Government were to continue to absorb private capital at the rate it did in the ten years of Witte's reign over Russian finance, half a century would develop a perfected state capitalism (a more accurate term than state socialism) and the monopoly of industry and banking by the Government. To accomplish his reforms Witte did not have to resort to whips and the sword like Peter. As long as the instruments of violence could preserve the Czarism from revolution, Witte had no need of their direct use for his reforms. Quite the contrary, where they were in use he often had them abolished and replaced by more modern instruments. Starvation of the people is, as I shall show, literally the foundation of Witte's reforms. But actual starvation is unable to bring about the permanent economic prosperity of any community. It cannot be said that Witte's plan has failed, for it is still in practice. But it must lead to the greatest economic cataclysm the world has seen.

Peter's whole system, says Kostomarov, was directed against the prevailing want of public spirit, the lack of independence of action, the absence of initiative capacity. Mentioning his proposed reforms and the Czar's October Manifesto, Witte says in the budget of 1906: "The steady growth of the consciousness of the masses will undoubtedly soon lead them to true comprehension of economic progress, and arouse in them a *desire* for real improvement of national well-being. A sure pledge of the awakening of *public life* is Your Majesty's call to the nation to enter the path of *independent* action, and also the equality before the law granted to all Your Majesty's subjects." After the lapse of two centuries Russia's statesmen are still trying to inoculate her Czar-cursed people with initiative, independence, and public spirit.

That Witte failed as Peter did is due not entirely to himself. The proposed equality before the law and the popular assembly for which he finally obtained the Czar's promise against all the

nobility and the court, have now been definitely abandoned. If Witte could have spoken more openly perhaps he would have deplored not the lack of desire, but the lack of hope, for real improvement among the masses of the people. But Witte's error lay not so much in a too loyal hopefulness and confidence in the false Nicholas, or in a too bureaucratic contempt for the people, as in a fundamental misconception of his own business, finance. It is he that has the lack of true comprehension of economic progress of which he accuses the Russian people.

Peter could not, says Kostomarov, "inoculate civic courage, the feeling of duty, or love of one's neighbour," he could not create a new and living Russia by means of violence. Witte could not inoculate initiative, independence, and public spirit on the basis of the starvation of the peasants, which is the basis of his conception of economic progress.

Peter the Great laid the foundations of the modern absolutism; Witte has set it on the road of its last hope. Perhaps Witte at the last was even conscious of the desperate character of his experiment, of the need of compromising with democracy, the arch-enemy. It was no accident, however, that the road of state socialism was chosen. If Witte had not been there, another man or other men would have assumed his burden, and the same results would have been reached, perhaps with the loss of a few years, or a few billion rubles to the Russian state. The reason for choosing this road is not far to seek — the necessities of war; a reason fearfully painful to consider, for poor, starving, Czar-cursed Russia is, after all, part and parcel of the great modern world, flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone.

Russia is part and parcel of the modern world if for no other reason because she must defend herself against it. She is our neighbour, she controls a fourth of the best cultivable land of the earth, her people are of our own white race and of the same religions as ourselves. Even at the time of Peter the Great she had already decided to utilise all the machinery of modern industry that does so much to make our life what it is. Besides, millions of her people have all our modern culture, and half the rising generation can read and write. Why do we forget all these obvious facts and try to judge Russia as a thing apart? Even Japan and Turkey are dragged into the circle of modern

civilisation, above all by the necessity of defending themselves by modern means. It was especially by the necessities of war that the Czars have been compelled to keep step with many modern ideas, and it was the absolute need of getting money to support her enormous armies and costly fleets that inevitably forced Alexander II. to abolish slavery and his son Alexander III. to call a modern financier like Witte into power. It was likewise inevitable in a country where all the power rests with the Government, that Witte in strengthening capitalism should seek to establish State capitalism, just as Alexander II. in abolishing the slavery of the agriculturists to the landlords, should establish instead a slavery to the State.

The crushing defeat of Russia by France and England in the Crimean War necessitated revolutionary changes in the Russian army if the country were to preserve its independence. The professional army of military slaves forced to twenty-five years of service, had to be replaced by the much larger modern army of all the young men of the nation enlisted for a few years and trained by a certain "patriotism" as much as by fear. The peasants, breaking out more and more in revolt, had to be made over not only into loyal but into zealous subjects. War railroads had to be built, and a new fleet and modern armament were indispensable. At least there had to be enough clothes to keep the soldiers from freezing, as happened so frequently in that war; there had to be medical attendance for the sick and wounded, the miserable lack of which had caused more losses than the enemies' bullets; and enough powder, also lacking, for the cannons and guns. But the country could pay no more even for these important purposes. The serfs had to be liberated then and modern railroads and industry introduced, or the country would be divided up by the foreign powers. It was not an internal situation that abolished serfdom and moved Russia once more into modern Europe, but the imperative necessity of keeping up with her neighbours or belonging to them.

Modern civilisation is a whole. It is doubtful if modern machinery can be used without introducing modern ideas and a measure of liberty for the individual and democracy for the mass. To be able to borrow the money for railroads, passing

through a non-industrial region that does not give profits in the early years, one must have high taxes to pay the interest on the railway bonds. To get carrying profits even from the grain-trade in an impoverished country, the export business must be developed. But high taxes can only be secured from the high profits of modern industry and modern agriculture, and it is only the latter than can produce enough surplus grain to keep going an export trade. Modern industry needs metal and not paper money. A debtor nation must have a large export trade, and the export trade may make possible gold money. It is all one piece — modern armies and fleets and military railroads, a large government debt, high taxes, gold money, large agricultural exports and a protected industry. And all this was forced on the unwilling Czars by the fact that Russia is an integral part of the modern world.

State capitalism went further in Russia than elsewhere. In monopolising the manufacture of spirits Witte undertook one of the very largest businesses in the country; in founding mortgage banks and pushing the active participation of the Government banks and railroads in the furtherance or hindrance of this or that business enterprise, he became the financial dictator of the country as much as the Czar, his master, is the direct dictator over its political and military life. And as the Czar, his master, was helpless before the great fact of human nature, that men cannot be governed by external violence, so Witte was helpless against the great economic fact that the prosperity of a nation cannot be attained without the economic elevation of the masses of the people.

The Council of State confessed at the end of the year 1902 that "the Government is powerless for the reorganisation of the life of the peasants and the assistance of agricultural industry." This is an acknowledgment of the complete economic failure of the Czarism. Three-fourths of the Russian people are peasants and two-thirds of her wealth comes from agricultural industry. What is the use of State socialism or autocratic capitalism if all economic hope of regenerating "in this epoch" the chief national industry and the chief industrial class is abandoned? For Witte has used in the State budget the explicit words that this regeneration must belong

to a future epoch — that is, a future generation, or even a future century.

Witte was forced to avow his helplessness not by war or revolution, for neither had yet begun, but by the inevitable industrial crisis that must arise when it is sought to build up a modern industry among a people a large part of which is starving every other year, and is happy to have enough to eat let alone being able to purchase the product of the countries' factories or to give goods or passengers to its railroads.

But before this frank confession of failure had been forced on Witte by the tremendous panic and crash of Russian industry in 1900, which he himself had feared, he had already succeeded in one-third revolutionising the economy of Russia. I say one-third revolutionising, for many of the best Russian economists contend that the same policy by which he revolutionised Russian industry is largely accountable for the progressive and constant decay of agriculture.

As I have suggested, the modernising process in the national economy began at the time of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. It took a much more rapid course, on the ascension of Alexander III. in 1882, under Witte's predecessor Wishegradsky. It was he that first introduced the high protective customs tariff and increased every other form of indirect taxation on articles of consumption. As fast as the peasants began to use some manufactured and imported article, or rather as fast as the non-starving minority were able to do this, the article was burdened with a crushing taxation. A part of the peasants began to drink tea with sugar, to wear cotton, to use petroleum and matches and to employ steel ploughs and iron nails. Almost in proportion to the increased use the taxes were raised. Again and again this happened, and was repeated under Witte, and was repeated again in the last two years, until the already miserable Russian peasant now pays two, three, and four times as much for these articles as do the people of Germany or France. The result has been that, although the cost of producing such simple articles is falling enormously everywhere and the consumption doubling again and again, consumption has risen very slowly in all Russia and still more slowly among those most in need. The peasant can afford only the fewest nails, the

cheapest plough, and almost no petroleum. His single shirt must last a season, sugar is a luxury and his beloved tea an occasional drink.

Under Witte's predecessor the peasants were already beginning to bear the new load of the railroads and manufacturing industry, added to the already crushing payments they were forced to make to their former masters for their so-called freedom and the possession of a part of the land they had always occupied. In 1891 the customs tariff was again increased; during Witte's first ten years, 1892-1902, the mileage of the Russian railways was doubled, the operations of the State banks were still more rapidly increased and a new bank was formed for lending money to the nobility; in 1894 the State monopolised the alcohol industry, and in 1897 the gold standard was finally established.

All these measures were again bound together as a single whole along with the export of grain. For evidently the gold standard could not be maintained unless from year to year Russia should receive from abroad in payment for her exports a sum of gold sufficient to enable her to pay the interest on the huge sums she was borrowing. But the peasants export very little, since they produce scarcely enough for their own elementary needs. While they were crushed with the indirect taxes required to support the new huge and artificial economic structure, their enemies, the landlords, were allowed to reach their hands into the treasury of this poverty-stricken State. They were loaned money below the current rates and in amounts greater than their properties justified. Having one bank for this purpose, another was created with the high-sounding name of "Peasants' Bank" to enable the most needy landlords to sell out at high prices to the few prospering peasants who had elevated themselves by usury to their starving neighbours and in their turn have become rich proprietors — some having by now millions of acres. But more than this, Witte stated that he did what he could in this starving country, which was no little, to keep up the prices of grain for the landlord's benefit.

But the famines came along regularly every other year, bountiful foreign crops or financial crises lowered prices in spite of him, and Witte confessed finally to the Czar that they did not

possess the economic dictatorship of the earth. Witte was fond of saying to his own associates: "But you don't know the cards." He had not played his last card and had a most disagreeable surprise in store for the landlords and the Czar. We need not accuse Witte of duplicity at this point. He had always favoured industry — even though sometimes only as a home market for agriculture. He now felt himself strong enough, and his policies far enough in practice, to display his hand.

The budget speech of 1897 is already addressed to a greater power in the end than the Russian landlords, that is, to international capital. Of course his relations with the great bankers were private. The budget address is aimed at their protégés, the small investors. The minister of finance finds now that low agricultural prices have their good sides for other elements than the landlords. And he boasts that the product of industry is now greater than that of agriculture. Industry had increased rapidly though artificially, but Witte used here a very vulgar prospectus writer's trick. The product of agriculture he reckoned at one and a half billion rubles, that of industry at two billions. But a large part of the value of the product of industry is due merely to raw material. The expert De Vaux reckoned the net product at this time as four hundred million or one-fifth as much as Witte.

Instead of being the rich country Witte boasted, Russia is almost incredibly poor. One of Witte's modern devices was the savings banks. The pennies of the non-starving minority of the people were collected in Government saloons, post-offices, railway-stations, ships, barracks, and even schools — from the first to the last always the pitiful total of about five rubles from each depositor. In the fifteen years of Witte's administration (1891--1906) the total of the depositors increased from one to five million, of the deposits from two hundred to one thousand million rubles. The bank was a good piece of business for the Government. But it is only another sign of the poverty of this vast nation. The bank has ceased to grow so rapidly and probably most of the available pennies are already collected. What is a billion rubles among a hundred and forty million people? The savings banks of other smaller countries have ten times as much.

This money of course nearly all goes over to the Government. It is like another tax. The Government pays low interest and gets high. At first the money went directly into Government bonds. But wise and modern Witte has put it into his railways and his land banks. And in spite of all, the show remains a wretched one. In 1902, after all Witte's borrowing, Russia had only forty-two thousand miles of railways to two hundred thousand in the United States. Moreover, perhaps a fourth of Russia's roads are merely military and most of them are miserably built and equipped. The estimates for all the Russian state railways (two-thirds of the total) in the budget of 1906 were pitifully small—for construction forty-two million rubles, for improvements twelve million, for rolling stock two million, and for repair of locomotives three million. Divide these figures by two to bring them to dollars and they will not by any means be as high as those of several private American companies for the same year. No wonder the bitter and ceaseless complaints that appear from day to day in the Russian press from every branch of business. Every day products are undelivered, factories closed for lack of fuel, perishable goods ruined in transport and whole train-loads destroyed by accidents.

Russia is wretchedly provided with railroads; the United States has eight times as many miles for each soul of her population. But still Russia will find it difficult to build more until it is arranged that her people shall cease to starve. Witte boasted that the annual loss on the railroads, had fallen from one hundred and seventy-six million rubles in 1892 to ninety million in 1897. According to the juggled official figures it fell to only thirty-five million in 1901, but by 1903 it had risen again to sixty million and is not likely soon to fall.

Far worse, and in the end a greater waste, for the country is the almost complete absence of roads. I have seen almost no paved roads except for a few miles from the towns and across some of the properties of the grand dukes of the Czar. The mileage of paved roads in France is one hundred and in Great Britain six hundred times as great as in Russia.

In fact Russia has none of the elements of great wealth except the raw materials of the earth that would have been there were the land without people at all. She has neither a great

agriculture, a great transportation system, a great industry, a great internal, or a great external trade in proportion to her population. The value of the products of Russian industry as reckoned by Witte in 1897 was less than one-tenth, that of agriculture one-fifteenth, of those of the United States. The Russian farmers, confesses Witte, are in the economic position of European farmers of 1800 or 1850. I shall later show this to be a fact.

The Russian farmer gets only one-third the product per acre the English or German does, though he has a much better soil. While the total wheat product of the United States increased more than a third during the last decade, that of miserable Russia increased less than one-tenth, not as fast as the population. During this period while Russian exports of wheat remained about the same, ours nearly doubled.

But as I have shown, the whole economic structure of Russian society and the credit of the Government rests largely on the exports, of which two-thirds are grain and all but 3 per cent. raw or half-raw products. The export of animals and animal products in this vast country, so much better adapted to the purposes of animal raising than Canada, is less than one-tenth that of the latter comparatively small country. Russia exports less wool than she imports and less than ten other smaller countries.

The total trade of Russia increased in the last decade before the war, only 25 per cent., less rapidly than the population. The exports, however, increased only 14 per cent. and the so necessary favourable balance of trade, or superiority of exports over imports, fell by one-third. More recently, in 1903, 1904, and 1905, it seems surprising to find that this balance has doubled. The explanation of this, according to a personal remark of Finance Minister Shipov, was that the peasants were so necessitous that they were forced to sell products needed by their animals and themselves, and these products were then exported. But even then the balance was only about four hundred million rubles, not enough to pay the annual interest on the foreign debts of the State, the railroads, and the great industrial enterprises. And then came, in the years 1906 and 1907, the periodical famine.

The false policy of the minister of finance kept up the exports the first of these years in order to pay the country's bad debts, but now even reactionaries are demanding the prohibition of the export of the food of a starving people. The Government has not forbidden, but it has discouraged, the shipping away of grain, and this has rapidly diminished.

But in the coming decade, as in the last, reckoning every second or third year as a famine year, as has been the case for several decades, the excess of exports over imports will scarcely average more than two hundred million rubles, or less than half enough to pay the interest, to say nothing of payments on the principal, on the foreign debt.

Whether the Russian Government is a failure as a business institution or not, it is certain that the nation under its present masters is not a successful business concern. The Government has the advantage over the nation in that it can secure money from abroad, either through the hope of the lenders that it will be able to shoot and whip more taxes out of the people, or that it will lend the aid of its rifles and cannons or warships to some foreign ally. In either case the foreign investor is lending not to a business, but to an army of mercenaries.

And in either case there are two sides to this bargain. If the foreign investor in Russian bonds agrees to ask no question as to where or how the Czar gets the money to pay him his interest, the Czar must furnish the guns. He is subject to a large extent to the wishes of the creditors to whom he must appeal year after year. Already the most powerful reactionary and Governmental organ has protested angrily that it is not the Duma but the foreign financiers that constitute Russia's real parliament.

This, then, is where the new finance and the last hope of the autocracy has led — to a permanent financial dependence on foreign capital. And if internal poverty is the weakness of Witte's policy, it is this external dependence that is its strength. The international bankers are exacting, but they are the powerful and invaluable friends that are keeping the Czarism together. For the Czarism is not supported by Russia — the Russians would have destroyed it long ago — but by the whole world through its gold.

Russia is poor but the world is rich. The Russian finances in themselves are as hopeless as were those of France before the Revolution. But at that time there was not a tithe of the wealth there is in the world to-day, and all the nations but England were poorer than France. Now there are four great nations each with several times the wealth of Russia, and four smaller ones as rich. All the older countries are overflowing with capital seeking profitable investment, and Russia, like India or China, has become a financial protectorate of international capital.

Already Russia is the heaviest indebted as well as the poorest of the great nations. The Government has borrowed five billion rubles for military purposes and three billion for the railways, while Russia's private railways and industries have indebted themselves for an almost equal sum. From 1890 to 1896 there were four large Government loans, from 1897 to 1903 most of the borrowing was private. Since the war every year again requires large borrowings from abroad. The taxes have been brought nearly to the limits; the chief expenditures, the military and naval, are about to be increased, for only by maintaining her armed strength does Russia obtain her foreign military allies and loans. It seems that the deficit of several hundred millions, euphemistically called in the budget "extraordinary expenditure," must remain. Every year or two will see a new loan, just as every two or three years sees a new famine. The sums paid for interest will increase and the Government's financial position will remain of the most difficult. It will not mean bankruptcy unless there is some international military or financial crisis. For if the Government has not the power to make fundamental financial reforms, it can, with the aid of foreign capital, maintain the present taxes and expenditure.

But the country is clamouring for reform and reform can mean in a position like Russia's nothing but decreased taxation or increased Government expenditure. Those who want anything fundamental, whether it is a new fleet or better schools, will have to solve the financial problem. And they will soon see that it is useless to go to the Government, and will begin more and more to look over the head of the minister of finance

and the Czar, to their financial masters abroad. Here also they will get no more than they have already gotten, and all the vigorous forces of the country, both revolutionary and reactionary, may turn against the foreign creditor. Already the revolutionaries have announced they will recognise no loan not authorised by a people's Duma, and the reactionaries almost as a man declare that Witte has turned over Russia to the international Jews (e. g., financiers). The popular measure would be the suspension of interest on the bonds or its payment in paper money, rather of course than the cruder cancellation of the debt.

In the meanwhile private capital is not accumulating to any great extent in Russia, simply because the larger share of profitable business has been monopolised by the Government. According to Witte's figures, already quoted, the private income of Russia cannot be more than two or three billion rubles. But the Government industries and railroads themselves produce a billion gross income and it takes another billion from the people in the form of taxes. The Government besides borrows several hundred million, which is several times as much as private enterprises get from abroad. The Russian people, then, already owes most of its income directly to the Government, whether in the form of salaries, purchases, or contracts. The way to make money, then, is not to go into business, but to stand in with the officials or to be one. Naturally the accumulation of capital under these conditions is slow. Without materially diminishing poverty State capitalism has made all but impossible the rapid accumulation of wealth.

Witte's conception of the omnipotent state went so far as to consider it as *the* "dispenser of credit" and arbiter of industry. He dilates upon the greatness of this power, but never once suggests that it might be used to enable the peasant to support himself and accumulate capital enough to modernise his agriculture. Witte simply delivered the economic policy of the Government for a short time from the hands of the landlords and gave it over to the foreign financiers. The Japanese war loans strengthened the grip of the financiers, but the dismissal of Witte, the reaction against all liberalism, and the third Duma, seem again about to deliver it over to the landlords.



THE VILLAGE "POPE"

The spiritual representative of the Czarism in Russia's 100,000 villages

Still more likely is a return under the leadership of Stolypine and Gutchkov to the middle course followed during the reign of the father of the present Czar, by which Russian landlords and foreign capitalists inside and outside of Russia divide among them all the rich profits of the benevolent despotism that do not fall to the bureaucracy's lot.

Inertia, reaction, or merely formal reform, these are the three courses open to the Government, but the greatest of these is inertia. Inertia defeated completely the heroic measures of Peter the Great to Prussianise his empire and reduced his bureaus to parodies in later years. The impossibility of bringing about any great economic reforms in a country presided over by violence, and where neither freedom of contract nor equality before the law nor inviolability either of property or labour prevail, the contradiction of obtaining the funds for the carrying out of such reforms by promising the aid of the Russian army in case of war, or by guaranteeing the use of the same arbitrary power to squeeze the money in some way out of the people — all this is reducing to a still more tragic parody Witte's efforts to modernise Russia by marrying the autocracy to the money-power. The union has taken place and it has brought its fruits. But it is like a union of royal houses. The people were not consulted. But they are already surly and the strength of sullen resistance knows no bounds. There are economic laws even in Russia. Against these neither the Czarism nor capitalism is able to have its will. What these laws are I can say only after I have spoken of the people, of the new Russia that is in some degree independent of the Government, and of the several efforts to bring the people to a consciousness of the economic realities in which they live.

PART TWO

REVOLT

CHAPTER I

THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE — A MYSTERY

THE Czar and his ministers continue to assure the world that the real Russian people, the hundred million peasants are, and always have been, contented, loyal and devoted subjects. This has been the favourite slander in the long campaign of defamation of its own people that constitutes one of the worst crimes of the Government. We know some of the infamies of Czarism, but there are many of which we are entirely ignorant. Because of the rigid censorship in Russia of all the news, the systematic bribery of many foreign newspapers, and the favourable misrepresentation of officials on all occasions, it has been impossible to get at reliable and general information on the very subjects that are fundamental to all others — the actual conditions of the villages where four-fifths of the people live, the present development of the peasants, their attitude to the Czar, the Church, the officials, the landlords and the revolution.

With so little reliable knowledge we have been at the mercy of the unscrupulous official statements. Before the peasants had an opportunity to voice themselves in their national parliament, these official statements had succeeded in implanting in the consciousness and literature of foreign nations a vague and indefinite, but none the less obnoxious, picture portraying the peasants as a dull and indolent race, ignorant, hard-drinking, fanatically religious and stupidly devoted to the Czar. Naturally we have had small sympathy with a people we believed to have so little manhood and so little love of freedom as humbly to submit to the curse of Czarism.

In Russia itself the Czar's defenders have carried their attacks on the peasants' character so far as to reduce them to absurdity. As patriotic Russians they pretended, of course, that most of the shameful characteristics they attributed to the great mass

of their countrymen are after all virtues, and that the key to the peasants' psychology, the greatest of all virtues, is —self-renunciation. This is "the highest expression possible to the human individual" since it makes of him the perfect subject of those divine Russian institutions, the absolute Czarism and the "changeless" Church. According to the professional Russian patriots or Slavophiles, whatever is Russian is right. But the peasants of Russia are both poor and illiterate. Are their poverty and lack of education also part of the "highest expression possible to the human individual"? The late head of the Holy Church could well give an authoritative answer, since he was also the most venerated adviser of Alexander III. and of the present Czar. That terrible old man Pobiedonostzev opposed general education, newspapers, and everything else that might develop the slightest spirit of freedom. He carried his ideas to their logical conclusion and fearlessly announced to a world that still refuses to believe its ears and does not yet realise the full monstrosity of his doctrine, that "inertia is the fulcrum of progress" and that "poverty, lowliness, deprivation, and self-denial are the true lot of men."

Such are the ideas that have ruled and guided the present Czar.

This "official character" of the peasants, as I have said, has been so long and stoutly repeated as to have been accepted and passed on by foreign writers on Russian conditions. The three volume work of Leroy-Beaulieu is undoubtedly the most important foreign study of "The Empire of the Czars." By a scientific and historical method the author has covered every phase of Russian life, from the geography of the country to its latest political, economic, and cultural development. But he has refused to place himself at the only standpoint that can lead to a true understanding, that of the Russian people. He has failed to distinguish between that part of Russian life that emanates from the spirit and natural evolution of the Russian people, and that other alien part that has been forced on it by an alien Government which owes its origin and maintenance either to foreign power and influence or to the stern military necessity of defending the most exposed country of Europe against the Turks and Tartars.

This famous "scientific" but unsympathetic observer, attributing the barbarism of the Government to the whole nation, has branded the Russian people with the same vulgar libels that are current among those totally ignorant of the land. To him Russia is still essentially mediæval, the people mystical, fatalistic, inert. "Modern as Russia is if we look to the external side of her civilisation, to her army and bureaucracy," he says, "she is mediæval still in the manners and spirit of her people."

This brief sentence is yet such a conglomeration of truth, untruth, and half-truth that I can scarcely correct it, and to bring out all its inaccuracies I must offer a substitute. I am certain that the author in penning such a perversion of the reality was thinking of the only side of Russia with which his book shows any deep acquaintance, namely its government. The sentence should read "Modern as the *Russian Government* is, if we look at the external side of her army and bureaucracy, the *governing caste* is still mediæval in its opinions and spirit." Certainly the Russian army has a modern organisation and armament, certainly the Russian prisons and police are among the most highly developed in the world — this organized violence is indeed the very *raison d'être* of the autocratic form of government. It is alone to a certain aptitude and success in modernising the means of holding the people in subjection that it owes its existence. But this is the end of the virtues of the ruling caste. The whole history of Russia and of the present revolution shows that it is the spirit and opinions of the army of officers and Government officials that are reactionary and even mediæval.

Perhaps the most dangerous of all the criticisms of Russia is that which attaches some fundamental deficiency to the race itself. Leroy-Beaulieu, who is careful to make no direct attack on the Slavic peoples as such, nevertheless characterises the peasant of to-day as inert and lacking in creative power. But what permanently oppressed and starving people ever showed much sign of creative power? Are not the East Prussian peasants of to-day, though infinitely less poverty-stricken, both inert and reactionary, an accusation that can scarcely be made against the revolutionary and Socialistic Russian peasants. Have not the Russian peasants adapted themselves

quickly to every variety of modern life and industry that was opened to them? Are not former peasants working successfully in many instances the most complicated agricultural machinery, railway locomotives, the most delicate tools? In fact half of the five or six million working people in Russia's modern industries are former peasants.

Furthermore, Leroy-Beaulieu refers continually to "mysticism," "fatalism," and "passive endurance" as the chief traits of the peasant's character. Yet may not such passive qualities, as far as they really do exist, be simply the temporary results of oppression? Mysticism may arise from the very keenness of the desire for a rational explanation of life on the part of those to whom knowledge is denied; fatalism may come from the intensity of frustrated longing for a better régime; passive endurance from the futility of resistance to a stronger physical power. Leroy-Beaulieu himself acknowledged that he had only spoken of negative qualities, for he found it impossible at the time he wrote to give an estimate of the peasant's "actual creative power." It is precisely this positive creative power that we want to understand.

But this racial prejudice appears much more clearly in more recent and less scientific books than the one to which I have been referring, works which are nevertheless widely circulated and have had on the whole an immense influence. An American book that appeared just before the Russian-Japanese War is typical. The author, Senator Beveridge, is known to everybody in America and his views are sure to have had their converts. Among the most striking traits of the Slavic race he finds fatalism, indolence, stolidity, inertia, slowness, lethargy, conservatism, subservience, and lack of initiative. Passing from the people to the general spirit of the nation the writer finds the soul of Russia in the voice of Pobiedonostzev. But on this man's death the foreign press characterised him rightly as the best-hated man in all Russia.

The voice of Pobiedonostzev and of the officers, officials, landlords, bankers, merchants, and manufacturers, to whom this author expressly acknowledges his indebtedness for the information he gathered during the few weeks of his stay in European Russia, naturally supplied him with his view of

the nation's ideals. The author found that his interlocutors, whose identity he betrays when he speaks of the "ordinary Russian," "business man, banker, or what-not," "appears to be devoted to his Czar and Russian institutions," and that "the Czar is beloved by the great body of his subjects with an adoring affection not accorded to any other ruler." Finally he concluded that the Slav thinks that autocratic Czarism and the Orthodox Church are the "foundation stones of civilisation."

Unfortunately, many persons still believe that the Russian masses are devoted to their Czar and Church in spite of the plentiful evidence to the contrary in the recent revolutionary events. I shall deal with this fallacy in an early chapter. But in the meanwhile I shall show the superficial character of the broad assertions of this typical observer. The writer quotes without criticism or contradiction the statement of a landlord that the emancipation was granted by the "liberal" Czar "at the expense of the Russian nobility." The truth is that the chief cause of the present revolution is the crushing burden of taxes laid on the peasants to enable the Government to pay the nobility not only an ample, but often even an exorbitant, price for their losses both of land and the uncompensated service of the serfs. This same informant also told our writer that the ignorant peasants had not not known how to use their liberty and had even refused to use iron or steel ploughs. The truth is that the peasants had used iron ploughs even under serfdom, and as to the steel ones they do not employ them at the present day simply because they cannot afford the price. It is certainly not true that the peasant has ever refused to use any important agricultural implement within his purchasing power. Finally, this landlord informed our friend that the peasants had soon forgotten the severities of serfdom and remembered only "the comparatively trivial inconveniences" of the present time. I shall deal with these comparatively trivial inconveniences later. I can find no words for the ignorance, carelessness, or indifference of a person writing on the Russia of to-day for a necessarily ignorant audience, who reprints this phrase with every sign of approval and without giving anywhere a single fact or statement to counteract the singularly false and misleading impression it creates. The

present sufferings of the peasants may be less than those at the time of serfdom, but they are not trivial in comparison with those of any period through which humanity has passed, and to speak of them as inconveniences is a monstrous understatement of the truth.

The reader of Senator Beveridge's book knows that this writer's judgment has been condemned out of his own mouth. Writing just before the war with Japan he predicted in his book that there was no probability in international politics greater than the permanency of the Russian occupation of Manchuria. Writing after the outbreak of the great and bloody labour disturbances of 1902 and 1903, which he even mentions, he says that "there have been no considerable labour riots," that labour is submissive and there is no labour question. The year before the outbreak of the revolution he belittles what disturbances had occurred and expected nothing of a very serious character.

Another book is worth mentioning here as a sample of the malicious statements that have been circulated over the world as the truth. During the famine of 1906-7 Mr. Howard P. Kennard, M. D., an English "humanitarian," was in Russia to assist the Government and the landlords in relieving the wholesale starvation and disease they themselves had brought on. His book, "The Russian Peasant," he claims to be based on his own personal observation; however, in his preface he confesses himself indebted to such acknowledged friends of Nicholas II. and enemies of the Russian people as the Frenchman Leroy-Beaulieu, the Englishmen Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, and the courtier Prince Nicholas Sherebatov, one of the most hated men in all Russia.

Mr. Kennard unmistakably suggests that the peasants have not progressed since the time of Ivan the Terrible. He describes a national peasant festivity, which he claims is typical, as an "unbridled bestial orgy." He finds that "natural laziness and addiction to drink have brought the peasant to the pass he is in to-day," says that the peasant's belly is his god, that he does not wish to improve his condition, and that they do not even wish "to learn to farm in any other way than that which has been handed down to them by their forefathers."

Mr. Kennard declares that the "Russian peasant, devoid of all capabilities in the matter of reading and writing, has a mind and imagination which are ripe for the reception of all trash that Church, State, those desirous of influencing him for good or evil, may pour into his poor besotted brain." Our savant friend then proceeds to state "that the *only* subject he knows about is the subject of devils," and that the peasant's first thought every morning is "what will the Domovoi (household demon) do to-day?" In brief, Mr. Kennard finds the peasant "utterly unable to understand what is meant by education, progress, or culture."

Finally he sums up the peasant in this manner: "The peasant emerges from the ordeal to-day but the semblance of a man — a thing with half a mind, a mortal without attributes; a morbid being blessed with life alone, and cursed with ignorance and imbecility until, in the twentieth century, his melancholy has become innate."

All of these statements of Mr. Kennard are about as false and vicious as any calumnies concerning a whole people, or a large majority of any people, could well be. His book must remain a classic example of the stream of poison and hatred that pours into some hearts in the presence of the ugliness of human misery. I have no hope of driving the writer who penned such words to shame. But I do expect to show that, badly educated as the peasants are, a very large portion of them have more than a modicum of education and that they are thirsting for more, that far from being devoted to devils the peasants have a kind of natural instinct for independent religious and ethical ideas; and I expect to show that nothing but a readiness to accept prejudiced statements, or a natural blindness to truth while in its very presence, or a deeply ingrained hatred of mankind, could have led any person who has spent several months among the Russian farmers to find in them merely a creature ranking somewhere between man and beast.

I trust it is clear to the reader that the Russian people have enemies in all directions, even among those who claim the most loudly to be their friends; and I trust that he will read what follows unswayed by the self-evident prejudices so widely circulated by writers like those referred to above. This im-

partiality is important, not alone because of the immense interest attaching to the peasant, but also because he has so long remained an unknown quantity, even to the most sympathetic and unbiased minds.

The real character of the peasant has remained a mystery until to-day. He constitutes the greatest unknown element of the white race. He is just for this reason the most interesting human problem of our time. If his nature is undeveloped it is in the same proportion unfixed and unspoiled — in other words, the nature of the generic man. He will come to his majority in the twentieth century more freed from tradition than our own pioneers in the nineteenth. The Russian revolution, bound sooner or later to end in his favour, will not only make him master of half Europe and Asia, and revolutionise the relations of the world powers; it will decide the fate of every democratic movement on the continent, and give a new inspiration to the international movement for economic quality.

CHAPTER II

THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE — THEIR TRUE CHARACTER

BUT at last the mystery surrounding the peasant, his low reputation, are beginning to be dissolved. Since the first and second Dumas, in which the peasants' feelings and opinions, kept dumb for centuries, were for the first time publicly voiced, we have begun to get a glimpse of the true character of the peasants, of their true attitude toward the Government. The people's own chosen representatives have pointed out that the peasants are and always have been in a rebellious state, that the history of the Russian peasantry has been that of an unending series of revolts, and that the only reason a revolution has not yet overturned the Government is the terrible brute-power of the half-million semi-foreign Cossacks who guard the Czar. It appears in contradiction to everything the Government has claimed that the peasant is a democrat in everything and a Socialist in regard to the land, that he is almost without race prejudice, and that he is liberal and even independent in his religious views. There can no longer be the slightest doubt of these claims; the two elections are substantiated by tens of thousands of village meetings, endorsing the action and attitude of the people's representatives, and by thousands of cases in which the peasants have gone to imprisonment and death for supporting their political faith.

It seems that the spiritual, if not the physical, resistance of the people has risen proportionately to the unreason, injustice, and violence of the ruling caste. Instead of devotion to the Czar, there reigns in the mind of the peasant a supreme indifference to the spirit of his laws and an almost equal indifference to the authority of his Church. In this the Russian is removed at once from the subserviency of the German peasant before his officials, and that of the Southern Italian before his priests.

The story of the origin of the Russian Church gives the best

symbol of its position to-day. Before their "conversion" to Christianity, the ancient Slavs had a very simple and flexible form of belief. They were not idolaters or worshippers of many gods, they had no priests, and their cult was limited to that of Svarog, the god of heaven and light, certainly a rather spiritual deity who might well symbolise the universe and its life. The Emperor Vladimir, however, descendant of one of the Norse conquerors of the land, was impressed with the glory of Constantinople and the Greek Church, and proceeded quite in the scientific spirit to send a commission to study it and the other Christian churches. The commission returned overcome by the beauty of the singing, temples, and service of the Greeks. They declared that they found no gladness among the Bulgarians, and no beauty in the temples of the Germans, but among the Greeks they found such beauty that they knew not how to tell of it, they no longer knew, they said, "whether they were in heaven or on earth." "It is there," they reported, "that God dwells among men, and their service surpasses that of any land." So influenced by the beauty of the Greek Church's temples and service, and in return for the hand of a princess of the Eastern Empire, Vladimir was baptised, and gave up his promising design of capturing Constantinople, which if accomplished might well have transformed the history of Europe and the world. No sooner was he Christianised than with the true gesture of a Czar he ordered his people led to the rivers and baptised. Thus was Russia converted to the Greek Church.

In the same spirit a law among the statutes to-day requires every Russian citizen who does not belong to some other "recognised" creed to attend at least once every year the Orthodox service. Innumerable other enactments of the kind have followed without interruption since the time of Vladimir's baptism, and naturally have had no spiritual effect. To-day it is the pleasure taken in the service and singing that attracts the peasant; the priest does not as a rule enter seriously into his life. The priest is nearly always paid in kind for each service and so is economically dependent on the poorest peasants, who often find they can make a bargain better in proportion to the amount of vodka they can persuade him to drink. The priests also are forced to serve as the political agents of the



THE STORE

The peasants do so little buying, even of shirts and shoes that stores are small and not much in evidence



Government, and this the peasants do not fail to feel and resent. For instance, the priests received full instructions as to what they were to say and do during the elections for the Duma. The outraged peasants replied by ceasing to go to church, by refusing to do any labour for the priests, and even in some cases by proposing through the village meetings to take away their land. Subjected economically to the peasants, and politically to the police, even the relatively small number of the priests that possess the attributes to assume moral leadership are usually without the power to do so.

In what, then, does the peasant's loudly proclaimed Orthodoxy consist? In the first place he has shown an unconquerable tendency not to be Orthodox at all, but to do his own religious thinking. When two centuries and a half ago one of the Czars appointed a commission to study again the original forms of the Greek Church, which were supposed to have degenerated, the new ceremonies that were enacted were met by a variety of passive resistance as obstinate and successful as the world has ever seen. The passive resisters, the "Old Believers," were satisfied with the "Slavic" Church and the forms of service they themselves had helped to develop. The genius of the people, working through the Church, has developed an original and truly beautiful music that is a real source of inspirational delight. The people loved these forms as they were, they considered they had a God-given right to them. So they obstinately refused these Czar-imposed changes — refused them though persecuted and tortured relentlessly. The Czars, on the other hand, have realised that one freedom leads to another, and have claimed with equal obstinacy until to-day that God, having entrusted them with the absolute mastery of the peasants' bodies, has also made them tyrants of their souls.

A large portion of the peasants still go to the Czar's church, for in the sombre, isolated and often starving villages of the forests and the steppes, the most beautiful or least ugly spot is the church, and the most interesting occasion is its service. But they do not obey the Czar's priests and they have developed a morality of their own making. Another large part have not been deterred by the most terrible persecution from creating a religion also after their own ideas. The tendency to break

away altogether from the priests is general. A large part of the "Old Believers," especially those who settled in outlying districts where priests were difficult to obtain, decided finally to do without them altogether. The idea spread all over the country and of course led these "priestless" ones, as they are called, to do their religious thinking for themselves. The result is perhaps as large a body of sincere and rationalistic religious thinkers as is to be found among the people of any land.

But the religious evolution did not stop here. It has continued and grown with the increase of education and travel, and with the new life and new occupations of the people in this already half-modernised country. Along with a political revolution as profound as the French, is going on a popular religious reformation comparable only to the peasants' movements of Luther's time. The peasants have created systems of new religious belief on an entirely independent basis. The subtlety, simplicity and dignity of these beliefs has charmed, and even won, many of their observers. It is enough to remember that Tolstoi has confessed his deep indebtedness to both Molokani and Doukhobors. Though these numerous sects are still in progress of growth and development, their adherents are already numbered by the millions.

The Government, of course, is at present straining every nerve to repress and conceal these schisms and to strengthen in every possible way the Orthodox Church. Persecutions relaxed for a year or more after the Czar's famous promises of religious liberty, are every day being renewed. The warfare between the people's genuine religious instinct and the hated State Church is bound to go on undiminished.

The peasants have shown as much character in their attitude toward the laws of the Czar as toward his Church. The thousands of bloodily suppressed revolts, and the hundreds of thousands of cases of rebellious peasants who have languished away their lives in prison and exile, are only the lesser manifestation of the hatred for the Government. Where the people have been literally beaten into submission by the Cossacks, and this has happened at one time or another in most of the villages, there has arisen a spirit of passive resistance which has often ended by a complete victory over the Czar.

The Czars have always been able to exact from the peasant a terrible tribute of taxes and recruits. They have been able to tie the peasants to their villages and to prevent their escape from these exactions, but when they have attempted to interfere with the villagers' internal affairs, the imperial will has been shattered against the people's own ideas of right and wrong. Especially when they have tried to upset the peoples' own laws of property, it has been the autocrats who have had to surrender. The peasants as a whole have not yet permitted the Czars to subvert their laws of inheritance or their equitable system of distributing the land.

The hundred thousand villages where the mass of the Russian people live are in their internal affairs so many little immemorial republics. At the present moment, as at the earliest dawn of history, they are ruled by a pure spirit of democracy not only in political but in economic affairs. A large part of the peasant land is village property used by all the villagers in common; the rest is divided, and from time to time redistributed, according to the ideas of equity of the whole village. An estimate is made of each family's claims, either at the death of its head, or at the time of a general census, and the family is allotted a certain proportion of the village ploughed land. But no person is ever allowed to claim a right to a particular piece of soil, he has merely a right to a certain quantity. There is no such thing as title and private ownership of the land itself, since it is not a product of individual labour but a "gift of God." A family is allowed possession of a definite piece of the land long enough only to secure the family the fruits of its labour — that is, for the three years' rotation of crops which prevails — then triennial redistribution of land takes place. This is why the peasant deputies in the Duma can say with perfect truth that the peasants do not want the land to buy and sell, but merely to plough. They want more land in order that they may have more work. They have never in their own experience known what rents or unearned profits from land ownership are.

The village community, since it controls the peasant's means of livelihood, has an unlimited power over his existence. But this power is as democratic as it is unlimited. All the peasants live in the village, and are infinitely more intimately related

to one another than a country-people living on isolated farms. They work together and are always under one another's eye. The spirit is profoundly social, and has been made all the more so by the village ownership of the land. The democracy is therefore profound and rests on the feeling of full social and economic equality, which is the only sure foundation of democracy in any land. The village meetings concern themselves principally with questions of the chief and only great business of every member, the winning of the daily bread. And so the equality of these tens of thousands of little communities has gone deeper than any other equality we know, because it rests on a social and not merely on a political democracy.

There is no conflict between this village government and its citizens. The villages do not elect temporary masters to rule over them, like many so-called democratic communities. The starosta, or head of the village, is in very truth the servant of the community, and remains its servant in spite of all the St. Petersburg Government can do to make of him an authority of the despotic order always so necessary to a Czarism. The Czar has enacted that the starosta shall receive a good salary and be immune from taxes and corporal punishment; the Government has endowed him with enough insignia of office to buy the souls of the nobility of some European countries. But the village assembly considers him as its servant and gives its orders at every meeting as to its secretary or clerk.

The real business of the village is concentrated in the assembly itself, and there are few villagers that do not take an active part. There is nothing more immediate or important in their lives. Conducted on a scale sufficiently small to enable all the elements of the vital questions under discussion to be understood by everybody, the village meeting has come to form a part and parcel of the peasant's existence. Public life is not a thing apart as in some externally democratic countries where private business overshadows public affairs and politics are a mask for private interests and the greed for office. "As soon as public service ceases to be the principal business of the citizens," said Rousseau, "the state is already near to ruin." Of all modern communities the Russian villages are perhaps farthest from this calamity.

In some cases there is already complete communism — that is, both common ownership and common cultivation of the soil, a system that allows the advantages not only of every modern method of agriculture but of large scale production and the use of machinery that no small farmer can afford. Peasant companies (artels) often buy or rent a piece of land, work it together, and share expenses and profits according to a pre-arranged plan. In all the villages the peasants manage their cattle in common, cut their hay in common, and in many cases they own a common granary. A large part of the peasants, and the most progressive and enlightened experts on Russian agriculture as well, hope and believe that this coöperation in production, a natural outgrowth of the prevalent social spirit, will so develop as to make it possible that common property in land will remain the basis of Russian agriculture and of Russian society. The peasants' party in the Duma wishes each province to be allowed to adopt communism if it desires. This privilege would certainly be widely accepted and would result in the abolition of private property in two-thirds of the land.

The Czar's Government has looked with suspicion enough at this village nucleus of democracy and Socialism. A generation ago Alexander II. was deliberating over the village commune, or mir. The dangers to the Czarism of maintaining such a democratic institution were obvious. But for several generations the Czarism has been caught between two equal dangers — one due to the education and development of the people within the country, and another due to industrial progress of the rival nations without. If the village commune were to be dissolved to give place to private property, this would do away with the immemorial village republics; but it would also hasten the economic development of Russia by creating two new classes, landless working people furnishing cheap labour, and a rural middle class to furnish capital and business enterprise. The development of capitalists and cheap labour might in turn enable Russia to develop her industry, to accumulate wealth and to build up an army and navy fit to resist those of other modern lands. But such a development seemed to many of the highest officials highly undesirable.

Both working people and small capitalists are democratic everywhere, and it was they that had brought about the European revolution of 1848. So Alexander decided to keep the mir. He preferred a democratic village to a free nation, a pauperised people to a constitution.

But the same Czar also used all his power to maintain another class, whose interests were in sharpest contrast to the peasants' commune. He had made the landlords free their peasant serfs, but he allowed them to take away part of the peasants' land, while he forced these famishing agriculturists to take on a new and crushing burden of taxes and payments of indemnity for their own freedom. The result was that the peasants starved more and more as the years went on, agriculture stagnated and even deteriorated, it became impossible to beat more taxes out of the villagers, industry was without country purchasers, and the State finances were hopeless. The finance ministers, as we have seen, had introduced every manner of taxation, had protected industry, established a gold currency, built railways, and borrowed billions of rubles from abroad; but the Counsel of State, during Count Witte's ministry, was forced to confess the failure of all these measures to reach their chief aim and to declare that the Government was "powerless for the reorganisation of the life of the peasants and assisting agricultural industry." Read for "peasants" the "mass of the people" and for "assisting agricultural industry" "preserving from ruin the economic foundation of Russian society."

The Czars had no hope for their people. But the condition could scarcely be worse, and they began almost automatically to reverse their older policies. So finally the present Czar decided to abandon the mir. If there were no chance to save the mass of the people from starvation, perhaps he might aid a few of the peasants to establish an agricultural middle class on the ruin and pauperisation of the rest.

Minister Stolypine now proposes to give the last stroke to the village commune — to allow every starving peasant the right of selling his land, and to assign the communities' political powers to other higher, newer, and less dangerous local authorities. It is doubtful if the villages will surrender their political power, more than doubtful if they will allow a few of their number

the right to buy up the land of the rest. For the popularity of communal property has been growing, and the well-defined Socialist and revolutionary politics of the peasant representatives in the second Duma leave no further doubt of the Socialistic principles Russia will some day apply to her land. The great peasant institution, the Socialistic commune, will have furnished the basis of the future Russian State.

The peasants, then, show every sign of creative power, in religion, in politics, in economic institutions. They are independent and positive in their individual thought and feeling, social and democratic in public life. Have they also the practical qualities that will bring the revolution to a successful conclusion? We can be certain of at least two of the characteristics most essential to a rapid and sound development, open-mindedness to modern ideas, and the spirit of unity among themselves. They are open-minded with regard to national institutions because Russia has had no national traditions except those imposed by the violence of the Czar. The peasants have neither assisted in the law-making nor, except under coercion, obeyed the law. They are progressive also because conditions have united them by a close material and spiritual bond with two other classes that are as progressive, if not more so, than the corresponding classes of any other country — the working people and the professional element.

In Russia, as in no other land, the city working people and the country people form a single whole. The city workingmen were drawn only lately from the country. Most of them are in the habit of returning to the country from time to time; many go back for every harvest, for often the city work, service, driving, and so on, is less important to them than their interest in the village property. Furthermore, this current from city to country is increased by the tens of thousands of rebellious workingmen the Government sends back to their villages. All these workingmen have brought back with them the revolutionary ideas of the towns.

The educated classes have succeeded in establishing the most cordial and intimate relations with the people of both cities and villages. It is as if the whole country were an endless series of social settlements in which the settlement residents

had not merely sacrificed a few luxuries and pleasures, but had accepted the risk of imprisonment, exile, and execution. In all the great popular organisations of the revolution, the *intelligentsia*, or educated and professional classes, have played a predominant rôle, have been gladly accepted by the people, and have acted side by side with the people's leaders, who often owed their education in turn to that same class. The political parties are governed almost exclusively by these tried and cultivated democrats. The still more typically popular organisations, the Peasants' Union, the Railway Union, the Councils of Labour Deputies, were also managed almost entirely by men of university training and by self-educated peasants and workingmen. From the greatest professors and lawyers of the land down to the village doctors and school teachers, there has been one common movement toward the people — a movement not only for union against despotism, but for bringing to the people all the great ideas and aspirations of civilisation. The culture of this educated class being in many respects superior to that of other countries — as for instance, in knowledge of foreign languages, literature, and history, and in the sincerity of their social theories — the people secured a corresponding advantage. Through this movement some of the greatest ideas and highest aspirations of humanity have gained common circulation among the masses. Many Russian peasants and workingmen are now seriously and intelligently interested in foreign history, literature, economics, and politics. The politics and economics of their own land are put into terse and readable form by the "intellectuals," spread over the country in a sea of leaflets and illegal or short-lived newspapers, and literally devoured by the people of every village and workshop in the empire.

Thus there has arisen a great unity among the masses, including the educated and professional class. On the other side and in favour of the Czarism, are only the landlords, officials and army officers and those who accept their pay. Neither the bitterness and class hatred that characterised Germany, nor the selfishness of the extreme individualism that was created by early conditions and still characterises the United States, have ever existed in Russia, to plant in the minds of

the people anti-social or non-social instincts that may take generations to eradicate. The origin of the Russian people, its common struggle against those united powers of evil that call themselves the Czarism, and above all the situation in which it finds itself to-day, have joined together to create the strongest social and the first Socialistic nation of history.

It is not only the psychology of the people, it is the present situation itself, that has created this Socialistic sentiment. For whatever the causes of the revolutionary crisis, the crisis itself demands and requires a social solution. The situation is in sharpest contrast to that which prevailed at the birth of our nation. The United States of America were formed by a democratic population whose problem was to people a vast and uninhabited land. The United States of Russia will be formed by a democratic nation whose problem will be to provide a vast people with land. Our internal problem was purely political, to protect individuals from the violent encroachments of other individuals. Most economic and social problems were left in the individual's hands, and out of the control of society. The result has been the most developed individualism the world has known. The Russian people, on the contrary, are confronted with a problem that is at once social, economic, and political. The political problem is to do away, not with the violence of individuals, but with that of the State. The economic problem is the common need for all classes of the nation to lift to the level of the times the methods of the national industry of agriculture and the conditions of the whole agricultural class. As the great mass of the farms and farmers are at present on the same low level, this economic problem is not only common to all, but one in the solution of which society as a whole can and will certainly take an active part. The great social problem has to do with the present and future division of the land. If the Duma were to allow unrestricted private property, free trade in land under the present conditions, the penniless and needy peasants would be at the mercy of such among them as had a little capital at hand with which to buy the others' land. The peasants are painfully conscious of this danger, and have declared at innumerable village meetings that the right of private property would mean the still further impoverishment,

the absolute pauperisation, of the many for the benefit of a new landlord class. Some are, therefore, in favour of the retention of the old form of property, the village commune, adapted to new needs. All are for special laws restricting the rights of the individual owner and possessor, and all are in favour of the absolute subordination of private interests as the foundation of the new law and the NATIONALISATION OF THE LAND.

The social spirit goes to unimagined lengths. It has no sombre exceptions for persons of foreign race. The same feeling that holds individuals and classes together has bound into one whole all the races of the enormous empire. Finns and Tartars, with their separate religions, have lived for centuries in friendly neighbourliness with the Russian peasants all over the country. In certain sections, German and Jewish colonies have been treated in a cordial and neighbourly manner for a similar period. The White Russians and South Russians have lived for generations in harmony with Letts, Lithuanians, and Poles. The Siberian settlers have gotten along with innumerable Asiatic tribes, as we failed to get along with our Indians, and as the English failed to get along with their native subjects. When the Czars have decided to undertake a special persecution and robbery of some subject race — like the Jews — they have not been able to get the least support from the people on racial grounds, and have had to resort to the same purely religious pretexts with which they persecute the purest Russian sects. The few popular persecutions of the Jews on Russian territory have been the work not of Russians, but of Poles or of Roumanians, like Krushevan. This absence of race feeling is perhaps the last and severest test of the profundity, the completeness, of the social spirit that binds together this great-hearted people.

It is not merely a new race or a new nation that is coming into being in the great territory that stretches half-way round the world, from the Pacific to the Black and Baltic seas. The new country, casting aside all governmental violence within and invincible to external attack in its freedom and immensity, will be held together only by the common social problem and the common social idea. By its freedom and power it will be constituted a great and almost decisive influence for peace

among the nations. An essentially new people on the stage of the world, in possession of a boundless and almost undeveloped land, unhampered by traditions, accustomed to economic equality, and permeated with the social spirit, the Russians are likely soon to become the chief inspiration of the other nations, a position recently lost after having been held for a century by the United States.

CHAPTER III

HOW THE PEASANTS LIVE

THOUGH Russia's hundred million agriculturists are free from the self-imposed shackles of accepted tradition, both of Church and of State, yet they are by no means free from limitations forced upon them by their own meagre lives, by exhausting and almost unremunerated labour, and by the calamities through which they have had to pass. To see a little way into the lives of these so little understood people — to know concretely the daily work that makes them what they are — to understand the present meaning of their recent history, and even more to know just what they are thinking to-day — to know how far they have advanced in their feeling about coming social changes, how far they dare to pit themselves against the Government, and what are the qualities by which they expect to win and hold the power over the greatest empire in the world — it is necessary not only to hear what sympathetic and educated Russians have to say, but it is also necessary to move among the peasants themselves. So after having interviewed in the towns numerous experts on Russian agriculture and the condition of the peasantry, I went out among the villages armed with introductions to doctors, school teachers, and other devoted persons of education living there, and also to certain of the more intelligent peasants who were able to put me in touch with the rest. I visited half a hundred villages, scattered from the northern forests of Kostroma to the southern steppes of Poltava, from near the Asiatic frontier to the former Polish province of Kiev, and talked with several hundred peasants of every condition and every class. I made it a practice to verify all statements made to me; I endeavoured always to avoid the prejudices of a given moment or a given place; and I checked by personal observations the statistics I had obtained in the provincial capitals, and then in turn I had my observations

criticised by the doctors, teachers, agricultural experts and statisticians who are giving their lives to the betterment of country conditions. In this business I spent half of the summer of 1906, while the revolutionary movement was still in swing, and half of the summer of 1907, when the revolution had greatly subsided and the peasants were hoping to overturn the Czarism only after a desperate struggle that would perhaps not even begin in its full intensity for several years.

A mention of some of the circumstances attending these trips will afford an insight into the internal condition of Russia. The Government is trying to quarantine the villages from all contact with the world's intelligence by means just as stringent as those taken to quarantine them from Asiatic cholera or any pest. Very many of the city persons to whom I was directed, although by no means active revolutionists, had just been hurried off by the officials to be entombed in prisons or exiled to the arctic deserts, merely because they had visited some village, or happened to be acquainted with a few peasants. Most of the courageous, progressive element had indeed disappeared on my second circuit of the provincial towns. Those that remained often did all they could to discourage me from the very idea of visiting any Russian village. Indeed, it is so difficult and rare for Russians to be allowed to travel about among the peasants that on my return from the first journey in 1906 I was eagerly interviewed, even by some who have devoted their whole lives to a study of the peasant question. Occasionally it happened that I would have to spend several days in a provincial capital of some one hundred thousand people, with the best introductions, before any one would dare to suggest the name of some friend in the country to whom I might talk without endangering his safety. In one province, after remaining several days, I had finally to abandon entirely the idea of visiting any of the several thousand villages it contained.

In this great quarantine, probably the lack of sufficient railways and the almost total lack of good roads does more automatically to keep the villages and towns separated from one-another than all the Government can accomplish with its oppression. Whenever I had to wait in a railway station I found dozens, sometimes hundreds, of peasants lying about

on the hard floors waiting for trains, where often they had waited for days. Sometimes the trains were late, but usually the delay was because the Government did not take pains to furnish sufficient cars for such very common passengers. This is doubtless a matter of much less consequence to the peasant than the fact that the cars he needs to transport his products are not on hand, and the further fact that the railways are not able to take the peasants' products to market but rather serve the largest estates and industries or are used merely for strategic military ends.

Away from the railways conditions are infinitely worse. Of course there are no roads whatever in the sense of paved roadways. Everywhere there is naturally some effort to drain off the most serious mud holes and to bridge over otherwise impassable streams, but even this work is so badly done that the roads are often utterly impassable for many weeks, while in many sections the bridges are in a passable condition only in that part of the year when they are strictly necessary. This condition is partly due not only to the poverty of the peasant, who in the Province of Simbirsk spends only half a cent a head per year on the repair of roads, but also partly to the Government which allows the landlords to have an absolute monopoly of the local government and even to pay no taxes whatever for such purposes. It is unnecessary to attempt a calculation of how many hundred million rubles such a state of the roads costs this miserably poor country that can so ill afford such waste.


In the great majority of the Russian provinces I did not see any isolated farm-houses. The villages, where live the peasants, are separated by many miles of forests or fields. Usually the first objects that struck the eye before entering a village were a large number of windmills. These are nearly everywhere constructed on the same primitive pattern and entirely of wood, apparently as they were a hundred years ago. It seems that the milling of flour on an economic scale has scarcely begun in most of the villages. It is also to be noted that the windmills are owned and operated in common by a group of several families, as is so often the case in Russian country life. The same coöperative habit can be noticed



CHILD SUFFERER IN A FAMINE DISTRICT



COTTAGE INTERIOR



in the presence outside the villages of flocks and herds tended by a single shepherd or cowherd, generally some small girl. The average family has only a very few head of cattle, and usually the herding is done in common.

The village consisted as a rule of a single street, a mile or more long. Here I was reminded at once of the ever-present despotism that weighs like a nightmare on the land. Most of the villages have the appearance of fortified camps, are surrounded by palisades, and toward evening have a guard standing at the gate. This is no mere figure of speech, for the Government actually does consider the villagers to be prisoners for the night. Here is an order issued by a "land-official" in 1899 which became a popular model for such orders among other such officials of his class:

Nobody shall leave the village at night *at all*, or in the day-time for more than twenty-four hours without reporting to the selectman where he is going and for what purpose. For any departure without permission the guilty one shall be punished. Anyone who departs at night is to be reported in the morning by the watchmen and sentinels to the selectman, who is to inquire into the matter and punish disobedience, *even if it be proven that there was nothing suspicious or improper in the departure.*

That this law is enforced more generally than ever to-day there need be little doubt. Further, the Government has not only guarded the villages, but in many cases has established a night patrol across the country as well — as is done in a conquered country.

There is a remarkable similarity among the houses in a village. As a rule there are not more than two or three houses in an entire village that differentiate themselves by some slight change from the others — though of course in different parts of the country the style and size of the cottage varies considerably. There is usually no iron employed, and even wood for doors is sparingly used. The single door is made so small that a peasant above the average height is unable to enter without bowing his head. Everywhere the people spend no small part of their time in re-thatching the roofs and re-plastering the cracks in their houses with mud. Extremely cheap and amateur construction make necessary a great deal more repairs than are required in other countries. Of course if the house

falls into a bad condition while the peasants are very busy, or when they have lost a hand by death, they are forced to stand the cold and moisture for a long period.

The cottage is generally fifteen by thirty feet, and half of it, without windows and constructed more poorly than the rest, is built for animals rather than for men. Indeed, every cottage is also a stable. As we pass through the low door we come into the animals' part of the house. Here we often stumble over cattle, chickens, and pigs, and some of the more valuable agricultural implements. It is impossible to describe this part of the house, for there is really nothing here to describe. Passing through the second door we come into the one room, about fifteen feet square, that serves as kitchen, sleeping and living room for the whole family of six to twelve persons — for a "family," it must be remembered, consists not only of parents and children, but also of the grandparents, and perhaps of a non-relative or two, for all single unattached adults of a community are divided up among the families.

The worked-out old people — they are the cause of one of the greatest tragedies of peasant life. They are the paupers of paupers. It is no easy situation for a family, the food-producers of which are starving, to be compelled to share its food with those who can contribute nothing. Sometimes the peasants find themselves looking forward to the time when the old people will be removed by a natural cause. Nor is this the worst of the tragedies which come from the fearful poverty and overcrowding in the cottages. It is unnecessary to picture conditions that often arise when ten or fifteen people of both sexes and all ages, sometimes not very nearly related, are piled up on a single broad wooden shelf and the single earthen stove that constitute the only cottage beds.

The only furniture in such a place is a table, benches around the wall, and the large shelf that composes the sleeping place of all the family, except the old people, for whom the top of the stove is reserved. Both benches and beds remind one of the jail furniture that in more prosperous countries is considered a part of the punishment of the convicted criminal.

Almost everywhere windows are few and very small; they are often broken, and often they are sealed so that it is

impossible to open them the year through. It must be remembered that in mid-summer Russia has the same hot and dry weather that prevails in America. The inability to open the windows in the summer is a very great evil, but a far greater one is the inability to replace during the long and terrible winter the broken panes on account of the cost of glass. In consequence many broken windows are boarded up a large part of the year. As soon as the weather becomes a little chilly even such as can be opened are immediately tightly closed until the return of spring. Many superficial visitors are disgusted at such an unhealthy habit; but this is not a matter of sanitary or unsanitary habits—it is a matter of expense. Nothing is more costly in many parts of the country than wood. To open one of the little windows, even partly for a whole day or night, would doubtless cost the peasant several kopecks for fuel. Perhaps it would be better for the health of the family if he would spend this little sum and eat a little less, already famishing as he is. Let us remember, however, that a large part even of the educated classes of Russia's neighbour, Germany, would unquestionably reach the same unsanitary solution wherever the question lay between expense and fresh air.

Do not convict the peasant too hastily of uncleanness. There is no doubt that he lives in contaminating proximity with his calves, chickens, and sometimes also with his pigs. The reason for this is not far to seek. In the long and severe winters the animals would often freeze if it were not that they got a little of the heat of the living-room. Furthermore, it is true the peasant does not often change his clothes. An answer to this charge is, he has not the clothes to change. In addition it can be said in his behalf that, as the public bath-house is an institution of his country, there is much more cleanliness in Russia than there was, for instance, in some parts of America in the early days when no such institution existed.

Not only do the peasants not have enough inner garments to permit cleanliness, but they do not have enough shoes and overcoats to keep them warm. I was shocked when I saw women passing along the roads in their short skirts on windy winter days and noticed that they wore no woollen clothing of any kind. It would seem to be possible for the peasant to have

at least enough of these cotton garments for cleanliness and warmth if the Government had not put such a high customs tariff on cotton and cotton goods that the wretched consumers are forced to pay several prices for all they buy. As it is, the man has not enough shirts or the woman enough skirts even for decency, not to speak of warmth.

As for woollen garments, they are rare. Is it not incredible that in this country, possessing more pasture land than any other on earth, there should be insufficient wool for the elementary needs of the population, and insufficient hides and leather to enable the people to wear leather shoes? For in the south, and in the north in the summer, the shoe is not of leather, but is of woven bark such as is used by many a primitive race. Even in winter one sees more boots of felt than of leather. But worst of all, these wretched people are not able to afford warm overcoats. It is by no means always that a peasant has a good sheep-skin coat. If he does possess one, it is often held together in tatters for many years until it reaches a disgusting degree of filth. Certainly a sheep-skin coat is the least expensive garment imaginable to protect him from the winter, but even that is all but beyond his attenuated means.

It is almost superfluous to speak of the dreadfully low quality and poor variety of the peasant's food. He himself considers that he is very fortunate when he has enough to eat, to say nothing of quality or variety. The staple diet is black bread and potato soup, with in summer green cucumbers or water-melons. The staple drink is not tea as is commonly supposed; on the other hand this is considered rather as a luxury. Their chief drink is "kvas," which is brewed from sour bread. It is not only tea which is looked upon as a luxury more than a necessity, but often also sugar, cabbage, and even a sufficient amount of salt. All these articles are to be seen in every peasant's cottage, but they are very sparingly used. The tea is diluted and adulterated until it is almost unfit to drink, the salt is coarse and dirty from long keeping until it is repugnant even to the eye. Of meat, even the coarsest cuts of pork are not eaten daily, but are a luxury indeed. A large part of the peasant families have meat only on the greatest holidays — that is, four times a year.

But in the preceding paragraph I have spoken only of the average. A teacher from one of the poorer districts, who knew all the peasants of her village, assured me that there, even when there is no famine, the ordinary peasant does not drink tea, that there are no vegetables in common use except green cucumbers, and that he who can put fat in his soup is considered by the others to be a rich man. Instead of meat on the ordinary holidays, they were able to purchase only a little dry fish. And during the frequent famines the food is infinitely more miserable; the flour, to increase the bulk of the bread, is mixed with hay, straw, bark, and even earth.

One feels keenly just what life on this basis means when one considers the life of the women. Of course, it is impossible for any woman that must work like a man in the fields to give any attention to cooking. Bread is baked once a week, and this is about all the cooking; occasionally, with a great effort and at a sacrifice of her already exhausted strength, a peasant woman will be able to cook a little potato or cabbage soup in the evening. Ordinarily she leaves a few pieces of bread at home for the children, takes some more with her to the fields and returns only after an absence of twelve to fifteen hours—for we must remember that the Russian system forces the peasants to work at a great distance from the villages. It happens not only occasionally, but very commonly, that the women give birth to children in the fields, that they are carried home only in the evening, and that in three or four days they are back again at work, taking the child with them. The inevitable result is that nearly every peasant woman of middle age is sick in some way or other.

Women who work and live and suffer like this are naturally unable to see anything of life or even of the commonest conditions immediately around them. One woman with whom I spoke, who happened to be very intelligent, had never been on a railway train in all the forty-five years of her life although the station was only four or five miles away. Twelve years before my visit she had been in a little town a few miles away, but not since. Her case was not an extreme one. This woman, as well as other educated persons in the neighbourhood, assured me that in a village not very far away the women were unable to feed their children after a few months, and that the children

were then nourished on bread previously chewed by the women and put into little sacks. Of course, such children die wholesale; the greater part of Russia's fearful mortality figures apply to children under one year of age. Also in the village referred to even the grown-up men were under-sized.

I spoke of these fearful conditions to one of Witte's lieutenants in St. Petersburg, and asked him what was the hope for the Russian peasant. Of course no satisfactory answer was forthcoming. But although he did not have a solution, he did have a point of view, and this came out as the result of his telling how it was very common among the peasants to wear a belt and to tighten it frequently to allay the pangs of hunger. "Why, under the present perfectly hopeless circumstances," he asked, "is this not a very practical device? Why may it not pay both the peasant and Russia that he should just take in his belt? The peasant is underfed, but there is not enough work for him to do. Why should he be kept in full strength? Is it not fortunate for Russia that her peasants do not have the habit of eating as much as they do elsewhere? For the most part they manage to live and cost the country comparatively little. This is lucky for the peasant, as there is no possibility of obtaining any more. Countries differ in respect to diet as in respect to everything else. There are many savage races that, forced by necessity, have accommodated themselves to the most varied and meagre diet. It is only by this power of accommodation that they manage to survive."

He was thoroughly aware of all the tragedies of the situation, but he accepted them as if there was no ray of hope in any direction. Like the minister of finance, he stated that Russia's grain exports were momentarily rising, because the people were too poor to be able to keep their food for themselves; he pointed out that the exports of eggs and butter from Siberia deprived the Siberian peasants themselves of these simple articles of diet. But when he finally took an economic standpoint in which he viewed the peasant entirely as he viewed a horse, the true inwardness of his philosophy came to the light. While we were speaking of the degeneration of the Russian horse and of the fact that it was also underfed, he insisted that it was not worth while feeding *such a horse*, and used the same terms with which

he had spoken of the peasant. For the most part the Russian officials do not have any social philosophy, but this is the morality of those who do. The Russian peasants, they confess, are in a deplorable condition — so little advanced, indeed, that it would not even pay for the State to make any sacrifice on their behalf.

The terribly low productivity of the peasant's agriculture and the small size of his income are of course at the bottom of his suffering. He is receiving about one-third the income of a poor German peasant, one-fourth that of a French. He is producing only about one-half enough to properly feed himself and animals. To discuss a remedy for this condition leads at once to the whole social problem, the whole economic and political situation of the country, a matter on which conclusions can be reached only farther on; but in the meanwhile it can be pointed out how the situation is aggravated by the Government. There are two very reliable estimates of the portion of the peasant's income which goes into the treasury of the Government in the form of direct taxation; one from the relatively poor province of Saratov and the other from the relatively rich province of Moscow. In the poor province, where the net family income is only 114 rubles (\$57), more than half goes in the form of taxes to the Government. In Moscow where the income, the highest in Russia, is nearly four hundred rubles, nearly one-fifth goes to taxation. Of the taxes the most important are the indirect.

In proportion as the direct taxes have been slowly lowered, the indirect have been rapidly elevated. It must not be supposed, however, that direct land taxes absorb any small part of the peasant's income. Direct taxes going to the Central Government have been recently much decreased, but there has been at the same time a very large increase in direct taxes going to the province and the village. As the relation between the local and Central Government is so intimate the latter takes advantage of the new taxing power of the local government, made possible by the retirement of the central authorities, to throw off on the provinces many of its own burdens, and it may soon be that the sum total of all direct taxes will also begin again to increase.

In the last twenty-five years some of the indirect tax-rates have been raised almost every year. It is estimated that between 1880 and 1902 the tax on tea increased threefold, that on sugar, five, and that on cotton six; the increased duties on copper and iron have corresponded. The American Bureau of Statistics estimates that on account of the taxing system Russians are forced to pay four times as much for petroleum as they would otherwise. The result is not only that the people are paying several times more for ordinary articles than they should, but that they are absolutely unable to purchase very large quantities of any of the articles so heavily taxed. Where modern industries are arising, as in the cities, and the people are slightly better off, they are consuming five times as much sugar, ten times as much tea, eighteen times as much petroleum, as in the country.

The robbing of the people through this system is effected not only by the money taken by the State itself, but also through the abnormal profits the very high customs tariff gives to the Russian manufacturer. The latter is the chief beneficiary from the several prices which are paid for cotton goods and for sugar. But in other cases, tea and alcohol for instance, the profit of the system is almost altogether the Government's. Four-fifths of all that the peasants pay for alcohol goes into the coffers of the Government and half of what he pays for tea. On tea and cotton alone, the greater portion of both of which goes into the hands of the masses, the Government raises over a hundred million rubles.

If any considerable portion of all these sums, so vast for a poor country like Russia, came back to the people, perhaps there would be somewhat less reason for complaint. But if we were to examine the expenditure of the Russian budget (excluding expenditures for businesses like alcohol and railways which are privately operated in other countries) we would find that over one-half of the total sum expended for purely governmental ends, goes for the army and navy and the police, while another fourth goes to pay the interest on the over-swollen national debt. In reckoning the sum paid for interest by the Government as one-fourth of the total expended, I have not included the interest on sums borrowed for railways, although

a very large part of this money also served for almost purely military ends.

Considering the many millions of persons that have died in Russia in the last decade from direct starvation or diseases that are derived from it, the amount borrowed and spent on such an absolutely prime national necessity as the relief of famine has been trivial — a total of a few hundred million rubles in all these years. We cannot at all grasp the conditions of the life of the Russian peasantry without recalling the almost chronic famines. We must remember that not only do famines occur occasionally, but that in the larger part of the country they occur with the greatest regularity every two or three years. Of course I did not fail to enter into a famine district in order to see with my own eyes what the conditions were. In the district of Buzuluk, in the province of Samara, the crop had been so small in 1906, and what little grain there was left was so valuable, that the peasants pulled the stalks by hand, finding it impossible to use their scythes. There was even no hay for the horses, and in August they were already breaking down with disease and the people were feeding the thatched roofs of barns to the dying animals. In a small district seven hundred cows had already been sold, which meant, of course, more starvation for the coming year. Horses were selling at five and ten rubles, and goats for as little as seventy-five kopecks. The peasants had recently been forced to buy grain at a ruble and a quarter, the grain they had sold a few weeks before for three-quarters of a ruble. The children were already too weak to study and had left the schools — the village meetings had declared that they would soon die of hunger. Some parents, finding they could not feed their children by staying at home, had left them behind in the village, hoping they might be able somewhere or other to earn them a little bread.

The Government was doing something to relieve the famine, but the relief was ridiculously insufficient and outrageously administered. The peasants were being given for the whole season forty pounds of grain for each person in the village, whereas at least two hundred pounds would be required. The Government was feeding the people not with bread, but with a weak soup made out of potatoes and bread. Not only was the

Government ration insufficient, but in many places the grain sent for seeds was mixed with earth and manure, even to such an extent that in one case the peasants of a certain village had refused absolutely to accept it. In some districts the grain sent for food was rotten and full of worms; in others the seed needed for planting on the first of September had only been half delivered when that time arrived. In still others, as was brought out in the noted case of the stealing grain-contractor, Lidval, and his friend, Assistant Minister Gurko, a large portion of the sum assigned for this purpose was stolen outright. I have called attention elsewhere to the fact that Lidval was let out of jail on bail, and that it was impossible in the Government's courts to place any criminal responsibility on the shoulders of the former minister.

Let us recall that while the peasants are starving, the exports of rye, even from the very district where the famine occurred, continued, and that the total exports of the country in the famine year of 1906 even rose, and that the encouragement of these large exports is the basis of the whole financial policy of the country. And let us remember, finally, that the new law which allows the peasant for the first time to sell or mortgage his land, will rob him during such famine periods of the only assurance that remains to him of the slightest chance of extricating himself from his hopeless situation.

In 1906, when the official reports showed that thirty million people were on the verge of starvation, Russia's grain exports actually reached a value of more than five hundred million rubles—more than sufficient to have prevented the death by famine diseases of several hundred thousand children, and to have kept alive millions of dying horses and cattle on which the peasants' life or death in the future depended. If the peasants had not been pauperised by taxes, they would have bought this grain and never have allowed it to leave the country. If the landlords had not been subsidised for a generation, they would never have owned either the grain or the land that produced it, and the famine would not even have existed. For famine is a by-product of poverty. We have the same droughts in America as they do in Russia, sometimes even the same crop failures; but we do not have famines. Our farmers have too much money in the bank.

And this new law is Stolypine's great reform. The overwhelming majority of the people must continue to starve. The State is not prepared to make any great financial sacrifice or fundamental reorganisation of the Government in their behalf. But at any cost it must have a few million farmers of the German or American sort. So the State has decided to give over the mass into the hands of the more thrifty and business-like few, to sacrifice the ninety penniless families of the village for the five or ten that have a little cash. The penniless peasants are to be allowed for the first time to sell and mortgage their little lots. The very first famine they will be sold into the hands of their more usurious or thrifty neighbours. It will then doubtless be possible for many of these latter to build up quite modern little farms of fifty to a hundred acres with several of the former peasants as labourers, forced to accept all wages and conditions offered or to starve.

The Government proposes to reduce ninety million of Russia's peasants to a still lower level of dependence and misery than that on which they now live, in order, by handing over their property to the rest, to build up the prosperity of the remaining ten millions. This, in Governmental Russia, is what is called "social reform."

CHAPTER IV

HOW THE PEASANTS TILL THE SOIL

IT IS impossible for the peasants to extricate themselves from their terrible predicament. Their farming is doomed to pitiful failure from the outset. The youngest American farmer boy would die of irritation if he were set to work under the antiquated conditions that prevail everywhere in Russia. It is very difficult indeed to make the reader realise how far behind in this respect the Russian peasants are; yet we must not imagine them too backward. It was only a generation or two ago when many parts of America and several European countries were farmed in a similar manner; and in the United States even to-day there are to be found localities in the out-of-the-way mountains of the East where methods are not much more improved.

In the conditions of labour we can see, as in no other part of the lives of the Russian people, the extent to which they have been debarred from civilisation, and why their condition is hopeless without some revolutionary change. We have seen that the peasant is underfed; Kornilov shows that the men have 17 per cent., the horses 40 per cent., less food than they require, even to maintain their full working power. But the peasants want work as much as they do bread; they are even more underworked than they are underfed. A Government commission investigating the cause of poverty in central Russia found the men had enough work to employ only one-fifth, and the horses enough to employ only one-third, of their working power.

Here, then, were the great, incontestable truths underlying the peasants' condition. Neither the farmers nor the farm animals have enough to keep them from physical degeneration. Even if the peasant was sufficiently occupied to keep himself from starving to death, there would still be no chance for him to

save money and to accumulate that capital absolutely necessary for the regeneration of his agriculture; even if the men and farm animals had enough to eat, the peasants would still be idle three-fourth of their time and the horses one-half the time; there would be no money to buy better animals or better ploughs, no means to increase the miserable yield of the crops and to improve the lot of the miserable agriculturist.

We cannot account for these conditions by saying simply that Russia has not entered into the pale of civilisation as far as agriculture is concerned. Everywhere one passes great estates of the nobility and merchants, or occasionally of the very exceptional peasants who have become rich from usury and the very sufferings of their fellow-countrymen. In nearly every such estate modern agricultural methods are applied, often in the most advanced manner. Everywhere peasants are employed on these places, and after a little natural prejudice at the beginning, they soon master the most complicated machines. It is not, therefore, as if the people did not know what scientific methods are. We are facing in Russia not the poverty of barbarism, but the poverty of civilisation, a clear social product.

Anyone with a pencil and paper can verify in a few minutes the reckoning of the great geographer, Elisee Reclus, that Russia, cultivated like Great Britain, should sustain the population of five hundred million souls. Cultivated like the United States even, it should keep in prosperity half that number; whereas at the present moment a large part of its one hundred and forty million starves. Nor does the condition tend to improve. Every year, while the population increases 2 or 3 per cent., the agricultural production of the country increases only about half as fast. While American farmers have learned to get at least twice as much from an acre as they did half a century ago, the Russian peasants are actually producing less than they did at the time of the emancipation in 1861.

This is bankruptcy, ruin, and degeneration for the peasants' agriculture. Of course the soil is being robbed and exhausted and the farm animals are becoming weaker and smaller every year. In the agricultural section, too, men die twice as rapidly as in any other modern country. Every year half a million

human lives, more than those lost in the whole of the Japanese war, are sacrificed to the demon poverty.

This is the social evil in Russia, this is the marsh and quicksand on which courtier-statesmen are building their gilded and tawdry structure of mere police reform. Since Witte's Council of State declared the Government helpless to aid the peasantry, no minister has had the effrontery even to claim that anything could be done to strike at the root of Russia's ills.

When I went to the villages I knew that I saw conditions that have existed over half a century, that are not improving themselves to-day, and that the Government has no hope to improve materially "in this epoch," to use the words of Witte. When I saw how the Russian Government leaves the farmer to sow and reap, I saw at the same time into the very heart of hearts of the Czarism's pretensions. Laying aside for the moment the question of the right of any man to govern and master another without that other's consent, forgetting that the Russian peasant has a right to the full power over his own life, if for no other reason than because nobody else has any superior claim to exercise that power, let us see how the Czar has employed his "God-given" pretension to act as "shepherd to his flock," to employ again a favourite official phrase.

Before entering into the Russian villages themselves, even from the train windows, two or three significant features of the peasants' agriculture can be noted: first, that the fields are everywhere divided into very long and ridiculously narrow strips, often stretching as far as the eye can reach and only a few paces wide; and, second, that every third field is lying fallow all the year around. The strips result from the fact that all the land of the village is the common property of the whole. In their crude efforts to attain equality in the division of the land, and the absence of any method of exactly estimating the value of the different kinds of soil in the village's possession, each field is divided among all the several hundred villagers in this manner. Even where, as it happens sometimes in Western Russia, that a single peasant is allowed to own several "shares," the same method of division is used.

This custom, one of the greatest evils in the present system, and recognised as such both by the Government and the



TYPICAL PEASANT'S CART



WOODEN PLOWS AND HARROWS —

Still in wide use (neither the wagon nor these implements have any iron about them, not even for nails)



peasants, is to be attributed almost entirely to the oppressive system of the Government. No sooner was there a measure of liberty a year or so ago, than both peasants and educated persons who worked in their behalf began to replace this awkward triennial redistribution of the land by some kind of graduated land tax, such as is already in practice in Australia. There is no tendency on the part of the peasants to abandon their almost instinctive insistence on the greatest possible economic equality, but it is evident that a graduated tax is a far superior method of reaching this end than the perpetual redistribution of the land, especially in these utterly impractical narrow strips.

The other feature to be seen from the car window, the fallow fields, indicate the still universal use in Russia of the ancient "three field system." The peasantry have never been rich enough to afford a rotation of crops, to be able to plant a field in root crops and to wait for a good yield; neither have they enough farm animals to be able properly to utilise these crops, or to manure the fields. If they stick to the old wasteful system it is not due to ignorance, but to the pressure of sheer economic necessity.

The implements used by the peasants are almost incredibly crude. The majority of the waggons I have examined were made without the least scrap of iron, as was sometimes the case among our pioneer farmers over a century ago. The plough is for the most part of a type that has been in use for more than a hundred years, while the so-called new plough, also in common use, is two or three generations behind the times. The harrow, like the waggon, is made without a scrap of iron. Nor is it iron alone that is too expensive for extensive use; it is very rare that the peasant can afford anything but rope or thongs of some wild fibre for the harness either of his carts or his ploughing implements.

In this beautiful and immensely rich agricultural country, with its long sunny days in the summer, its plentiful snows in the winter, and its very wonderful black soil, the vastest agricultural plain in the world, all the work of cultivating the soil is carried on in such a primitive and wasteful manner that far more of its riches go to waste than are economically utilised. Everything, of course, is done by hand. The seeds are cast out of a

sack or apron, as they were a hundred years ago. Naturally, the birds that are to be seen everywhere in immense swarms, get a large part. Then if there is too much rain, the seeds rot, or if not enough, it is very common for the wind to heap them up or to blow them away. The ploughing as a rule is about six or eight inches into the soil. In the eastern half of Russia, in the most fertile sections, droughts are very frequent. If a plough was here used that turned up from twelve to eighteen inches, to say nothing of the use of the modern dust blanket idea, there would be very few famines at all in the land, but at the worst only half crops. That this is no exaggeration is proven by the results already achieved by some of the German colonists that settled in the heart of Russia over a century ago.

In the summer of 1905, when there was almost a complete crop failure on the lower Volga, where I happened to be, I was able to secure some of the crop statistics of these German colonists and their Russian neighbours in nine German and eighteen Russian townships. These figures show that already the Germans have learned to produce one-quarter or one-half crop where the Russians get practically nothing. In the majority of the Russian townships, the rye crops showed next to nothing, while in the majority of the German there was almost one-quarter of a normal crop. While a large part of the Russian townships produced less than one-quarter of the normal wheat crops, the majority of the German townships were able to obtain from one-quarter to one-half of a normal crop. Now of course these Germans are also poor and have by no means introduced the most modern methods. Where they obtained a fourth, there is little doubt that our Kansas farmer could have obtained half a crop.

Of course the first cause of the peasants' agriculture is his poverty, just as the first cause of his poverty is his bad agriculture. The average peasant family is enabled to obtain an income altogether of only one hundred to two hundred rubles (fifty to one hundred dollars); the most friendly of the reformers do not undertake to promise him that he will be able to bring his income to higher than two hundred rubles within the first few years. To show just what these figures mean, we have many scientific investigations of the peasants' expendi-

ture. Such an inquiry in the province of Veronege showed that the peasants' total household expenditure, outside of purchases of food for men and horses, was a little less than one hundred rubles, that he invested for building thirty-four, for clothes twenty-five, for farm animals twenty-four, for implements about eight, and for furniture and vessels six. If we convert these figures into dollars it is not necessary to have any further explanation of the backwardness of the peasants' agriculture.

I took pains frequently to learn what the peasant paid for ploughs, harrows, and waggons — and these prices will indicate the inefficiency of the implements. For the most modern plough in use he was paying five rubles and every three years he had to renew the ploughshare at the cost of about 1.80 rubles. These ploughs were manufactured in the village with the exception of certain bolts, screws, and simple pieces that the smiths bought from the factory. I found that the peasants rarely paid more than ten rubles for a waggon, and one waggon-maker assured me a majority of those he made he sold for only five rubles and that such a waggon was the result of one week of his labour. The harrows with iron teeth, which are in rather common use, are worth five or six rubles, but I saw more wooden ones which were only worth a ruble or two.

I have traced the blame of these conditions first of all to the poverty and general condition of the country; but the Government, besides being responsible for this, has also a special blame. The tariff of the customs duties on iron has been placed so high that the peasants can scarcely afford to use even nails. As a result Russia uses per head one-tenth as much iron as the United States. The duty on the machinery the peasant requires is correspondingly high, and there can be no question that a large part of all his technical expenses are due directly to this high tariff policy of the Government.

The condition in respect to the live stock is even more illuminating than that of the implements. More than one-fourth of the peasants' households are entirely without a horse, another third has only one horse, while only slightly more than a third have two or more. The condition is not getting better, but worse. In the centre of the country, out of one hundred

families, one every year joins the horseless class. Still more striking is the fact that the average Russian horse weighs little more than half of the better breeds of France. In 1870 there were nine head of cattle for each household. Every ten years this number has fallen one; in 1900 the average number was only a little over six head of cattle for each household. Neither in cattle, sheep nor pigs are the Russian peasants one-quarter as well provided as those of Germany.

To make still more clear the remarkable inferiority of the agriculture of the Russian peasant, let us contrast the better farmers among the Russian peasants with those of the leading agricultural states of the American Northwest. The American farmer in this section has about one hundred acres of land, the Russian peasant about twenty. The value of the land of the American farmer is about four times as great, so we see already that the landed wealth of the American is twenty times that of his Russian competitor — for we must not forget that these two great grain-exporting countries and their farmers are competitors in the world market.

The value of the live stock and implements is in about the same proportion. We may reckon this in Russia to be about twenty-five rubles for machinery and seventy-five for live stock—that is altogether about one hundred rubles or fifty dollars; whereas the American farmer of the Northwest has more than two hundred dollars in implements and machinery and nearly eight hundred dollars in live stock. Witte estimated the value of the Russian agriculture products of 1897 as one and a half billion rubles; those of America were about eight times as great. The area of the crops in the two countries was about the same. This relative condition is not changing, for whereas in the last decade our wheat crop increased 39 per cent. that of Russia scarcely increased 9 per cent.

The contrast is even greater in regard to exports. In the fifteen years preceding 1902 the wheat exports of America nearly doubled, while those of Russia remained almost stationary. But I have suggested in a former chapter that the whole economy of the Russian nation, the maintenance of the gold standard, the payment of the interest on foreign loans, all depend upon a large grain export. The majority of the total exports of

Russia is indeed grain; butter and eggs bring up the proportion of agricultural products in exports to two-thirds of the total, and the rest consists of the raw materials, like wood and petroleum; manufactured products do not make 3 per cent. of the whole. If the agricultural exports, especially wheat, do not rise rapidly, then the whole financial policy deliberately chosen by the Government has proved itself a failure.

It would doubtless have been more wise on the part of the Government to have discontinued entirely the policy of encouraging grain exports from a country where both men and farm animals are starving for the need of grain. Only lately another repetition of famine has forced the minister of finance not only to reverse the former policy, but actually to discourage the exports. Both from the extreme reactionary and the extreme revolutionary party there was a strong cry for the forbidding of exports from starving districts, but it was only after her neighbour, Turkey, had taken this very essential means of protecting its population from wholesale starvation that Russia was forced to follow its example. Of course it is recognised by all writers on economic questions that the forbidding of exports must be only a temporary expedient, absolutely necessary as it may be in times of famine and war.

But the real source of the degeneration of Russian agriculture lies deeper than the exporting of the food of starving men and beasts. At the time of the emancipation in 1861 it was already recognised that a peasant family, in order to support itself, should possess at least twelve and a half dessiatines (or thirty-three acres) of land. When serf-owners allowed their peasants' land to fall below this amount, the Government insisted that the peasants should be transported to some of the newer sections, such as the Province of Samara. But in 1875 the average amount of land in the peasants' possession was already only about nine dessiatines (twenty-four acres) for each household; in 1900 it had fallen further to six and a half dessiatines (seventeen acres) — just about half enough, according to the Government's own calculation, to keep a peasant family alive. This does not quite represent the situation, for in some places the decrease has been relatively slight, whereas in the

south and west the peasants have at the present time less than a half of what they had at the time of the emancipation.

Only in the extreme south does the value of the average peasant farm rise as high as five hundred rubles, whereas in the leading agricultural districts in the centre and east it is between three hundred and seventy-five and five hundred rubles, and in the north and west under this sum. An American can get an idea of these farms only by comparing them with the miserable little holdings of our Southern Negroes. Even this does not represent the low level of the Russian agriculturist; the woods and meadows so necessary for the pasturing of cattle and the forests that supply building material and fuel are largely in the hands of the landlords. In the north where the land is poor, and in the east where the so-called "beggar's lots" exist, a large part of the revolts that have occurred in the last two years have had for their immediate cause some quarrel with the landlords over the woods and meadows. So far have the proprietors gone in protecting such monopolised property rights that they have even forbidden the gathering of berries or mushrooms.

The "beggar's lots" are those of the peasants whose masters at the time of the emancipation took advantage of the clause of the law allowing them to give the peasants a diminutive piece of land outright, rather than to sell them a larger piece. At this time these "beggar's lots" consisted usually of less than one dessiatine (two and three-quarter acres). Now, owing to the increase of population and division of these properties, the peasant owners are often possessed of no more than one single acre. Such owners of "beggar's lots" are of course forced to rent land from the landlord at his own terms if they remain in the country. The proprietors assign for this purpose the worst and least accessible of their lands, at rents which have very often been proved statistically to amount to more than the net product, and sometimes even to twice as much. Of course such rents are not, and cannot be, collected. They mean simply that the peasants are forced to do the landlords' work on the "rented" land for the price often of nothing more than the straw that is left over. As part of the rent of meadows the landlords often insist on the transportation of their grain to the

railways, usually at a considerable distance, and even on as much as two-thirds of the hay crop besides. Little wonder the helpless peasants revolt.

Meanwhile all these conditions are always getting worse. The peasant's poverty and the exhaustion of the soil enable him to get less from the land than he did a generation ago, whereas land values and rents have risen more than threefold. Far from being of any service whatever to the people in this hopeless situation, the Government is an even more oppressive financial burden than the landlords themselves. Professor Janson has shown that for many years continually (in fact, until two years ago) the Government taxes were often equal to the peasant's income from the land, and sometimes even twice as much. Again, it goes without saying, as in the case of the high rents just mentioned, that such taxes were not collected. But these excessive burdens meant that the tax-collecting officials were present at the time of the harvest and took every scrap of the peasant's property that was not necessary to prevent his immediate starvation. As we shall see later, the Government actually intended that this tax should make the former serf of a private individual the serf of the State. The taxes were so high that they took from the peasants not only all that the land could produce, but also a very large part of all that he could make by his labour elsewhere.

Professor Simkhovitch quotes figures from the province of Novgorod showing that the food deficit to be made up by labour of the peasants in the cities or on the estates of the landlords amounted to three million rubles, taxes to a similar sum, and that all that remained to the peasants of this province, after all their labour for themselves and for other persons, was only about twelve and a half rubles per household, from which infinitesimal amount they had to purchase their clothing, part of their food, and their agricultural implements. The same writer quotes the opinion of Professor Janson to the effect that the peasantry was economically better off even during serfdom than at the present time.

The result of this extreme poverty is of course to drive a very large part of the peasantry into the position of mere agricultural labourers. Of these there are now in Russia many

millions. What it means to be a farm worker in Russia one can very readily grasp from the wages they receive. One of the most scientific and complete studies on the subject has been produced by the local government board of Poltava. The wages of this class of labour from 1890 to 1900 varied from twenty-two to forty kopecks a day, with the exception of a single year. The average was thirty-three kopecks (seventeen cents). The monthly wages were on the average \$3.06, and the yearly wages \$29.46. The wages in the United States, except in the South, were in 1900 about seventeen dollars per month, or nearly six times as much.

This by no means indicates the worst of the Russian wage conditions in agricultural industry. We must take into account the good and bad harvests and the varying wages of the different seasons. During the harvest period wages have in certain years risen almost to fifty cents a day, and in the worst years they have fallen only about as low as twenty-five. But we must take into account the long spring and winter seasons when the wages have varied from nine to twelve and a half cents per day. We can indicate the fundamental condition that underlies such starvation wages by remembering that the product for a farm worker in the United States has risen in the last decade by nearly half, while that of the Russian worker has fallen to a little more than half what it was. Russia's hundred million people employed in agriculture are producing crops that, at the most liberal estimate, have only a fifth of the value of those produced by less than fifty million people in the United States. With the aid of our railroads, education, and farm machinery, a single American farmer is producing crops as valuable as those produced by ten Russian peasants, while he is actually receiving as much as fifteen or twenty.

There is a glaring inequality in the distribution of such wealth as Russia does manage to produce. The Government and the landlords take nearly half of the peasants' product; and, furthermore, in order to retain their large share of the spoils, the Government and the landlords will not allow the peasants enough income even to develop their agriculture. With a free government, as in America, and the land in the possession of the rural workers themselves, Russia would now

be producing tenfold the agricultural wealth she does to-day. And if the people had possessed liberty and the land a century ago the social problem in Russia would not be other than it is now in the United States.

But this opportunity has passed. The social evil has now become deeper in Russia than in any other modern country, the social problem has become greater, and the solution of this problem will have to be correspondingly more revolutionary and more profound.

CHAPTER V

FROM SLAVES OF THE LANDLORD TO SLAVES OF THE STATE

And as for the activity of landlords, nobody would even attempt to justify it.—TOLSTOI, "*What Is to Be Done.*"

WHITE slavery has been the basis of the Russian State for a thousand years. The so-called revolutionary change that took place at the time of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 by Alexander II. was no more than a change of the system of servitude. Before that time a part of the peasants had been the slaves directly of the landlords and only indirectly of the State. By the emancipation they became directly the slaves of the State. The overwhelming majority of the Russian people, of absolutely the same blood as the landlord nobility, in this country where all are levelled before the Czar and a nobleman may be created overnight, were not merely serfs but slaves in the fullest sense of the term. For the so-called serfdom that prevailed for two centuries before the emancipation was nothing less than slavery. To be sure, the greater part of the peasants tilling the soil had some sort of a guaranteed legal relation to the land. But this was purely a matter of convenience. It was possible for the landlords and the Government to transfer them at any time into the class of domestic slaves, who were also called by the same name of serf.

After the fixing of the peasants to the soil over two centuries ago, which was the beginning of the new slavery, serfdom, there was a continuous contest between the Czar and the landlords as to which should exercise the dominant rôle over the slaves. Of course there was never any question that the landlord noblemen also were the slaves of the Czar, and that the serfs were therefore the slaves of slaves. But there were always many matters of state which hung on the question as to how far the Czar should interfere directly in the behaviour of

the masters toward the slaves, and concerning the extent to which he should exercise directly his power over them.

Both Catharine II. and Alexander I., over a century ago, saw that the landlords were becoming such despotic masters that they were starving their own slaves and depopulating the country, to say nothing of other vices of the system which threatened the State's very existence. Both monarchs saw that the serfs must be ultimately "free" — that is, they understood that the welfare of the country required a single form of slavery instead of both Czarism and serfdom, two systems that contradict each other at many points. For a long time serfdom, or servitude to the landlords, was maintained. In spite of the foresight of the more intelligent Czars, they valued the support and aid furnished them by the landlords even more than they did the health or even the existence of the common man. When the emancipation was finally enacted it meant only a partial accomplishment of the Czar's design of replacing slavery to the individual by slavery to the State; for while politically the landlord masters lost their old position, the emancipation was accomplished in such a way, as I shall show, as to make the peasantry economically more dependent than ever on the landlord class.

The contest between two systems, an oligarchy of slave-owning noblemen and a slave-holding bureaucratic absolutism with all the power centred in the Czar, has been a burning one from the outset. After the two hundred years of this contest that have elapsed since the reign of Peter the Great, it is still impossible to say whether the autocracy or the oligarchy of landlords has at last come out the stronger. We have just seen the creation of a landlords' Duma. Under Peter the Great the landlord nobility was absolutely crushed, and every individual nobleman that arose into any prominence, whether Menchikov, Biren, or Munich, was exiled, imprisoned, or executed. It might appear from this that the power of the nobility was increasing, but such is not the case. The victory fluctuates from one to another in each succeeding reign, and after viewing the two centuries as a whole we must rather conclude that all such conflict is equally unprofitable for both sides, and that the autocracy and nobility are absolutely necessary to one another's existence.

A few years after the death of Peter the Great, in 1730, the Empress Anne even signed a sort of constitution granting a noblemen's government. There was to have been an assembly of gentlemen, merchants, and the lesser nobility, a senate of the higher nobility, and a supreme council of twelve which was always to be consulted on questions of peace and war, taxation, the appointment of officials and the condemnation of the nobility or confiscation of their property, and even on the alienation of the Crown domains, the marriages of the royal princes and the fixing of the principles of succession. The Empress was to have a fixed sum for her household and was to command only the Palace Guards. Ten days after yielding to the landlords Anne tore this instrument to pieces. It had proved impossible to maintain any unity among the nobility and the nobles saw then, as they had often seen before and since, that the autocracy was a necessary method of maintaining their domination in the country — sorry as they might be to have to be forced to admit a despot above themselves.

All the palace revolutions, those of 1740 and 1741, of 1762 when Catharine II. got rid of her husband, of 1801 when Alexander I. allowed his father to be assassinated, were revolutions accomplished by the nobility for their own ends. At the same time the nobles had been taught by experience, and their purpose was merely the naming of a new autocrat. They had learned that the Czarism is as necessary to themselves as it is to the Czar. Catharine II., indeed, moved in an opposite direction from Peter and Anne; although she did not limit her own power directly she did the same thing indirectly by making the landlords absolute masters over the peasantry. Under her grandson, Alexander I, the severity used against the masses was even greater than before, and the peasants' complaints were not even tolerated. Alexander's chief favourite, Arakcheev, led in the tortures until he was finally murdered by his own slaves.

Alexander I., who reigned at the beginning of the last century, was one of the Czars who felt inclined rather to reduce chattel slavery in order to strengthen the servitude to the State; but, unfortunately, he had enjoyed such a good education that he also understood the absurdity of the State despotism. Hesi-



THE MAIN THOROUGHFARE



A TYPICAL PEASANT COURT-YARD IN SOUTH RUSSIA



tating for a while between the reform of these two evils, he was finally caught in the wave of reaction that spread over Europe and accomplished neither. In the meanwhile his insight into the impossibility of absolutism led him to maintain the power of the landlord class.

One of the books that did the most to bring about the emancipation was "The Annals of a Sportsman" by Turgeniev, whom many think the greatest novelist the world has ever produced. In order to give an idea of the condition in which the fathers and grandfathers of the peasants were held, and of the opinions in which the present officials and landlords have been educated, I shall draw upon a few stories from this book, which was recognised by all the contemporaries to be eminently moderate and fair in its judgments. Though Turgeniev pictures a number of typical landlords, I shall refer only to the more humane ones.

As a sportsman Turgeniev's attention was especially called to proprietors who summoned peasants from their daily labour to use them as huntsmen. This shows that the so-called serfdom was nothing but slavery. It was slavery, as Turgeniev mentioned, because the landlords had the right to judge the peasants and to send them to exile or imprisonment for life in the military battalions. The landlords drawn by Turgeniev took advantage of their position to rob the peasants of land which they were supposed to have a right to cultivate. Even this right to work on a certain piece of land, the very basis of serfdom and the only feature that separates it from mere slavery, was all but ignored. In one case robbery had been accomplished by ceaseless beatings, and the land in dispute was referred to by the peasants in the neighbourhood as the "cudgelled land."

Since serfdom was supposed to differ in some respects from slavery, of course it was not supposed that the landlords had a right to allow and forbid the peasants to marry, but this right also they assumed. Turgeniev speaks of one cruel master who forbade all his maids to marry and had cruelly punished anyone who disobeyed; he relates the story of a peasant lover who was sent away for twenty-five years to the ruin of the whole family which was supported by him alone; and he tells of an

old-maid mistress who never allowed any of her serfs, male or female, to marry. "God forbid," she sometimes said, "here I am living single; what indulgence! what are they thinking of!"

The most cruel of the masters were under no illusions as to whether the system in existence was serfdom or slavery. "When a man's a master he is a master," explains one of them, who had advised every manner of torture for his slaves, "and when he is a peasant, he is a peasant." But what is the most interesting for our purpose, is that when the slaves were most disobedient and the masters most cruelly aroused, they spoke not of a slaves' revolt, but of a "mutiny." In other words, the most extreme form of servitude that these slave-owners could imagine was military servitude, the most extreme form of insubordination was military mutiny — that is, revolt not against private ownership but against the State, which was after all the more oppressive master at that time and has remained so until the present day.

Turgenev hesitated to present in a work intended for general reading a full picture of the frightful degree which the oppression at that time had reached. But we must understand this if we are to understand the character of the present rulers of the country. The cruelties that follow are all supported by documentary evidence.

The proprietors were allowed to make their own laws for the most part as far as the peasants were concerned. One such law read as follows: "For insulting a neighbouring proprietor — to be whipped cruelly:" another, "if a serf omits to fast at the proper time and for a period ordained by the Church, he or she must fast for a week and receive five thousand strokes unsparingly." The preceding are from the private law-books. There is one from the public army regulations, chapter 29, that requires that the court must examine carefully in the case of a peasant's death why he died *so easily* and how it was possible for him to die *so easily*. The public laws set the example, and we must remember that half of the serfs were not owned by private proprietors but by the Czar himself. Catharine II. issued an order that the serfs were not to be permitted to complain to their masters, and when some peasants begged that they be killed or exiled forever rather than be left to the

mercies of their master, Count Alexis Lapuchin, Catharine ordered "half of them to be whipped publicly with rods in the market-place and other squares in Moscow, and the other half to be whipped in the villages in presence of the peasants; and then sent them to hard labour in the Siberian mines."*

When cases against the peasants did come up for trial they were judged of course by the landlords themselves. A certain Redkin, marshal of the nobility in the Government of Riazan, said frankly: "If I saw a gentleman who is my comrade kill one of his serfs I would take an oath without any scruple that I had seen nothing." This from the chief of the nobility of a whole province.

The slavery of white men of the same blood as their masters is even more demoralising than the slavery of another race that the whites can imagine inferior to their own. This demoralisation in Russia knew no bounds. A certain nobleman had his manager present to him on the day of his arrival at his estate each year, a list of all the adult young women of the two villages under the manager's authority. This gentleman then took each one of these girls into his seignorial mansion as a servant, and when the list was exhausted he went to another one of his estates. The same story repeated itself year after year. This, like the other cases I shall relate, is given by the best known and most reliable of the Russian historians. One of these servant women belonging to a proprietor named Karteev tried to escape. He had her whipped and put a collar with iron points on it around her neck. The unfortunate woman tried to drown herself but did not succeed, and the proprietor captured her again. He then had her foot chained to a post in the kitchen, and she was kept this way for five years until finally she was unchained in order to be allowed to work in the fields of the proprietor. This case of chaining peasants up like dogs was repeated elsewhere, although sometimes the chain was placed around the peasant's neck.

One proprietor, Sau Kanov, killed a boy of twelve years for having let a hare escape on a hunt. He felled the lad with a stroke of his bayonet, and continued the attack by kicking him in the stomach and chest. The boy died the same day.

*See Kennard, Chapter II.

The inquiry undertaken by gentlemen landlords discovered nothing. The doctor did not find any traces on the body, and the peasants kept a profound silence, terrorised by the promise of Sau Kanov to flay alive whoever should dare utter a single word against him. But the inquiry was again taken up, and this time the council of State brought out the truth.

It is impossible to imagine all the methods and instruments of torture that were in use on various estates. In the government of Saratov there is a document in the archives that describes some of them. From the list of hundreds the following are interesting: beating with salted sticks and rubbing salt into the wounds; putting on collars of iron with nails inside; beating with rawhide whips; burning the hair of women down to the skin; boiling in a caldron; roasting on red-hot grills. In this same government a proprietor named Garasky beat his steward so hard in the chest that the man died within a week. Police agents coming to make a search in the village found various instruments of torture in the proprietors' houses — a collar, chains, handcuffs, a mask that was placed over the head of the peasant and then locked in order to rob him of the possibility of eating. This latter end, by the way, is accomplished much better at the present time when the peasant has only half as much land as he had before the emancipation, and is more effectually placed at the disposition of his economic masters without the proprietor being forced to take any direct action.

It must not be supposed that these white slaves quietly accepted their servitude. The tradition of the days when they had had much greater freedom still lived on, and they knew that they were the same flesh and blood as their masters; but the means of revolt were narrowly limited and the first reaction among the peasants was usually desperate. Suicides were frequent, very many thousands taking place every year, sometimes in the most spectacular manner. One coachman belonging to a paralysed landlord drove the latter into a forest and hung himself before his master's eyes to a bare tree, leaving him alone and helpless until he was able to call others to take him home — a strang vengeance on the landlord by a servant who for several decades had suffered unbearable tortures.

Of course it often happened that the peasants killed the nobleman instead of themselves. Hardly a month passed that some such attempt of murder did not succeed and reach the ears of the public. How many murders were done, how many attempted, without being disclosed, will never be known. In the peasants' defence it must be recalled that the Czars condemned to the most terrible punishment any peasant that even had the audacity to complain against his proprietor.

Later I shall show how this slavery continues to-day under a new form. But first I shall touch upon the other form of slavery that existed before the emancipation, that is, slavery to the State. This served also as the historical foundation of the present servitude.

Nicholas I. was the monarch who developed this form of slavery to its height. He was the son of a very stupid German woman and was penetrated to the bottom of his soul with monarchical and religious prejudices. Although his successor was forced to introduce the Emancipation Act, Nicholas was violently opposed to it, and developed the country in the opposite direction. For while he did not believe that the landlords should themselves exercise much power, he was in favour of slavery as a general principle, and saw that it was necessary to lend the landlords some of his autocratic power. He did this against his will, for his favourite tyranny was of a purely military character.

He himself confessed that he and his brother Michael had received a very poor education, that "even in the matter of religion we had been taught only to make the sign of the cross at certain moments, to go to Mass and to recite by heart a few prayers without taking the slightest interest in what was going on in our souls." The sciences were completely neglected, and while the teacher was trying to instruct the children they were drawing caricatures. All their education, all their play even, had for its only end the development of a taste for military exercise. This confession, written by Nicholas for his own children, shows the way in which the characters and souls of Czars are formed.

From this training Nicholas became, according to the historian Childere, coarse, rude, haughty, and presumptuous. He

showed his hatred on every occasion of all that was liberal, and his love for Prussian military despotism. While on his visit to England he did not wish even to see the Parliament or to make the acquaintance of English statesmen; he passed all his time with officers and generals. In Prussia he delighted only in military parades and reviewing the army with his father-in-law, the King of Prussia. Dressed in the uniform of a Prussian regiment, he said to the soldiers, "Never forget, my friends, that I am half your countryman and that like you I am a member of the army of your King." Perhaps this was what gave rise to the Russian couplet, popular at that time:

The Czar's a German Russian,
His uniform is Prussian.

It was this same military Emperor who tried to revive the Holy Alliance in 1848, and to help all the kings of Europe to put down the democratic movements of their subjects; and it was this same haughty military despot that met his defeat at the hands of the liberal French and English in the Crimean War, and died probably of shame as the result.

It was a Czar of this soulless military type that brought the State slavery to its highest point of development. So far did he go that it was necessary first of all that he should prevent all intellectual development among his subjects, since his actions were such that no intelligent man could tolerate them. He forbade all discussions in the press on the subject of the Government. He created not one office of censorship but a dozen — the ecclesiastic, the military, the educational, the judicial, the political, the ministers' and the secret. When a distinguished citizen asked to be allowed to start a review, the Emperor replied curtly: "There is no need for it." The minister of foreign affairs ordered that, in articles on any of the foreign countries, the Russian press should not even print the words "parliament," "constitution," or "elections," and should not mention the demands, or even the needs, of the foreign working class. The minister of interior affairs ordered, in his turn, that there should be no description of the needs or calamities of the Russian people or of any contemporary event that might excite the population, that no regret should be expressed concerning the position of the peasant serfs, and

that there should be no description of the proprietors' abuses of their authority. The minister of education ordered that there should be no mention of the historic facts that there had been struggles for freedom in Greece and Rome, and no mention of the names of the heroes of those struggles. In an historical work on Greek history the censor would not even permit to a former minister to make use of the Greek word "Demos," commanding that it be replaced by some other word. Recognising how much Nicholas I. had in common with Ivan the Terrible, the deviltries of the latter were not allowed to be mentioned in Russian histories. Let us remember that all these measures belong to but a little more than a half century ago, and that conditions are in many respects similar at the present moment.

Nicholas, however, went a little farther than any other Czars in his fight against intelligence. "His object," says a Russian historian, "seemed to be to enslave the people intellectually and to extinguish their souls." "Imagine," says another, "an enormous and solid prison, a prison for forced labour constructed purposely to contain all the peasants of Russia, and around this prison sentinels with loaded guns, and you will have an exact image of the whole policy of Nicholas I. as far as the peasants are concerned." Of course a man who thus treated the whole nation, considered the peasants to be not only less than men but merely pieces of wood, objects even rather than beasts.

Under Nicholas the State had ten million slaves directly belonging to it. We are interested not only in its behaviour toward this half of the peasantry, but also toward the enormous standing army and the million of other slaves that were employed directly or indirectly by the Government. Although the State did not as a rule deal in human flesh commercially, yet this practice also existed. The Crown paid 300 rubles a head for every young man that it was allowed to send to colonise Siberia, and it was very common for peasants to be sold to take the place of other recruits under the ironical name always of "volunteers."

I have already mentioned that the soldiers were slaves of the lowest order for the twenty-five years of their service, that

all the Government employees in the post-office and other departments, as well as in the mines, were nothing less than slaves, and that the State also permitted the manufacturers to deal with their employees in an utterly arbitrary manner. So we see that on the whole the State was a much more important master of serfs than all the landlords put together. Against the State there was another desperate remedy besides suicide and the killing of a few cruel masters. This remedy was revolt, such as has been in practice for Russia during centuries and is going on at the present moment all over the Empire

In 1841 four hundred persons organised a resistance to the soldiers, and thirty-three were killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded. Here was a little pitched battle of the same kind as has occurred so frequently in recent years. In 1842, in the government of Kasan, the authorities wanted to force the peasants belonging to the Crown to plough the land in common. Eight were killed, two hundred and thirty wounded and four hundred and twenty taken before the military courts. Then, year after year, until the emancipation in 1861, there were twenty to forty revolts, more frequent of course on the small and numerous estates of the proprietors, but of a far more serious import on the large properties of the Government. It was because he was frightened at these revolts, as Nicholas I. confessed, that he began to consider the question of emancipation, though he finally decided against it.

The State Council discussions upon emancipation are interesting as showing the intimate and interdependent relations of the landlords and the Crown. Although Nicholas confessed that the "present position cannot continue forever," he said also, "I shall never decide for the emancipation." The reason he thought conditions could not continue, he said frankly, was the spirit of revolt among the peasants. A councillor of state, seeing a little further ahead than Nicholas, proposed a plan of emancipation by which the landlord-noblemen friends of the Czar should not suffer. "In order that the peasants to be deprived of land shall not escape the labour of gentlemen," he said, "when emancipated they should form a class of obligatory peasants who should not have the right to change

their place of residence without the permission of the authorities." This is exactly what was finally done, and it had the desired result. For if the landlord owns the larger part of the land and the peasants are not permitted to leave the village, they have no choice but to work for him at his own terms or to starve. The proprietor might lose a few slave house-servants by the new system, but he would probably be better served with labour on the land. Councillors still more conservative feared that the Government would not be able to gather taxes regularly, and insisted that the peasants should have a certain amount of land, but should be forced to pay a tax beyond their power to the landlords. This amendment was also accepted, with the modification that the Government instead of the landlords collected these taxes. As the proposer of this amendment claimed would be the case, the peasants were thus obliged to work all their lives for the proprietor, with the advantage for the State and the public peace that the amount contributed was determined once for all by the law.

The State was probably persuaded to undertake the emancipation by three considerations: First, the necessity of promoting the prosperity of the peasants in order to get a new source of taxation for itself, so pressing after the disastrous Crimean War; secondly, in order to make possible the change from a small professional army to an army of the whole people, in which of course patriotism as well as military terror must be a part of the soldiers' discipline; and thirdly, in order to prevent the proprietors from literally eating up the peasantry and depopulating the country — for many of the landlords, after squeezing the last penny out of the peasants, spent everything on riotous living, invested nothing in agriculture, and were either unable or unwilling even to keep their peasants alive in famine times.

Such was the benefit received by the State. I shall now speak of the profit received by the proprietors. Let us recall, however, that whatever profited the nobility profited the State also. The Emperor Paul loved to repeat that the State had in the one hundred thousand noblemen one hundred thousand voluntary chiefs of police. The councillor of Nicholas I. whom I have just quoted, the Minister of Public Instructions Ourvarov,

said of serfdom, "This tree has taken a profound root; it shades both the Church and the Throne."

Although it was decided that it was impossible to give the peasants freedom without giving them land on which to live, nevertheless a very large portion received either no land or so little that it was impossible for them to keep themselves alive without another occupation. Seven hundred thousand domestics who before the emancipation were supposed to have the same claim as other peasants to a share of the land, were deprived definitely of all rights at this time; one hundred and sixty thousand other peasants were left landless without any excuse being offered; six hundred thousand received the so-called "beggar's lots." The extent of these lots was only one-fourth of the land the peasants had formerly tilled, the other three-fourths being left for the first time in the absolute possession and ownership of the landlords, unburdened by the duty of supporting as formerly the peasants that had been legally attached to the soil. Of the remaining four million *households* (the other four and a half million were the previously mentioned serfs of the State), one-half received allotments so small that according to the law of the Government itself, they would have had the right before the emancipation to be sent away to some new section of the country.

In all sections where the land was more valuable the peasants fell into one or another of the above classes. In the east and south, where the land was both rich and comparatively new, having been under cultivation only a few decades, the peasants lost from one-fifth to one-half, and even more, of all their property. In the equally rich but older centre of the country, they lost in every province, sometimes as much as 20 per cent. If we look at the total amount of land in possession of the peasants and proprietors at this time, we find that one hundred thousand landlords still were in possession of almost as much of the land as twenty million peasants.

The landlords gained, then, both by obtaining cheaper and more reliable labour and by getting possession of large amounts of land formerly in the peasants' hands. But this was not all. Whatever power over the person of the peasants they had lost was handed over to the police, who were also controlled either

directly by the local landlords or through St. Petersburg bureaux that were on the friendliest terms with the land-owning class. A typical law of these bureaux is that of the 12th of June, 1886, which gives the employer the right to make deductions from wages of the peasant for whatever he considered to be negligent work and even for *rudeness*.

The crushing burden of taxation laid upon the peasantry by the State has also been of tremendous service to the landlords in keeping the peasants in an utterly dependent economic condition. At the time of the emancipation the peasants who received the pitifully small allotments mentioned were burdened by the Czar with a debt of almost nine hundred million rubles, one-half more than the total value of their land. Of course they fell immediately into arrears — and at the present moment, according to a statement made in the Duma, have already paid more than one thousand five hundred million rubles. So crushing were these taxes which the starving peasants were forced to pay for freedom, that they often reached as much as 50 percent. of their total net product, and in the last decade of the nineteenth century even exceeded the peasants' income. But during this same decade the amount of money loaned by the Government to the nobility *below the market rate of interest* increased from nine hundred million rubles in 1890 to one thousand six hundred and fifty million in 1900.

In the meanwhile landlordism continued to flourish. Prince Galitzin, grand equerry of the court, has nearly three million acres; Prince Rukavishnikov, secret counsel of the ministry of the interior, has nearly two million; Prince Sheremetiev, of the Imperial Council, has nearly half a million, and so on. To show better the local conditions I shall mention some of the largest estates in the miserable province of Poltava, where I visited in the summer of 1906. There, where land is worth about one hundred rubles an acre (fifty dollars), the Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz has an estate worth about fifteen million rubles, Minister Durnovo's property is worth about four million, those of the Princes Kotzebue, Bariatinsky, and Gortchakov are each worth several millions. About one-third is in the hands of the rich or well-to-do proprietors, averaging more than four hundred acres of the valuable soil; while the majority of the

peasants own only from five to twenty-five acres per household, and two hundred thousand have less than five acres.

An examination of the economic basis of Russia's landlord nobility shows that there are two thousand persons, largely of princely rank, possessed of more than twenty-five thousand acres, fifteen thousand of the higher nobility and persons of corresponding wealth possessed of from twenty-five hundred to twenty-five thousand acres, and sixty thousand of the lesser nobility or gentry with two hundred and fifty to twenty-five hundred acres. The four hundred thousand individual farmers and other persons of a similar class are possessed of less than two hundred and fifty acres each. We see by these figures not only what a power the nobility has in the land, owning as it does one-third of the richest soil in the country, but also that the land is highly concentrated even within this class; for the owners whom I have called of "the higher nobility" are possessed of twice as much land as the mere gentry, while the princes own half as much again. The gentlemen taken altogether have thirteen times as much land as the middle-class farmers, excluding the fifteen million peasant households.

The condition is not fully represented by taking the country as a whole. In some parts the landlords are comparatively powerless, but in others they own such a large proportion of the land, are possessed of such large funds with which to buy the local officials and police, that under the Russian despotic system they are nothing less than a local oligarchy. In all the western and southernmost provinces, and in five others, the landlords own almost as much as, or more than, the peasants. It is in these provinces that the massacres have been organised, that the police have practised the most outrages in the so-called elections, that rents are most exorbitant and that the revolts of the peasantry have had the least success.

It is impossible, then, to consider that the peasants have ever been emancipated. Fully one-half of them, those that before 1861 had belonged to the State, are in approximately the same situation now as they were fifty years ago. The rest, besides being subjected to the State slavery that always overshadowed the private serfdom, are placed economically in the landlords' hands, and this economic dependence is enacted into



VILLAGE STREET SCENES



BUILDING OPERATIONS
(The men are in the fields)



law by the statutes concerning wage contracts, strikes, rents and every other economic question. The germs of reform that are being planted at the present time, are not only without any chance of growing up into something of consequence, but they are insignificant compared to the revival of the wholesale use of direct violence on the part of the Government and the landlords, and compared to the institution of a regular civil war against that "internal enemy," the revolted peasantry.

Let us remember that the Government and the landlords, and all the innumerable writers and journalists in their pay all over the world, blame the peasants themselves for their tragic condition, and that the landlords have also managed to cajole many serious persons into crediting their statement. Let us then judge between this standpoint of hostility toward the Russian people, and that of the tens of thousands of true Russians who have devoted their whole lives to the peasantry and who take a diametrically opposite point of view. And then let us realise to the full the criminal character of a monarch and a nobility that can sustain their self-respect before the modern world only by this most infamous campaign of lies against the people to whose exploitation and misery they owe their very existence.

CHAPTER VI

HOW THE PEASANT BECAME A REVOLUTIONIST

THERE was a time when we considered the Czar the god of the earth and the greatest of all benefactors. Now, the newspapers have opened the eyes of us common people. We see that he is only the richest of landlords and the first of all vampires. The blood that he has drunk will some day flow from him again."

This statement is typical of how the peasants talked after the Czar closed the first Duma and destroyed the faith of his people. It was spoken in a Volga village in my presence before a chance gathering of peasants, and I was requested to write it down and send it to America to show what the common people are thinking about their Czar. The Russian State is resting on a sleeping volcano of the people's hate. The real revolution — that of the hundred million peasants — is yet to come. When it does come the French Revolution will be eclipsed. For the forces to be overthrown by the Russian people are richer, wiser, and incomparably better organised than was the rotten feudalism of France.

What are the chances of an event of this inconceivable magnitude? At first glance the outlook is dark enough. Throughout all Russia the townspeople have abandoned themselves to depression or despair. The middle classes staked everything on the Dumas. Their last cards were passive resistance as to taxes and recruits, and the denunciation of foreign loans. Passive resistance having proved impracticable against active despotism, was definitely abandoned by the very party by which it was proposed. The denunciation of foreign loans is accountable at the most for a fall of not more than a point or two in the Russian funds. The Constitutional Democrats, partisans of those measures, managed to prevent the general disintegration of their party, but they have not been

able to prevent a wholesale desertion from their ranks. In the provincial capitals and country towns, where, like low thunder, the voice of the gagged and beaten peasants is beginning to be heard, there is a restless seeking for new parties and new means of combat to correspond with the magnitude and profundity of the growing revolt.

The workingmen are hardly in a better situation than the middle classes of the towns. The brilliantly successful general strike of October, 1905, brought the Manifesto, but it seems to have succeeded only because the Czar was unprepared. The workingmen's organisations were the first to recognise the fact. The next general strike must also be an insurrection, the St. Petersburg council of labour deputies decided within a few days after the strike had been brought to a close. The expected insurrection strike took place long before the councils were ready for it. The barricades of Moscow were reproduced at a dozen other important industrial centres. But the Government was prepared this time for both strikes and insurrection. Within a few weeks the last of the barricades had been swept away, the leaders imprisoned or shot, and the railroad men put to work under martial law and the penalty of instant death for leaving their posts.

This was the last spasmodic effort of the rebellious workingmen. Since the barricades, the masses of the towns have been vainly dreaming of, or sometimes vainly planning, another insurrection. This time it was to be an insurrection of soldiers and workmen — a mutiny strike. There were two insurmountable obstacles to the new plan. The workmen-soldiers of the artillery and sappers and miners were ready to die for the cause, and did die by hundreds at Sveaborg and Kronstadt; but the peasant soldiers, in the face of this type of munity, remained loyal to the Czar. The Railroad Union was ready to strike, but they were not ready to face the military courts unless the strike had some chances of success. To gain success, their congress unanimously decided, there must not only be a cessation of labour, but a tearing up of rails, blowing up of bridges and the destruction of the telegraph lines. The Government has declared a railway strike rebellion, the strikers to be instantly executed for high treason. Against this official "state of war"

the union proposed also to declare war. But for such a war the railway workers are not enough; they must have the support of the population along the lines. That population must be inflamed to the point not only of protecting and hiding the scattered and otherwise helpless railway men, but of aiding in the work of cutting and keeping out the Government's communications — an object eminently worth while in one case, but one only, when the peasants themselves are in revolt. The Railroad Union decided to wait.

Every path, then, that the "legal" opposition or the illegal revolution has trod has led finally to the peasants. Refusal of taxes, refusal of recruits, refusal to shoot on the revolted workmen, destruction of the railway lines, all depend on the peasants. And what has been their reply? We know what they did in the first two Duma elections; they sent the most radical and fearless deputies the Duma contained, men at the same time wise enough to lead the Duma even to its dissolution, and after that to the manifesto of "passive" revolt. We know how they supported their members with hundreds of delegations and some twenty thousand instructions as to what their servants, the deputies, were to demand. What do they intend, now that their Dumas are abolished, now that they have lost the only chance for a free discussion of their lot on a national scale that they have had for the thousand years since they left the pastoral stage of man, now that all other classes in the nation have cried out to them to act?

What did the peasants say when the first Duma was closed? The papers of the capital were not allowed to discuss the subject, the peasants no longer had Duma delegates with whom to lodge their grievances. But the provincial papers, caught in the irresistible current of free expression that prevailed during the Duma's session, were harder to suppress, and from them we see that in thousands of villages peasant opinion had so gained the upper hand over the village clergy and police that public discussion, even in official village meetings, went on much as before the Duma was dissolved. I went to the provincial capitals and smaller towns, and visited a number of villages, to make sure that these reports were correct. I found the peasants invariably familiar with all the larger aspects of the revolution.

I found that, trained by centuries of oppression and defeat, and having put little hope in the late Duma, they were neither surprised nor despondent at its dissolution. Having long hated the Government, they were now beginning to hate the Czar. Having long lost respect for the Government Church, they were now turning actively against it. Having put their case in the Duma and seeing it despised and their elected deputies thrown into prison, they now fully realised that they would get from the Government only what they could take.

"When Gapon came with the workingmen and a petition to the Czar, the ministers called them rebels," said the peasant I have quoted at the beginning of this chapter. "Then we believed it. When the Duma was meeting, the ministers stood against the people, and we knew that the ministers were our enemies. But now that the Duma is dissolved, we see that the Czar and the ministers are the same. Now we know that the Czar is our enemy, too, and we must upset the whole Government. And the peasants are ready to do it "

This statement of the peasant attitude is true. The massacre of the 22d of January, 1905, removed the last traces of loyalty from the masses of the workmen and the citizens. The brutal dissolution of the first Duma, and the abolition of the second, took away the last illusion and the last hope from the people of the soil. On the evening of the 22d of January a friend visiting Count Witte found him prostrate on his couch. With tears in his eyes, Witte said the last hope of the nation had been destroyed, the faith of the people in the Czar. That was true only of the cities then. It is true of the country and the nation to-day.

Listen now to the voice of another village. A little group was explaining to me the village opinion, and about them gathered the whole village, old men and young as they came home one by one from the fields, the women and the children. Many talked at the same time, but the peasants know how to talk together — as they have learned to do in their village meetings for centuries past. Out of the whole clearly came this common speech:

"We did hope the Duma would help us. But now we see that it was made for the rich and not for the poor. We were

told from the first that the Duma was a fraud made to lead us off by the nose, and that's all it was. We heard about the closing of the Duma a few days after it happened, but we did not hear the Czar's manifesto about it read in church. We do not go to church any more because when we hear the pope pray for the Government and the Czar, it is just as if some one turned a knife in our stomachs.

"We believed the October Manifesto, too, and in three days the Czar took it back. Now we all see we have nothing to expect. We've had enough of carrying the landlords on our backs. It's better to die for the right. If the other villages do anything we won't be behind."

"Do you believe in the Czar?" I asked.

"We believed in him once," they answered, without a protesting voice, "as in God, but our eyes now are open. Now we know it is n't the ministers, but the Czar himself who is to blame."

The villages I have mentioned were on the middle and lower Volga. Up toward the source of the river, by the northern woods that stretch up to the arctic tundra and reindeer land, I visited another little town. There the older peasants — splendid, erect, regular-featured men — were gathered together in the tea-house to make a business deal concerning the village hay with their friend, the agricultural expert of the Zemstvo, who had brought me with him. They, too, were unanimous in their opinions. They would gladly boycott the taxes and refuse recruits if this were possible. But a village can't resist a squadron of Cossacks, and the taxes, they understood clearly, were for the most part indirect and could not be boycotted. They knew all about the customs duties on cotton and tea, and the excise duties on petroleum, alcohol, sugar and vodka, that make them pay two or three prices for all they buy. They were clear as to what they thought about the Duma. They would not bother about another such as the last. The next one they would turn into a constituent assembly, and for that they would lay down their lives. They knew well enough what a constituent assembly was. It is a body, they said, that appoints all the ministers and officials. It must have all the power, and nobody (not the Czar) is to have a right to interfere with its

acts. While the older peasants were saying these things the younger peasants outside were singing as accompaniment the fiery, revolutionary words of the peasants' "Marseillaise."

The last hope of the Czar, the ignorance and disunion of his people, is giving way. In Russia the tendency of all despotism to keep the people in darkness and to exploit their divided state has been exalted into a perfectly conscious principle of State, freely expressed by ministers, bureaucrats, and heads of the Church. First, they say, do not let the individual know what the Government is about, and, second, if individuals do manage to learn, they must not be allowed any expression of what they think or want. The peasants were not only not taught to read by the Government, they were not allowed to read. If they had learned what the Government was about and wanted to hold meetings to discuss what they had learned, the village police sat by, closed the meeting when they saw fit, and arrested those whose speeches they did not like. As to meetings of several villages, they were tolerated under no form.

Since the war the new pressure against this system of compulsory ignorance has all but broken it down. The police are still on duty. Joint meetings of villages must be held secretly in the woods. Unnumbered tons of pamphlets and newspapers are confiscated and destroyed. But all the villages have now read more or less of the new deluge of newspapers, pamphlets, books, and peasants' weeklies. The peasants' intellectual appetite has grown incredibly, as I have already pointed out. They beg newspapers from the travellers, they send delegates to towns to get the students' aid. They spend the nights in barns or woods listening to readings of the French Revolution, or the history of Russia as it is not taught in the schools. Invariably they begged reading matter from our party, and I was often astonished by what they had already read. They pulled the most revolutionary proclamations out of their pockets, and asked intelligent questions about the conditions in the United States.

In a certain village I met a typical case of this development of interest. A young peasant who had been reading and studying through the long winter evenings for several years, under the guidance of a genial revolutionist librarian that

spent his summers nearby, undertook to rouse the people of his village by reading to them. Two winters before my visit he had found the villagers so little interested that even in the dull isolation of the northern night, they did not care to hear him read. The following winter all was suddenly changed; they eagerly followed and fairly consumed every scrap of printed matter he could offer; they were specially delighted with a little history of Russia, already circulated among the villages to the number of half a million copies. Picture the excitement of the peasants of a village that has slumbered from immemorial times when suddenly awakened to the dramatic story of their own wrongs, as freshly written by a Socialist writer with something of the simple style and the emotional genius of a Tolstoi!

Nearly all the peasants I met during my two thousand mile journey down the Volga had read an excellent peasants' weekly, published in Kasan. As a type of several others issued by the Socialist Revolutionary Party or the peasant group in the Duma and scattered in nearly every village in the land, a summary of its contents during the Duma and since will show the character of the peasants' new intellectual diet.

The *Kasan Peasants' News* seemingly neglected nothing that the peasants most needed to understand. Beginning with the late war, the whole ruinous policy of the Government was exposed and effectually damned. The weapons by which the Government maintains itself were sketched historically — Cossacks, "black hundreds" and the League of True Russian Men. It was pointed out that the village police and the new type of soldier-ruffians called rural guards, are paid twice as much as the village schoolmaster, who gets one hundred dollars a year. The Government's proposed reforms were laid bare in all their flimsiness, and there was a résumé showing how little the Government has done for the peasants.

The possibility of change was suggested by outlines of foreign forms of government, foreign election laws and foreign agrarian movements. There was a full account of the now illegal Peasants' Union, of the thousands of ukases sent by the peasants to the Duma, of the agrarian disorders, of the brutal expeditions of revenge sent out by the Government at the

demand and often under the personal direction of the injured landlords, of the killing and maiming of the peasants, of the retaliation of the latter in the Baltic provinces and in the Caucasus. To combat the Government's efforts to turn the popular excitement from itself to the Jews, Poles, Armenians, Letts, Lithuanians, this peasants' paper tried in every number to familiarise the peasants with the virtues and friendliness of these "conquered peoples."

The "black" papers, sustained by Government subsidies, or by the liberal subscriptions of high-place bureaucrats, generals, and landlords, carefully excluded any mention of these wholesome truths. But their influence was slight. Only in one village did I find copies of any of the reactionary organs sent gratis all over the land. For they were not only incredibly brutal and false, they were incredibly stupid in their judgment of the peasants. For instance, starving countrymen — and, be it remembered, there were thirty million of them in the winter of 1906-7 — were told that the reports of the famine were grossly exaggerated, and that if they suffered it was from their own drunkenness and laziness.

"Without the land officials and police and other benefactors," says one of those extraordinary articles, "the peasants would perish like a flock without shepherds." Now the hatred of the peasants for these same officials and police is too bitter and deep for words. Innumerable cases are on record in which these "shepherds" have beaten their sheep to death with clubs, or have crippled them for life. In Tambov, in the fall of 1905, some half hundred peasant rioters were captured while engaged in openly hauling off the landlords' grain, as the peasants did in thousands of villages at this time. The police "shepherd" had them bound and gagged, and held them prisoners in the barn which they were sacking. They were made to lie on one side for several weeks and beaten when they turned. One at a time they were "examined" and tortured within hearing of their comrades. Sixteen were thus before all slowly beaten to death, executed, not for murder, violence, or attack on the public officials, but for taking in broad daylight, or stealing if you like, what they considered should in law and justice have been their own. Every village has seen or known of cases of the

kind. What influence can a press have that sees in these brutes the shepherds of the peasant flock?

If it were not for the assiduity of a part of the village priests the peasants would long ago have lost all credence in the official system of falsehood. One priest and patriotic agitator travels about calling the peasants' deputies in the Duma Anti-Christ's who had been bought by the Jews. Others preach the like in their churches; all are perforce tools of the Czar, must read his ukases and manifestoes from the pulpit. Not all, however, are still "black" in their hearts; thousands are openly liberal and some are secretly revolutionists. Those who are still loyal are being reduced by the population to narrow straits. Only a dozen families of the hundreds in the village, the money-lenders and shopkeepers, are contented. The discontented, when not rebels at heart, are incredulous; in many places they have deserted the churches; in others they are beginning to boycott the services of the priests, and in some cases the villagers are taking away from the priests the grants of village lands upon which they live. The village popes were never respected, and this lack of respect is turning into open hate. Their sermons, threats, and advice will not long seriously hinder the new flood of literature and public discussion.

In the last two years and a half there has been more reading and discussion in the villages than took place in the preceding forty-five years. The peasants, then, know the great facts of the situation, but they know also what they have yet to learn. They have discussed everything in their village meetings, and often several villages have met together in the woods. They have held frequent secret congresses at which dozens, hundreds, and even thousands of villages have been represented. They have gone further in some governments, where, with the aid of the revolutionists, the whole countryside is organised in a system of secret committees — village, volost (township), district (county), and government (state). All this reading, discussion, and organisation, however hampered and incomplete, is duly bearing fruit.

The idea of a peasants' union and a peasants' party, of the absolute necessity of a common organization for all Russia, has taken permanent root; also the idea that the people's Duma



MIXING MORTAR



PLASTERING

was opposed, thwarted and finally abolished by the Government of the Czar; also the demand for a Duma with all the power of a constituent assembly; and, finally, the belief that the people should have all the land and that there should be no more landlords either now or at any future time.

The great majority of the villages hold in common the same ideas as to the means by which the people are to get the power and the land. They and their representatives — who had long ago proposed passive resistance, the refusal of taxes and recruits, and the denunciation of the foreign loans, measures that the Constitutional Democrats adopted only when the Duma was dissolved — were also the first to discover, as they had suspected from the outset, that these measures alone would never bring the Government to terms. Furthermore, the peasants have recognised that the measures of their own representatives were not at the time practical. After the dissolution of the first Duma the peasant deputies not only declared the Government illegal and at war with the people, but they declared all peaceful relations at an end. They left the accepted Fabian tactics of revolution of the Peasants' Union and joined with the Socialist parties in the proclamation of mutiny and armed insurrection before the army was ready to mutiny or the peasants ready to rise.

CHAPTER VII

THE VILLAGE AGAINST THE CZAR

THE threat and the imminent possibility of a costly, bloody and terrible revolution of the whole mass of the people is the driving force in Russia to-day. A general uprising is in the last resort the only possible goal for the revolutionary parties, it being deliberately prepared for by the Government, and it is the only real argument with which the nation has ever influenced the Czar. Whether the uprising actually does occur this year, next year, or never is relatively unimportant. It is enough to shape Russian history that it is an imminent possibility. To understand the chances of the revolution, the motives of the revolutionists, the inner meaning of the policy of the Government, we must realise with all well-informed Russians that this mass movement is, under present conditions, just what may be expected to occur; we must see just what the Government is doing and may be expected to do to prevent it, and we must know what qualities in the people and what elements in the general situation give the revolutionists the remarkable faith in the people that inspires their action.

The Government is in a feverish strain to keep the peasants out of the revolution. This is the key to every action it has taken since Witte came into power. I myself have heard Count Witte say, as I have already mentioned, that he expected the first Duma — largely a peasant body — to be composed of Jew-haters; that is, he actually thought (or said he thought) that the peasants would send forward extreme reactionaries in answer to the call of the Czar. In this mistaken belief lies the reason for the original convocation of a body that proved to be so hostile to the Czar. A majority of reactionary peasants was expected by the Government, and this majority was to have offset the revolutionism of the zemstvos, the intelligent townspeople and the workingmen. But instead

of sending reactionary representatives, the peasants sent Aladdin and his confrères, and these men called on the peasants, when the Duma was dissolved, to revolt against a Government that had "betrayed" them, was guilty of "treason," and had forfeited all claims to authority and the obedience of the people.

Not only the institution of a representative assembly, but all the other real Government changes in Russia since the fall of 1905, along with innumerable false promises of changes, have been aimed at the growing peasant discontent. Take for instance the new so-called "freedom of worship." Immediately after the October Manifesto the popular faction of the Russian Church, the ritualists, or "old believers," were given religious freedom, while the Jewish and other religions remained in about the same position as before. Why were the "old believers" preferred? Because among them are fifteen to twenty million peasants. Then consider the only important change in the system of taxation. Witte had not been prime minister for many weeks before the peasants were relieved of thirty-five million rubles of direct taxation on the land — and in 1906 a similar burden was removed. To counterbalance this loss all other forms of taxation were increased. Then shortly before the closing of the first Duma came the sale of the Crown lands — a drop in the bucket for the individual peasants — but a very real loss to the Czar. Then a few months ago certain special legal disabilities of the peasants were removed. They were given, for the first time, freedom to come and go, and access to the same justice(?) as the higher classes. Finally the property disqualification — the inability of the peasants to sell or mortgage their share of the village land — has been abolished, and it is said that the village commune, along with its common responsibility to the Government for the taxes of individuals, must disappear.

All these concessions were made during or after the time of hundreds and thousands of armed peasant revolts. And what is the outcome? The peasants feel that they have forced the Government to terms. They are not grateful as they would have been had the changes been freely granted. They are only crying for more. For, of course, none of these reforms strike

at the roots of the evil — the peasants' poverty, the terrible indirect taxation on which the Government lives, the oppression by local officials, the lack of the least trace of individual freedom, and the lack of that public life which can only come from local and national self-government. Besides, most of the reforms that have been given are not in reality in force. Every vestige of new or old freedom or legal form is choked by a monstrous growth of military courts, military governors, political execution and exile without trace of legal procedure. And every reality has been diluted and adulterated by a mass of false and broken promises.

The Russian peasantry has always been an eminently rebellious people and the tradition of rebellion has been revered and kept alive for hundreds of years. Over two centuries ago, almost immediately after the institution of serfdom, occurred the revolt of the Volga pirate, Stenka Razin, in which millions of peasants took part. More than a hundred years ago half of peasant Russia was infected with the rebellion of the serfs against the masters under the pretender Pougatchev. In this rebellion hundreds of thousands of peasants died, apparently in vain, for freedom. But neither the authorities nor the peasants have ever forgotten the event. I passed through a Volga province last summer, where the peasants of a certain village had asked the priest to say a mass for the souls of Pougatchev and Stenka Razin.

All through the present century every province of Russia has witnessed the horribly bloody suppression of peasant revolts. In 1854 and 1855 the rebellions covered a large part of Russia, and the partly enlightened Alexander II. told his landlords that they must either consent to the proposed emancipation of the serfs or see it accomplished by a movement from below. Even this Czar, so autocratic in the last half of his reign, realised the power and probable will of the peasants *in extremis* to overturn the whole structure of the Russian State. The great emancipation, then, was accomplished neither from philanthropic motives nor from economic consideration, but from a highly justified fear of immediate revolution.

After the emancipation the peasants again showed their unwillingness to accept, unless through sheer impotence, either autoc-

racy or the well-disguised shadow of reform that the emancipation turned out to be. After passing through the hands of the landlords' commission to which the Czar referred it, the proclamation contained neither freedom nor even the more needed land. The State simply became the master and extortioner instead of the landlord, while the latter got an even firmer grip on all the better parts of the land. The following years were most busy ones for the Czar's Cossacks and dragoons. The peasantry of whole provinces were in rebellion, there was violence in every direction, and there were many hundreds of outbreaks sufficiently serious to justify the call for military aid.

Never since the emancipation has the ceaseless recurrence of village rebellions been interrupted. Five years ago, before the Japanese war, there were half a hundred revolts in two provinces alone, and the peasants had to be mercilessly beaten and executed into submission. And in 1906 the spirit and fact of rebellion became general throughout the nation — more general, perhaps, than ever in the history of the empire.

The Russian villages have never lacked the will or the courage to revolt. They have only been wanting in the physical possibility of revolting together. No army can act as a unit, divided into a hundred thousand contingents and scattered over the half of a hemisphere. Yet if not much more coördinated and organised now than before, the revolts have become more and more general, and more and more imbued with a common idea. The villages discuss for months and years a situation that is general in the land. National crises arise. The reaction on the villages is general, almost universal — all the villages are prepared for similar action by the same events. Some village makes a desperate beginning and the outbreaks spread like wildfire over the country. To the outsider it all looks blind and wild. The observer in the village is neither shocked nor surprised. So it has come about that the spirit and manner of the peasants' revolts have kept a general character and have evolved together as a single movement.

The first roots of revolution go down to the very sources of the peasant nature. The Russian peasant was originally enslaved only by the utmost cruelty and bloodshed, after centuries

of the same relative freedom as our Anglo-Saxon forefathers enjoyed before the Normans came. But the enslavement came a thousand years ago in England; in Russia it came but three centuries ago — ten or twelve uneventful generations — and the peasants never forgot their former relative freedom. The Russians were so little serfs in spirit that they attached the smallest importance to their emancipation in 1861 from a yoke they had never accepted in their hearts. The system had only succeeded in keeping alive the spirit of rebellion against all authority.

The State religion, as we have also seen, had no deeper hold. No people of Europe so thoroughly paganised the early Christianity with their own popular legends and their own truly popular saints. Many millions of peasants, separating entirely from the Russian Church, have formed some of the most rational and some of the most spiritual sects in existence, never halted in their growth by the continuous persecution of the Government. As to the rest, the so-called orthodox, they mechanically follow the set Governmental forms and are inspired with a sincere, if broad and loose, Christianity. But nowhere do they show any deep respect either for the priests or their State-directed utterances from the pulpit. Not in Catholic Italy or Protestant England is there more resistance to the Church as an institution, more independent religious feeling, more rebellion against established creed. The peasant is imbued and permeated in his religious feeling, that is in the depths of his nature, by a thorough spirit of revolt.

In morality and law the opinion of the village, and not that of the priests, fixes the living moral code. This code is vital and flexible, irregular and changeable, but on the whole most elevated and most humane — witness any great Russian writer, say Turgeniev or Tolstoi. As for the St. Petersburg law, true, it must be obeyed, for it is backed by whips and bullets, imprisonment and exile — but it comes from outside the village assembly, so it is obeyed only in its letter, and not in its spirit. The peasants are told by the Government not to try to understand it, but to obey. So they obey its letter without trying to understand its spirit, and in consequence fully half of the Czar's orders are reduced to naught.

The peasants are born and bred in an atmosphere of unconscious and even conscious passive resistance to both Church and State. They were ordered from St. Petersburg not to interfere in the passing of property from father to son. But the villagers have always been accustomed to consider all the land at the bottom common property of the village. When an heir had too little, he was given something from the village store; when he had too much, something was taken away. So the Czar's orders were disobeyed. His terrible Cossacks were as nothing against the quiet village will, the common and almost religious feeling of the people that the land belongs to the community. The majority of the villagers not only equalised the shares between heirs, but they equalised landed wealth among all the families of the village. The Czar's Government, seeing at every point in the present revolution the danger of this rebellious village spirit, has decided to abolish entirely the commune's control over individual property. It can be doubted if the Czar has the power. In the village, the village meeting is the sovereign rather than the Czar.

Before the first Duma met, before even the Peasants' Union had conceived the plan, the peasants' spirit of resistance had already led to boycotting taxes and recruits. Many villages had refused taxes on various grounds; many others had refused the last levies of recruits during the war. These methods of action were proposed a year before the Duma by peasants at all the congresses of the Peasants' Union and were adopted and spread broadcast over the land. When the Czar dissolved the first Duma, and the representatives of all the nation wished to find a means of general national resistance, they adopted as a national measure the peasants' plan of the boycotting of taxes and recruits. Thus the first great revolutionary measure ever endorsed by the Russian people as a nation, came neither from professional revolutionists nor any upper social class, but from the people themselves.

But long before the Duma had adopted this measure, it had already been sufficiently tested among the peasantry to be rejected by them as impractical, for it left every advantage in the hands of the Government, which, of course, did not scruple to use force. They had turned to less passive ways

of making their power felt. The first and most natural action was against the landlords, who constitute the main support of the throne both in St. Petersburg and in the country. As soon as the Czar had granted the October Manifesto, the peasants began to make their preparations. They argued that the Manifesto must have given something of a very concrete nature to the nation at large, as was evident to them by the enthusiasm with which it had been received in the towns. They knew that the only reality to them as country people was the land. Therefore the Manifesto must sooner or later enable them to acquire the landlords' landed property. They began to consider themselves as the future proprietors of the landlords' estates. The latter protested in vain.

Had the landlords not lived at the people's expense? the peasants asked, and had they not stood between them and the Czar? Did they have any place in the village religion, the village morality, or the village law? Had they not pillaged the peasants after the emancipation, and since that time had they not taken advantage of the peasants' economic weakness and starvation to mercilessly lower wages while they pitilessly raised rents? To take a business advantage of a starving neighbour may be well in America; it agrees neither with the law, morality, nor religion of the benighted Russian peasants. When the landlords heard how the peasants reasoned, they began to hire armed guards. Evidently, said the peasants, they propose to thwart the will of the Czar. The peasants would see about that.

Suddenly the latent class-hatred between the village and landlord broke out into a gigantic class war. The countryside from Poland to the Urals and from the Black Sea to the Baltic was lighted up within a few weeks by the fires of thousands of country mansions — in all some fifty million dollars of property was destroyed. Everywhere the movement was similar, since it was everywhere invited by a common situation and founded on the same peasant nature. It consisted of two procedures. First, the peasants moved as a village against the neighbouring estate, often in daytime, always with their horses and carts. They took possession of all the landlord's movable property — implements, animals, and grain — and divided it in more or less



A LANDLORD'S MANSIONS —
With nothing but hovels for miles around



A LANDLORD'S MANSION AFTER A VISIT OF THE RED COCK
(Hundreds of mansions were burned by the peasants in 1905 and 1906)

equal proportions among themselves. They usually claimed to act either in the name of the people or that of the Peasants' Union. The second procedure was almost always the burning of the landlord's house as a war measure against this common enemy of the people, lest he should return and demand possession of what he claimed as his own. The landlord himself and his servants were rarely attacked. There was little or nothing of the spirit of personal vengeance.

This was the most universal plan of action in the months of November and December, 1905. With the coming of the winter snows, all the most active movements must relax. The peasants had time to think over this first plan of revolt, and their cooler judgment was against it. Cossacks came to the villages — not to all at once, there would not have been enough Cossacks in the Empire to do that — but to one at a time; they took back the landlords' property, beat the peasants into submission, killed a few of the ringleaders, and sent others to Siberia or the prisons in the towns. The landlords got back enough of their live stock and provisions to enable them to return. The plan had failed in every aspect. The peasants were neither on a better economic footing, nor had they achieved the least measure of freedom. They had only further embittered the landlords and police.

PART THREE

REVOLUTION AND THE MESSAGE

CHAPTER I

THE WORKINGMEN

IF THE peasants have become revolutionary and Socialistic, the city workingmen, better paid, better educated, and better organised, have both preceded them and gone further in this direction. Indeed the most important events of the revolutionary movement up to the present have been brought about solely by the workingmen. The Czar's promise of a national assembly was forced from him by the indignation of Russia and the whole world at his massacre, on January 22, 1905 (Western calendar), of the courageous workingmen petitioners before the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. On October 30th of the same year the general strike instituted by the Railway Union wrung from the reluctant Czar his promise of universal suffrage for this assembly and of the rights of man for Russian citizens. All these promises were empty phrases, but nevertheless the most momentous political acts of all Russian history up to the present day. Having gone so far, having made such sacrifices, and having won such a moral victory for the nation, the working people began to ask something for themselves. They saw it was possible that even under a free government, if it fell into the hands of other social classes, they might still continue to starve.

They had never placed a mere political liberty above their hope to reach a position where they might cease to go hungry. The petition of January 22d itself was the result of a strike for better wages and bearable hours of labour. The national general strike was instituted by the Railway Union driven to exasperation because the Government had refused it the elementary right to organise railway employees for economic betterment. The Russian workingmen have fought not only against political conditions worse than those of other countries,

but also against an equally inferior economic situation. They are not willing to give up their lives to a fight for a political freedom that would not bring a corresponding economic improvement.

The Russian working people are for the most part able to read and write. For many years the country has been in such a disturbed condition that they have had the advantage of the leadership not only of the intelligent individuals in their midst but of a large part of the equally revolutionary educated class who have turned to the working people with their ideas for political and social regeneration of Russia. They have come to be keenly conscious of the superior conditions of workingmen in other countries, and at the same time of all the social and political evils against which labour unions and social parties everywhere are fighting. They have found much matter of vital import to them in comparing the condition of their country with that of other lands.

They found that the American workingmen, with the aid of education and modern machinery, are producing three times, and the Englishmen twice, as much as the Russian, that the Englishmen are paid four and the American five times as much wages per hour, while the cost of living is on the whole as high in Russia as elsewhere. The meat is indeed dearer, the bread is as dear, and only clothes are cheap; yet the average yearly wage in Russia is less than \$100; the very highest wages in any industry is that in the construction of machines, \$262.50. The hours are longer than in other countries, even if we take into account in reckoning the annual working time of the Russians the large number of holidays. The hated system of company stores prevails widely, fines are in very wide use, and the employers pay the wages at such times as they think fit. Worst of all the conditions, perhaps, is the fact that the factories own a large part of the workingmen's homes and the overcrowding is greater than in the worst tenement districts in New York, sometimes several families being put into a single room. Sometimes the homes are even in the factories. There are labour laws, some of which look very well on the statute books. However, the law of 1897 about hours shortens them only to eleven and a half and is poorly enforced at that.

The big strikes began in the very beginning of the recent industrial movement in Russia, in 1885. Conditions at that time amounted practically to slavery and the result was a sort of anarchy in the factories. The chief cause of the large disturbances in the Moscow district in 1885 was that the employers were taking back from the working people of the Morosov factory every year three hundred thousand rubles, or nearly 40 per cent. of the workingmen's wages, in the form of fines. The strike was successful in a sense; laws were passed against the fines and company stores and irregularity in the payment of wages, but of course they were not enforced. The strikes continued to grow from this time, until in St. Petersburg in 1896 the strike of the weavers was so serious that the question came up in a conference between Finance Minister Witte and the chief of police of the city, Kleigels, whether it would be practicable, under modern conditions, to force workingmen, like slaves, to their work. The city chief of police answered that he could force workingmen to labour "if they would only make disturbances on the street," but that if they sat quietly at home he could do nothing against them. As a result of this strike the eleven and a half hours law I have mentioned was written on the statute books.

All the strikes during the recent revolutionary movement, both before and after the St. Petersburg strike that led to the massacre, have had as part of their object shorter hours and higher wages. In some cases the hours have actually been shortened to ten, nine, or in a very few even to eight hours. The workingmen have felt they have a certain power, however large the reserve army of starving peasants ready to take their places, or the army of police ready to shoot them down. They have felt at the same time that this power rises or falls with the general revolutionary movement, for as soon as the Government began to get the upper hand during 1907 wages were again curtailed and hours are being gradually put back to the old level.

Even more than the peasants, then, the working people had a social element in their revolutionary programme. Even before the meeting of the first Duma they had arrived at a very revolutionary position, demanding no mere reform of any

kind, but a constitutional assembly. They did not wait, like the peasants, to see whether the Duma succeeded or failed in wringing important concessions from the Czar; they wanted the Czar to turn over the Government into the hands of the people, and they felt that no lesser measure would give them any guarantee of the promised freedom.

Soon after the Labour Group was formed the eleven workingmen deputies left it. They were not satisfied with the address of the Duma to the Throne, but issued another of their own, in which they accused the Czar of having already broken his "sacred" promises of the October Manifesto of only a few months before, and of having lessened rather than increased the rights of the people. They further accused the Czar in issuing the fundamental laws of April 25, 1906, of having attempted to abolish the other part of the October Manifesto, viz., the promise of a popular Duma. It was certainly true that the power given to the Upper Chamber by this law and the restriction of the Duma's rights over the budget left the latter practically no power whatever. The workingmen's representatives demanded again immediate amnesty for all political prisoners, liberty and justice for those who had fought against the Government. They further asserted that the great land question could not be rightfully decided by the present Duma, elected on restricted suffrage, but must be turned over to another Duma elected by equal votes of all the people. They concluded that the only purpose of the first Duma, its only *raison d'être*, was to pass a universal suffrage law, and they declared that this must be done speedily if it was to be done peacefully.

The workingmen had reached the extreme revolutionary position without having to learn anything from the Dumas. The majority of the peasants only reached it after the dissolution of the first Duma, and a considerable part is only just now learning to take this advanced position. Not only had the workingmen reached this point, but the overwhelming majority were already republicans. The Social Democratic Party, to which most of them belong, demanded not only an immediate trial of "those bloody murderers, the ministers and the Czar," but also the abolition of the monarchy once

for all. It asserted before the meeting of the first Duma that all the ministers were simply the Czar's servants, and that he, therefore, must be held strictly responsible for all the outrages they committed.

The workingmen of Russia would be glad to secure the half-freedom of the workingmen of other countries, or even of the United States, but they are not ready to die for it. They did not have themselves shot down on the 22nd of January, executed by hundreds in Moscow, Riga, and Odessa, imprisoned by thousands in every Russian jail, and exiled to the deserts and the arctic regions, in exchange for the doubtful privileges of the workingmen of Goldfield or Cripple Creek. They knew these American stories; I have heard them from their own lips. I have talked with labour leaders of all the factions—pure and simple unionists, revolutionary Socialists, independent Socialists, and Social Democrats, members of the Duma, and the practical leaders of the great Railway Union. They were all agreed that our political institutions are much preferable to their own, but they were not very anxious to exchange one despot for another. The enthusiasm with which they, more than any other class in Russia, throw away their lives is due to the great hope that they may not exchange the despotism of the Czar for a despotism of private capital. No faction has any idea of the immediate creation of a Socialist state, but every faction hopes that the Russian working class, if it once makes possible the greatest revolution of the world's history, will demand such a voice in the reborn nation as to make it impossible that the new Government should be dominated by a handful of capitalists.

For a short while it looked as if labour might combine with capital against the Czar. After the 22nd of January, employers coöperated for a time with the workmen, and the workmen with employers, in a common cause against the Government. The strikes at that time had almost without exception a political character. Many employers freely paid for waiting time during these purely political strikes, a direct subsidy to the revolution. Even during the Moscow barricades several of the largest manufacturers openly or secretly supported the insurrection. But now the situation has cleared and the

Russian revolution, the only great revolution the world has seen since the rise of modern capitalism, is directed as much against landlordism and capitalism as it is against the Czar. For the Czar, by the "fundamental laws" of April 25th, invented an improved style of American Senate. Half the members of this august body are elected by employers, landlords, bankers, and clergymen — half appointed by the Czar. For fear the Duma might do something popular this second body shares the power. The employers were finally cured of their revolutionism by this measure, for from the capitalistic standpoint the new body was an ideal representation of the nation. When a few months later the second Duma was dissolved and a third created almost in the image of this Senate, or Council of the Empire, the capitalists became enthusiastic supporters of the "new" Government. The workingmen's unions and political parties, which never had anything but suspicion toward their self-professed ally, were at least in the fortunate position of having both their opponents, absolutism and capitalism, in a single camp.

Witte saw the danger that the workingmen would demand a share in the political power of the future Russian Government which his friends, the capitalists, would be unwilling to concede, and did not fail to try to thwart it. He advised the labour leaders to leave politics alone. He favoured purely economic action for his "brother workingmen," as he styled them. As much class struggle as you please, but no class politics!

When I called, Witte referred me to his Minister of Commerce (and Labor) Timiriaseff, with orders to the latter to talk freely for the benefit of the American workingman. Mr. Timiriaseff believed, he said, in the widest possible democracy — much beyond the "checks and balances" of the American Constitution. He believed in cabinet government; that is, that every executive should be always and forever responsible to the legislative power — an idea that, put into the American Constitution, might do much to restrain the unbridled conservatism of our elected executives and the judges, their appointees. He believed in many kinds of labour legislation, such as a legal maximum for the working day and workingmen's insurance. He believed, in fact, in everything the workingmen wanted, *but he did n't*

want them to take it themselves. He explained the benevolence of the new Government, which was ready to do everything, and showed how he and Witte had fought in the cabinet for toleration of "good" unions (the non-revolutionary ones). It was not Witte, he explained, but the Czar's pet minister, Durnovo, chief of police, gendarmes and spies, that had not even permitted these pious unions to hold a single meeting. Witte himself would have had them given every privilege.

Here was Mr. Witte's scheme to foil the revolution. The workingmen were to be divided into two parts—the wild and the tame. The wild, he said to a friend of mine, those who were not satisfied with his benevolent efforts, were to be killed or caged, "like the wild beasts they were." The tame were to be further tamed. First came Gapon with his 30,000 rubles subsidy for restoring the workingmen's clubs, under police supervision to be sure. But Gapon was inconvenient for the taming. He played such a hidden game—either very deep and subtle or else very oily and false—that he was trusted neither by the watchful workmen nor by the watchful police. His long, involved career is of more interest to the searcher for clever plots for novels than it is to the serious public. He stands for no great clear idea, and he spent the last year of his life trying in vain to explain himself.

Gapon's successor was Ushakoff, with whom I have talked frequently and at length. He certainly considered himself an honest man, though he has taken Witte's money for his movement. But labour did not fall into the trap. Ushakoff, as it happened, took more money than he was willing to confess. Exactly like one of the Gapon troop, he turned it over to the union, but he was ashamed to turn it over in Witte's name. The real origin of the money was discovered, and his movement was ruined. The Russian workman, his eyes more widely opened, now decided to keep his hands clean of Count Witte's benevolence. Later, when independent labour parties and unions appeared, condemning both Gapon and Ushakoff, but satisfied with political conditions and permitted by the Russian Government, this was enough in itself to condemn them in the eyes of the honest workman. So the tottering liberal (capitalistic) ministry had at last to give up its attempt to

defeat the revolutionising of the working class by terrorising its more active part and cajoling and deceiving the timid and ignorant.

The Russian workingman is revolutionary, but he is neither violent, dogmatic, nor unintelligent. He is ready for barricades, but he has studied them, and alone of the workmen of the world he has learned about them from actual experience. He believes in the class struggle. He is ready and willing to fight his oppressor, the capitalist class, to the finish. But he does not ignore the existence of still other classes. He merely asks that the other classes take one side or the other in the bitter conflict that draws so near.

He is unwilling to antagonise the agricultural classes, the peasants, though they may not always agree with him; he hopes rather to secure a common basis of action. There are many orthodox Marxists in Russia, but the great mass of the Russian workmen do not expect the peasants to disappear, absorbed either in the capitalist or working class, according to the stricter Marxist formula. Far from expecting the increasing lower middle classes of the cities to disappear, the workingmen invited their aid to build barricades and carry out the general strike — and the Moscow insurrection was carried on not alone by workmen but by students, clerks, office workers, Government employees, teachers, doctors, engineers. The majority faction of the Social Democratic Party (the progressive and more Russian part) having seen this light, is now for coöperation with these "little bourgeois."

The Railway Union, which formed the heart and core of the great October general strike, realises that the success even of a general strike does not depend on the working class alone. For if the October strike won the Manifesto, the December strike, at the time of the Moscow barricades, failed. The workingmen of the cities joined the strike, but it was only in Moscow that the whole mass of the population, excepting only the rich and privileged, was thoroughly roused. The Railway Union has proved itself wise. It favoured the October strike and the strike was won. It opposed the December strike and the strike was lost. It realises fully the enormous cost and danger of tying up the transportation of a great

country. Its wisdom consists in knowing that if the population is not thoroughly with the strike, the strike will fail. It does not oppose a new strike, but it proposes to wait until success is assured.

The railway men and the labour movement at large have not lost their heads. In October, 1905, they showed the world the first great example of a successful general strike on a national scale. At the first stroke they secured the Manifesto — the first promise of freedom ever wrung from the Czar. The next stroke is to be for nothing less than the final sovereignty of the people, in place of the sovereignty of the Czar — who, if he is kept at all, will retain little more than his name. The workmen are as one man in their demand for a constitution, and they know they will have to force it by revolution — “open, violent rebellion” as Carlyle defines it.

But they propose to make this revolution as speedy and orderly as it can be made, and for this end they propose one more great general strike. The working people, having forced the Czar to promise freedom, propose now to force him to make his promise good. It is to be a class struggle against officials, landlords, and employers. But the working class will not antagonise any other class except that of the rich and privileged. The Russian labour movement is under no delusions as to the “benevolence” of the employing class, but it does not extend its hatred to every other class outside its ranks. In the next great revolutionary crisis behind the rejected working people will be found the great mass of the intelligent city population of Russia — all those not held back by private interests, privileges, or public office, and above all, the overwhelming majority of her agricultural population of a hundred million souls.

CHAPTER II

THE POSITION OF THE WORKINGMEN

IMMEDIATELY after the great general strike the labour unions and the Socialist parties became at once aware that the promises in the Czar's Manifesto had no real value. If there were any illusions they did not last beyond the massacres of the second day; most of the leaders were thoroughly conscious of the emptiness of the victory from the first moment they heard the Manifesto and saw that it was a compromise that left all the actual power in the hands of the Czar. That the next movement would have to be, not a peaceful general strike, but an insurrection, was realised fully by the famous Council of Labour Deputies.

In St. Petersburg and many other places the insurrection-strike that followed was a complete fiasco, but in Moscow the revolutionaries succeeded with a little body of armed men, far inferior numerically to the army to which they were opposed, and with the aid of the population, in holding for several days large portions of Moscow. They were without cavalry, without artillery, and the great majority were without discipline; the trained revolutionary militia formed a very small part of the whole. Their success was due to the enthusiastic support of the population. If the revolutionary militia consisted of workingmen with a certain proportion of students and professional Socialist leaders, the barricades were built by workingmen, servants, clerks, engineers, lawyers, and members of the professional class.

A great lesson remains fixed in the minds of all the revolutionists, especially of the workingmen — the possible success of guerilla tactics in a modern city. It was because the population could *safely* aid the revolutionary militia without being caught; because the arms could be passed from hand to hand, so that one gun did the service of three, and the military

had no rest; because of the impossibility of the Government's deciding which house-owner was terrorised into aiding the revolutionists and which was glad to do so; because of the possibility of the sudden transformation of a peaceful citizen into a revolutionist and a revolutionist into a peaceful citizen at a moment's notice and without the least chance of detection — it was because of these conditions that the revolutionists performed their astounding feat. In a week were belied the theories of a whole generation of revolutionary but timid European Socialists and a century of military dogmas on the hopelessness of insurrection. The spontaneous and universal use of guerilla tactics by the revolutionaries and the assistance of a large part of the people of Moscow came near placing the second city of a great empire in the hands of the revolutionists.

In other sections of the country where the whole population had for many months been preparing for an armed insurrection, the movement, also guided by the workingmen, was more difficult to conquer. In one part of the Empire it even had a complete victory, and the Czar has not yet been able to force this section under the old servitude. In the Finnish, as in the other insurrectionary movements of which I have been speaking, the working people played by far the most important part. Aided by the "Red Guard," entirely under the leadership of workingmen and Socialists, moderately well supplied with arms and supported by nearly all classes of the population, the revolutionists were able to abolish entirely the Czar's Government, to remove the Russian officials and police and to establish Finns in their stead. It is well known that the Finnish revolutionary movement was orderly from the outset, that there was no unnecessary bloodshed and that there has been none since. The Czar's Government, occupied seriously with other insurrectionary movements in the heart of the Empire, conceded nearly everything, and for a while there was no freer country in Europe. Now the Red Guard has been disbanded, but the Finnish people have learned a lesson and if there is any sign of revolutionary movement in Russia they will undoubtedly at once undertake active measures for the defence and recovery of their liberties now being gradually stolen away.

Similar revolutionary movements of the overwhelming majority of the population, under the leadership of the working classes, placed considerable parts of Poland and the Caucasus for a time in the hands of the people. But with the aid of armies of 50,000 and 150,000 men these movements were completely suppressed. The movements in both these regions were on the whole orderly and humane, while the Government repressions were savage and barbarous from the first moment.

The intelligent classes in both sections saw that the rule of the revolutionary committees was in many respects better than the former rule of the police. The systematic lynching of thieves and the deliberate destruction of houses of ill-repute by the revolutionists did more for the good of Warsaw than years of its miserable, inefficient, and corrupt police, often in league with the thieves and *souteneurs* and occupied almost entirely with the oppression of political suspects. The Government has occupied, rather than conquered, these two regions, and it does not dare to remove any considerable part of the occupying forces. The people are not defeated, but only waiting until the Russian people are ready to renew the war against the Czar.

The same revolutionary committees were also conducting the only schools and classes to be found during the height of the movement. When all the schools were closed and all the scholars, from little children to students of law, medicine, and engineering, were on strike, the Socialists were conducting secret evening classes in reading and writing for the neglected children of the workers, and secret evening courses in these and other subjects for the adults. And for years every evening literally hundreds of these circles, necessarily confined to a dozen pupils or less for fear of the police, have gathered in every corner of Warsaw, taught by the students of the universities and higher schools, by young men of the professional classes, by young salesmen and clerks.

The schools are only a small part of the education the revolutionists provide. There are secret revolutionary pamphlets by the million, and even many regular revolutionary journals, the only truly popular newspapers, which handle every sort of political, economic, and social question under the direction



HOUSES OF "RICH" PEASANTS

of university-bred editors and contributors. The innumerable Government prosecutions have failed utterly to hold this flood of printed matter back.

Simultaneously with this great educational movement, both in Poland and throughout Russia generally, the revolutionary movement enabled the working people to organise into large and successful trade unions in spite of the prohibitions and persecutions of the Government. Wages were raised and hours shortened, until sometimes the wages were 50 per cent. more than before. From any standpoint of the public welfare or the best economic interests of the country at large, this movement must be considered entirely a progressive and profitable one. As soon as the Government once more secured the upper hand the unions were again suppressed, until now membership in nearly any union in Russia is a crime under the law. Doubtless the Government from its point of view is quite right in reaching this decision, since it is impossible to imagine that any labour organisation could long continue under the present Government without deciding to fight it to the death.

During the revolutionary movement the peaceful constructive work of organising the working people, not only in trade unions but in coöperative organisations, has gone on much more rapidly than before. Just as the Government has destroyed the unions and attacked the tremendously successful "People's Universities" or university extension movements as dangerous to the State, so have the reactionary organisations proposed that the Government should either close by force, or put out of business by subsidised competition, the astonishingly successful coöperative movement that began recently in St. Petersburg. There are already thousands of these workingmen's coöperative stores, just as there are thousands of secret classes to which the teachers and professors of the country, nearly all public-spirited men, are freely giving their time. It is certain that both of these movements are untinged by any direct political object; it is equally certain that the Government from the standpoint of the safety of autocracy, is right that anything that elevates the condition of the working people or increases their intelligence is likely to become an imminent danger to the Czarism.

It has, of course, been realised that the support of the army must be secured, and of the numerous mutinies that have occurred from Vladivostock to Sebastopol, Riga, and Cronstadt, nearly all have been brought about principally by workingmen agitators and by such elements of the army as have been composed largely of workingmen. The reason for the mutinies that all but put the fleets both of the Black and Baltic seas into the hands of the revolutionists was that sailors are also workingmen and in close touch with the rest of the working classes. Even the conservative wing of the Social Democrats has always favoured agitation in the army and hoped that the Government might fall into the hands of the people through widespread army rebellion. The prosecution of the fifty deputies of the Social Democratic Party of the second Duma, which was used by the Government as a pretext for dissolving the Duma when it refused to turn over the deputies to the courts, was based on the fact of this army agitation. The trial has now taken place; a third of these deputies have been sentenced to hard labour in the mines and another third exiled, while only a very few have gone entirely without punishment.

But these mutinies, isolated from one another, occurring also at different times, never succeeded even in gaining the whole garrison to their side. This was a necessary result of the propaganda as carried on by the workingmen's parties; the propaganda among soldiers already enlisted was necessarily a barracks propaganda and necessarily dealt largely with the conditions of the soldiers themselves, which varied greatly from regiment to regiment, and town to town. The leaders of the agitation soon saw two great necessities. One was to convert the soldiers before they enlisted, so that they would understand that they were fighting, not for temporary or small military evils, but for a great national cause. Another was to secure some form of common movement between the army and the rest of the people, without which no mutiny could, of course, ever develop into a national revolutionary movement. But before these lessons were learned hundreds of persons had been executed and thousands sent to hard labour for their lives for agitation in the barracks. The parties now know very well that no army movement, any more than a general strike, can

succeed until the general state of public feeling has reached an extremely acute stage. They know that no revolution can be planned beforehand; but they propose to be as ready as possible when the psychological moment has arrived. Unfortunately, a certain difficulty still exists between the workingmen's and the peasants' organisations. It is well understood that co-operation is necessary but some of the workingmen's parties, especially those composed largely of "intellectuals," feel that in the general movement the working people should have the leading rôle. This seems a very wrong attitude, since the peasants in Russia are five times more numerous than all other working classes.

The organisations that were initiated and managed by the workingmen themselves with the minimum of assistance from outsiders have always shown a very friendly spirit toward the peasantry. Most remarkable of such organisations were doubtless the Councils of Labour Deputies, purely revolutionary or insurrectionary bodies, that arose after the general strike and before the Government had again seized firmly the reins of power. These organisations were of a purely Socialist character but they were at the same time strictly non-partisan and took care not to develop a too definite political programme; they were composed of workingmen but they were not by any means labour unions, or even a federation of labour unions. They were nothing more nor less than a framework for a revolutionary government, perhaps some vague foreshadowing of what may develop into a very real power in some future revolutionary moment. It is largely on account of experience with these organisations that the Government hesitates to allow any labour association of any kind and continually fluctuates between two equally impossible policies. First it forbids all unions, but this only leads to the more rapid development of conspirative parties and every form of violence, as well as that disorganisation of industry which now exists at Odessa, Lodz, and many other places. Urged, then, by the employers themselves, and perhaps by the small moderate element among the workingmen, the Government decides to tolerate loyal and peaceful unions, but it has no sooner done this for a few months than these organisations, outraged at every point by the pre-

vailing despotism, turn into purely revolutionary associations. It was the Council of Labour Deputies to a large degree that taught the working people their power and placed the Government in the dilemma from which it can find no issue.

The Councils of Labour Deputies have usually taken a broad national view of the revolutionary movement, coöperating in the fullest way, for instance, with the Peasants' Union. Far from taking their leaders from the Socialist parties, they have rather given those parties some of their most active organisers. Such an example is Khrustalev, a figure so important and also so typical of the organisers of the labour movement in general that I have obtained from him a personal statement of his life.

Khrustalev, more correctly Nossar, was a peasant's son from the province of Poltava. His father had become a Tolstoian and was sentenced to exile for twenty years by the Government, though he was allowed to return under police supervision. His home was the centre of all revolutionary thought in the neighbourhood and the young man was early surrounded by every shade of revolutionist. As a Tolstoian his father demanded that he should work with his hands. He was employed at times by his landlord and at times attended a board school.

At this period, the early nineties, the revolutionary movement existed chiefly among the students, and young Nossar was urged to become one in order to carry on agitation. The police, knowing his revolutionary environment, wished to prevent his entrance to the high school, but the director was a friend of peasant and self-taught students and he was accepted. In 1897 he was one of the organisers of a students' congress. The police insisted on his being expelled from the school but he was allowed first to graduate. He then went to St. Petersburg and entered the university. The first great students' strike took place in 1898, and for having aided in the organisation of the national movement he was kept three months in prison. It was at this time that he changed from the radical people's party, of which Korolenko was at that time the leader, and joined the Social Democratic organisation, which, with its rich German literature, has always been popular among the student class.

He was exiled to South Russia, took part there in the organi-

sation of unions, a workingman's party, and a workingman's paper. Later he went to the Caucasus and tried to organise a railroad union and only escaped another imprisonment because he was employed as tutor to the son of the prosecuting attorney. The latter advised him to leave. He returned to St. Petersburg to continue his studies, but the police interfered and exiled him to Yaroslavl, where he passed his law examinations and received the rights of citizen and the privilege of holding a chair at the university, providing, of course, he could secure a vacancy.

In 1904, returning again to St. Petersburg, he met Gapon and took a prominent part in the movement that led to the general strike in St. Petersburg and the massacre of the working people on January 22d. It was at this time that he got his name of Khrustalev. When, after the massacre, the workingmen were allowed to elect a delegation to deal with the employers, Nossar was elected as a member, but since he was not a workingman he could not serve. Offered his place by a workingman, Khrustalev, Nossar assumed the workingman's name and has since borne it. The members of the commission were all arrested, among others Nossar. He stayed two months in prison and was condemned to eight years hard labour in Siberia. In the meanwhile he was exiled to Kharkov. But at the first station out from St. Petersburg he left the train and returned. In St. Petersburg he was again arrested, again kept two months in prison, again exiled, this time under escort. When the train arrived at Moscow a street demonstration was taking place and Khrustalev again managed to escape. Here he helped to organise a Council of Labour Deputies, and when the great general strike of October began he was sent as a delegate of this council to St. Petersburg to aid in organising a similar body there. He was successful, and after the great strike became the central figure of the revolutionary movement. He was again arrested and again exiled, but managed to make his escape. The conduct of his organisation and his opinions showed sufficient force and originality to interest the world at that time; and to this day, of course, he continues one of the leaders of the movement.

Another leader, Trotsky, likewise a young man in the early

thirties, is equally known among the revolutionists. In a recent talk with the latter I asked what was the final conclusion reached by the leaders of this movement as to the future of the revolution, and he answered that the future army would have to be educated for revolt in the villages themselves. In four years the army will be entirely composed of new recruits. It is hoped by Trotsky, as well as by a large part of the peasantry themselves, that the new army, made up of young men familiar with existing conditions, will be made up of revolutionists.

In the new revolutionary tactics which are working toward a complete unity of the peasants and working people in the revolutionary movement, the popular faction of the Social Democratic party has played a still more important rôle perhaps than the Council of Labour Deputies. But there has been a certain current of opinion in the party against this evidently practical and indispensable proposal of unity. The minority faction, represented by a number of leaders, among others by Zeretelly, has a very great scorn for peasant rebellions, which it claims have always been easily suppressed. It might, of course, be answered that rebellions conducted by workingmen alone have likewise failed. Fortunately, this attitude of suspicion toward the peasantry and underestimate of their power in the popular movement are confined almost entirely to the leaders. The majority faction and the Council of Labour Deputies, both composed largely of workingmen, have evolved no such theory of the superiority of workingmen over all other classes, either during the revolutionary movement or after it. The workingmen have from the first shown themselves more social than the majority of the professional Socialists, especially in their attitude toward the peasant class.

Nevertheless, the attitude of these leaders of the Social Democratic Party, more workingman than the workingmen themselves, more proletarian than the proletarians, has been a great retarding force on the revolutionary movement, and one of the great changes through which the masses of the people have gone has been to learn to distrust those who believe that there is a fundamental antagonism between the two most important classes of the country, the peasants and the working people. It was because of this suspicion toward the peasantry

that the leaders of the minority succeeded in getting the last congress of the party to reject guerilla warfare and the expropriation of Governmental funds as a means of combat at the present moment. The resolution, however, would have been lost had it been put to the vote of the Russians of the party alone. The delegates from Poland, the Baltic Provinces, and the Caucasus, though most revolutionary, were against the practice of guerilla war at the present time for a very practical reason peculiar to these non-Russian provinces — that the guerilla war in these sections has necessarily taken an anti-Russian turn, and the Russian soldiers stationed as garrison there have been severe sufferers. Many lives of innocent peasant soldiers have thus been sacrificed, and sometimes it has happened that Russian revolutionists themselves have been killed through inevitable mistakes. This reason does not apply in Russia itself, and the overwhelming majority of the working people of Russia, even of those who are members of this party, favours relentless warfare against the Government and the expropriation of Government money.

It can be asserted with all confidence that the Lettish, Polish, and Caucasian leaders of the party are not of a moderate but of the most revolutionary opinion. A Lettish leader has assured me that his party is only temporarily against guerilla war because the Russian movement itself is scarcely ripe for these tactics. A leader of the Poles has pointed out that a solution of the difficulty has been found by one of the chief Polish Socialist parties. This organisation has declared itself in favor of guerilla war, but at the same time against all war on the Russian soldiers. This restricts guerilla tactics very narrowly, but the principle is that in which the large majority of the Russian working people and nationalists undoubtedly believe. The most important Caucasian leader, though a member of the minority faction, declared to me that the peasants of the Caucasus are both revolutionary and well armed, that they make use of the strike and boycott almost as frequently and as successfully as the workingmen, that they are largely members of the party, and that the party hopes to keep them in its ranks, even those who are property owners. Certainly these peasants are not opposed generally to guerilla war.

The abandonment of guerilla war means the crippling of the agitation in the army itself. All the conferences of those who have risked their lives in this work favour both guerilla war and the expropriation of Government money. In the resolutions introduced by the majority faction, both these measures are favoured as a means of preparing the members of the party and the working people in general for future revolutionary conflicts. This is naturally the principal question within the party, for, if the organisation goes in for a guerilla civil war, it must expect to receive the most bitter opposition of all well-to-do and prosperous classes, who will necessarily suffer by the resulting confusion, and it must at the same time seek the closest possible alliance with the peasantry. The leaders of the majority now in control of the party clearly recognise this significance of the new policy. It is for this reason that they are in favour not merely of guerilla war but of the organisation of armed bands composed partly or altogether of non-party members, thus offering the possibility of the most complete co-operation with the peasants, who have shown very little tendency to join the Social Democratic organisation. The majority faction realises thoroughly the necessity of a full unity in the revolutionary movement and points out that the lack of this has been the chief failure up to the present point.

The leaders now in control of the party feel that the peasantry and the less well-to-do element of the middle classes of the large cities are entirely against both the landlords and the absolutism and altogether ripe for a thorough democratic revolution. This is why they favour the fullest co-operation both with the peasants and with the majority of the middle classes of the towns. But even these leaders do not concede that the Socialism of either of these classes can possibly be as genuine on the whole as that of the working people; they do not feel that unity is possible on the great land question, the first social issue to be solved by a democratic government. But they do feel that these classes can all struggle side by side for a constitutional assembly. It seems, then, that this party under the present leadership has shown that it may assume a part, but not the whole, of the leadership of the revolutionary movement.

I talked with the chief speaker and also with the chief writer

of this party in their separate hiding places in the woods of Finland. Alexinsky, one of the chief figures in the second Duma, is part workingman, part student, very much in the same way as Khrustalev. When he was elected to the Duma he was member of the Central Committee of the party in St. Petersburg. He is also a very young man, scarcely above thirty years of age. Like all the present leaders of the party, he feels that it must struggle as much against the "traitor Constitutional Democrats" as against the Government itself, and he stakes all his hope in the future of the revolution on the further development of the peasants' movement. He thought that the power given to the landlords in the third Duma was a reactionary movement that would especially stir up the peasants' hatred. Before this, he said, the landlords were only parasites, now they are occupying themselves with the politics of oppression as much as their noble heads permit. He felt that it was only when the peasants were in a revolutionary movement that it would be possible to secure the aid of the army, and so he, it is seen, was in substantial agreement with the organisers of the Councils of Labour Deputies.

Still more important for understanding the position of the workingmen's party at the present moment was my talk with the man who is perhaps the most popular leader in Russia, Lenin. He feels that the revolution in Russia is being retarded consciously by foreign capitalists and governments, which are very glad to be able to hold it back at any cost, knowing that it is sure to have a social character in the end that will affect even their own governments. All of his views are formed with a very full knowledge of the economic and political situation of other countries and are especially interesting because he sharply differentiates his Socialism from that prevailing in Germany, whence the leaders of the opposite faction have taken bodily nearly all their ideas. The German movement, he finds, has been too anxious to be legal. Under a despotic government like that of Prussia he would have been glad to see it take a more illegal and violent form; he thought that it had been deluded by the fact that Prussia had a paper constitution.

Like Alexinsky, Lenin awaits the agrarian movement, favours

the guerilla war at the present time, and hopes that a railway strike with the destruction of the lines of communication and the support of the peasantry may some day put the Government of Russia into the people's hands. However, I was shocked to find that this important leader also, though he expects a full coöperation with the peasants on equal terms during the revolution, feels toward them a very deep distrust, thinking them to a large extent bigoted and blindly patriotic, and fearing that they may some day shoot down the revolutionary workingmen as the French peasants did during the Paris Commune.

The chief basis for this distrust is of course the prejudiced feeling that the peasants are not likely to become good Socialists. It is on account of this feeling that Lenin and all the Social Democratic leaders place their hopes on a future development of modern large agricultural estates in Russia and the increase of the landless agricultural working class, which alone they believe would prove truly Socialist. At the same time Lenin is far more open-minded on the subject than the leaders formerly in control of the party, and conceded it was possible that such peasants or farmers as were not at the same time employers might join in a future Socialist movement.

We see, then, that the Russian working people in all their organisations are prepared for a cordial and full coöperation with the agricultural population in the revolutionary movement, but we see at the same time that their leading political party expects the city working people to maintain the chief rôle and that the confidence of the leaders of this party in the peasantry is without any deep roots. There is another Socialist and revolutionary organisation in Russia, however, that has as much trust in the peasants as in the workingmen, an organisation that has also a very large following among the working classes. It is to this revolutionary body that we must look to find out how far the movement for the unifying of the various revolutionary tendencies, for the formation of a single national revolutionary movement, has progressed.

CHAPTER III

ORGANISING

THE principles and tactics of the Socialist Revolutionary Party afford the best insight into the heart of the whole revolutionary and Socialist movement that is taking possession of the greater part of Russia's peasants and workingmen. Like the majority of the peasants and workingmen, the party is not looking backward on recent defeats and victories as marking any final stage in the movement; there is no sign of surrender or compromise. A recent party statement claims that the revolution has scarcely seen the end of its first act; that the chief characters in this first act were the city workingmen — the advance guard of the revolution — but that it would be erroneous to believe that this advance guard can take the place of the bulk of the army, the peasantry. It is just at this point that the party differs from the Social Democratic organisation which looks to the peasants to play a secondary, if essential, rôle.

"We are only at the beginning of the revolution," says this declaration, "and we have before us a long period of obstinate struggle, of organization, of new open conflicts, of new defeats and new victories." The Government, it acknowledges, is again in full power, but the general atmosphere is no longer the same and no repression in the world can efface from the conscience of the people what it has felt and endured during the period through which it has just passed. The task is the same as before the Manifesto, but the conditions are more favourable. In a conversation with one of the younger, but most important leaders, of the party, Sevenkov, the man who planned the "executions" of the brutal von Plehve and the Grand Duke Sergius, I found he held the same view. Far from underestimating the obstacles ahead of the movement, Sevenkov felt that the difficulties of the French Revolution were a bagatelle by comparison. The executive committee of the party

feels the same way: it looks at the third Duma as having the power of considerably strengthening the Autocracy; it does not deny that certain elements of the population, frightened by the growing profundity of the revolution, its development from a purely political to a profoundly social movement, have been driven into the camp of the enemy; it acknowledges that a part of the educated leaders of the revolutionary movement have become tired out, that another part have become disappointed, and that a third part have lost their heads; it sees that the Government repression has successfully prevented the organised movement of the masses, and it recognises that active and rebellious individuals, finding no possibility of an organised outlet for their passionate anger against the Government, have taken to individual actions which have no social value, however much they may have been prompted in the first instance by the social spirit. Nevertheless, it feels that this very situation will still further intensify the struggle and will weld all the revolutionary movements into a single whole.

Viewing the situation thus seriously, but without the least despondency, the party with its powerful allies, the Railway Union, the Peasants' Union and the majority of the Social Democratic Party, has laid out a whole plan of campaign against the Autocracy to be carried out without regard to the length of time or number of lives necessary for its execution. The party especially urges the peasantry to concentrate their efforts against the Government and its agents rather than against the landlords, and has a highly elaborate series of suggestions of means by which the struggle can be carried on with the greatest possible effect. The party undertakes to direct into a common plan of action the innumerable devoted persons who propose to sell their lives for those of officials who are carrying out the Czar's plan of murder on the wholesale scale. These persons are advised by the party as to the means of organizing their actions, of bringing them as far as possible into a general plan, of making them simultaneous, of directing them against the most nefarious persons, of aiding them to reach a successful result, and, in such few cases where this is possible, to escape with their own lives. The party also is always busy with plans for all possible insurrectionary and revolutionary movements



THE VILLAGE "INTELLECTUALS"

School Teachers, Veterinaries, etc. -- who almost invariably try to bring real light to the peasants

on a national scale that seem to have any chance of success; above all, it concentrates its attention on the army and navy, and as far as possible on the officers, feeling that intelligent organisation is most of all necessary in an army movement. To the workingmen the party says above all that the labour unions must enter, *independently of all political parties*, into Socialist and revolutionary politics.

In order to promote the unification of all the elements of the population that recognise that the only way to answer the war the Government is levying against the Russian people, is for the people to levy war against the Government, the party is endeavouring to maintain the friendliest relations with all organisations that are ready to fight. It has been especially ready and willing to grant whatever national autonomy is demanded by the movements of the very many oppressed people that live under the Czar's rule. By this policy it has brought into intimate relations with itself the principal revolutionary party in Poland and also the principal Armenian organisation.

This important organisation has conceived a broad idea not only with regard to tactics; its principles also are so broad as to admit all the important revolutionary elements in the country. The preamble to the party programme, besides employing the usual Marxian formulas, broadly attributes social progress to the conscious action of those who struggle for truth and justice; while the party expects to use, in order to realise its end of revolutionary Socialism, *all* the positive elements of economic evolution in the capitalist régime and also independent and autonomous creative powers of the working classes, whether propertyless or not. Thus the party appeals not only to the industrial working classes, but to the small farmers and to the professional element, without regard to the question as to whether they are well-to-do or not. The language of its programme, as that of many of its leaders, suggests that its attack is levelled against capitalism rather than against private property, this is partly why it has had considerable success in bringing about a unity among all the revolutionary classes of Russia.

The party assumes that war exists between the Russian

Government and the Russian people. It assumes that this war ought to be conducted under the rules of civilised warfare, and it strictly limits and disciplines the action of its party members to such a degree that the moderate parties recognise that it lives up to its own code, which can by no means be said of the Russian Government. The party saw at once that in this war against odds more overwhelming perhaps than those of any war on record, new methods and new tactics are necessary, but it believes that the measures that it undertakes are an inevitable outcome of the mere fact that this civil and social war exists.

Already there is a roll of thirty thousand people killed in the struggle for freedom — the majority in massacres in which the police and Cossacks have participated. Not only the outlying and non-Russian provinces, like Poland, the Caucasus, and the Baltic Provinces, are involved, but every part of Russia without exception. At the present time all but 26 of the 661 districts of European Russia are either under some form of martial law or the local governor is given by Nicholas II. the right to issue any order he pleases with the force of law.

A glance at a few places where the conflicts have been most acute will help to show how far this war has gone. In several Russian cities, like Odessa and Bielostock, several per cent. of the population have been killed or wounded. In Odessa as well as in Warsaw and Lodz, tens of thousands of persons have been imprisoned and exiled. The condition is such that scarcely one family out of ten has not suffered through its own members or intimate connections. Many other places have suffered more severely: Rostov and Novorissisk on the Black Sea, Tomsk in Siberia, and Kronstadt a couple of hours from St. Petersburg, have been partly depopulated.

This is war of the most barbarous kind; and without attempting to judge the morality or practicability of the measures adopted in their counter-war by the revolutionists, I have no hesitancy in saying that they are justified in using any means that tend to reach their goal without damaging innocent persons. Archangelsky declared in the Duma that as long as the demands of the people with regard to the pardon of the hundreds and thousands of political prisoners, and the

abolition of martial law, were denied, as long as the Government refused to abdicate in favour of a constitutional assembly elected by the equal votes of the whole people, the war would continue.

The character of the war waged by the revolutionists is rapidly changing. During the year 1907 the war was reduced almost exclusively to the executions of exceptionally brutal officials as a check on the ruthless massacres and "legal" murders practised by the Government. Widespread prevalence of this kind of warfare, it will be readily seen, is almost an inevitable result of Russia's condition. This is recognised by moderates as well as by all the popular parties; by the moderates when they refuse to condemn these acts, except in stating at the same time that they are the natural accompaniment of the violent acts of the Government; by the popular parties in refusing to condemn them altogether, except occasionally on purely tactical grounds. The execution of officials is justified as the only possible check to the savagery and cruelty of the official class. It is not supposed that such measures will long continue and it is purposed even by the most extreme organisations to replace them at the earliest moment by an entirely different mode of warfare.

When Ministers Sipiaguine and von Plehve were killed, a majority of the Russian people applauded, and a large part of Europe has since learned to recognise that these acts were as patriotic as that of William Tell. The killing of Bobrikov is certainly approved by the majority of the peaceful people of Finland, and like the execution of von Plehve brought decidedly beneficial results, since no man so strong and ruthless was to be procured to succeed him. Of those since executed, Ignatiev, a favourite of the Czar, was the chief instigator of the massacres of thousands of Jews; von Launitz was the savage head of Russia's savage police; Pavlov, who while speaking to the first Duma from the Minister's bench was driven out of the room with calls of "murderer," was the first organiser of the lawless military courts that have executed hundreds of persons without any real trial; Maximovsky, as head of the prison system, was responsible for the wholesale tortures and murders of political prisoners; and the Grand Duke Sergius was perhaps the

most cruel, brutal, and corrupt member of the royal family since Ivan the Terrible. It is impossible to deny that the nation has gained tremendously by the death of each of these individuals, and relatively few Russians outside of Government circles are disposed to question the public utility of most of these executions. Although, as the executions spread from the highest authorities to lower officials, their social utility becomes more and more questionable — laying aside for the moment all questions of morality inapplicable to a state of war, and remembering only the deep human instinct against all unnecessary cruelty and unnecessary sacrifices of life — we cannot doubt that such of them as are justified by the national conscience have afforded much temporary relief from the horrible practices of the Government.

The revolutionists and other outraged citizens have killed and wounded in the two years before July 1, 1907, seven hundred police officials and several thousand spies, political police, and other persons engaged in similar work. The proportion of the police officials attacked has been a considerable part of the total, but there can be no question that nearly all such officials are engaged in a perfectly relentless war against those who are trying to overturn the Government. Nor is the proportion of the total number of common police and gendarmes killed or injured a small one, although the policy of all the parties is to attack such persons as little as possible, since it is recognised that they are mere mercenaries, selling themselves perhaps only temporarily for their bloody work.

A large part of the common soldiers as well as Cossacks have been used against the revolutionists, yet even when both are classed together only a few hundreds out of the army of nearly two million have been killed or injured, for the revolutionists hope to ultimately win over most of the soldiers and even a considerable part of the Cossacks. Unfortunately, a good many private citizens have also been killed or wounded for political causes by peasants or workingmen, but the total out of Russia's millions is only a few hundred; not at all a serious matter in these times of tremendous losses of life.

Moreover, it is only in a very few parts of the country that these acts of violence have gone to a bitter extreme. In

Sebastopol and Kronstadt, two small towns of a half a hundred thousand people, over a hundred officials have been killed or wounded as the result of the repeated mutinies of soldiers and sailors engaged in a desperate war with the authorities. In the Caucasus, also in Tiflis and Baku, hundreds of these attacks on officials have taken place and the ordinary life of the community has certainly been forced into an entirely new course. The same is true of all the chief cities of Poland. Outside of these districts there have been massacres, mutinies, and other serious forms of revolutionary disturbances, but the attacks on officials have never reached such an acute stage as to mean anything in the daily life of the ordinary citizen.

This method of warfare is pretty well under the control of its principal advocates, the Socialist Revolutionary Party. During the first Duma the party ordered that the executions should cease, and they fell to less than one half of what they were before, such attacks as were made being those of half-organised groups or individuals on the police.

Recognising the inevitability of this form of self-defence on the part of the population, neither of the first two Dumas were willing to condemn it, without attacking in the same breath the Government also. The representatives of the people in both bodies, the deputies of 95 per cent. of the Russian population, the peasants and workingmen, were unwilling even to characterise with similar expressions the violence of the Government and that of the popular revolutionary organisations, for the latter they recognise as a legitimate means of replying to the warfare of a government. Even the moderates, in condemning violence on both sides, put the chief blame on the Government; assuming that this violence will and must continue until liberty is granted to the people, they do not defend it, but accept it, once and for all, as the inevitable result of the Government's own action, and hope that one day the Czar, realising his inability to restore order, will turn over his power into their hands.

Those of the popular parties which do not themselves take part in the practice of these executions, defend them. Alexinsky, the Social Democratic leader in the second Duma, proclaimed that these executions were as legitimate a weapon of

warfare as the courts-martial of the Government. "The State," he said, "is a gallows State, a nagaika State, a State of murder." Even the leaders of the more moderate faction of this party have confessed to me in private conversation that they recognise the utility of popular executions and wish to see them increased, desiring especially at the present time the execution of Stolypine, a strong and brutal servant the Czar would find it very difficult to replace.

The first of the present series of great executions was not accomplished by a member of any party. The Minister of the Interior, Sipiaguine, was shot by Balmachov in April, 1902. "My only accomplice in this act," said the popular executioner, before paying its penalty, "was the Russian Government; I was always against terrorism and violence, I was in favour of law and the constitution; it was the Russian ministers who converted me to the belief that there is no order and law in Russia, but instead only unpunished lawlessness and violence that can be resisted only by force."

The Social Revolutionary Party has been responsible for all the important later deeds. Since it has undertaken to organise this kind of warfare, it is natural that individuals who have decided that the nation has had enough of some particular oppressor, should join their forces with this organisation for the purpose of carrying out their proposed act. One-quarter of the persons executed by the Government in the first year of the courts-martial were members of this party. Already over a year ago (April, 1907) the party had lost fifteen thousand of its members, more than one-quarter of its total membership, by imprisonment, or exile in Siberia or in the mines; there can be little question that at least one-half of this organisation has been now captured by the enemy. But the party is by no means destroyed; the fighting spirit of the remaining members is rather intensified, and new recruits supply the empty places in the ranks. Each martyrdom brings in numerous new persons. If we can judge by the case of the revolutionists released from imprisonment or exile of fifteen or twenty years by the amnesty of the Government in 1905, we can be assured that as often as those now imprisoned or exiled are released or make escape, they also will rejoin the

movement. All the world knows of the cases of exiles, both men and women, some of them in the later years of life, and of prisoners who have been locked up in the fortresses ever since the former revolutionary movement in the eighties, who on their escape or release have plunged at once into the war of the new generation.

CHAPTER IV

HOW THE PRIESTS ARE BECOMING REVOLUTIONISTS

I HAVE been speaking at such length of the economic problems that underlie every great social movement, and have given so much attention to the political struggle in which the economic conflict expresses itself, that I have spoken little of the quite independent spiritual revolution which may in the end have as great an influence in reshaping the destinies of Russia's one hundred and forty millions as the political and economic revolution itself.

I do not speak of the spiritual regeneration of Russia as a thing apart. If the Czarism had not grown so infamous as to destroy all the illusions of trusting religious natures in the possibility of benevolent despotism whether in State or Church, if the peasantry had not evolved out of the most elementary human instincts a fundamental reaction against every form of oppression, if modern capitalism had not invaded Russia with its creation of new industries and new social classes, if modern science and modern ideas had not taken possession of all of Russia's intelligent classes, if the Duma had not created a centre to bring all these democratic tendencies together — then the spiritual and religious revolution could never have taken a general and national form. It would necessarily have been expressed, as for generations past, in the personal revolts of unconquerable individuals or in the localised, poorly organised and by no means entirely enlightened religious rebellion of Russia's numerous and highly interesting religious sects.

All elements of the people recognise that something of the greatest import is going on in Russia's religious thought. It is unnecessary to show how general this recognition is since the Government itself has proposed extraordinary measures to put it to an end. The first of such measures was the proposal

to grant what the Government was pleased to call "religious freedom"; the second, equally significant, is the calling of the first general congress of the Russian Church. It is hardly necessary to say that neither have the foreign religionists in Russia — Catholics, Mohammedans, Lutherans, or Jews, or the Russian sects, or the half-orthodox "old believers" — been in the least deluded by the Government's promises; nor have the ordinary members of the Orthodox Church, the liberal element among the democratic village priests, or those national leaders clamouring for church reform who have developed during the recent emancipation movement, put any hope whatever in the promised congress. The grounds for all these suspicions are very obvious

The Holy Synod, which now has the active backing not only of the Government but of at least one-third of the artificially elected reactionary Duma and the passive support of perhaps two-thirds of that body, has already set its "interpretation" on the new "religious freedom." Indicative of the general position taken is its demand that no new religions or religious sects shall be allowed "except if subordinated as before under the supreme spiritual authorities." The Synod has also practically decided to ask for the maintenance of all the principal elements of its control over religions and sects already "tolerated." It holds it for "its holy duty to insist that all the privileges of the Orthodox Church hitherto existing in Russia shall be reserved to it unchanged in the future, and that the right of the free propaganda of religious teachings shall belong alone to the Orthodox Church, while all other religious confessions shall be allowed to take into their faiths only such persons as come over to them of their own free impulsion." We might consider this reactionary proposal as merely a very despotic measure of defence. Other parts of the Synod's "reforms," although in the same defensive guise, are really almost savagely militant, reminding one of the persecutions and even tortures in force recently under the Pobiedonostzev régime. The Synod finds it necessary "in order to protect the dignity of the Orthodox Church and its servants against attacks, that all insults and expressed contempt of its laws shall be severely punished whether they take place in ordinary private conversation or in the press

or in representations on the stage" — a sort of a law of *lèse majesté* of the church, going as far certainly as any of the outrages of the past.

Recently the convention of a certain society, not of the non-orthodox but of the half-orthodox "old believers," ordinarily most loyal to the Czar, was forbidden in Moscow although it had held its sessions free and unhindered even under the rule of Minister von Plehve, supposedly the most oppressive that Russia has ever endured; while a priest of this creed that counts perhaps fifteen million believers in Russia was punished "because he had had friendly intercourse with the members of the village and had been able to convert the orthodox to the 'old believers' church."

Known to the whole nation and even more outrageous has been the attempt of the State to coerce the priests and members of the Orthodox Church politically. In the last elections in the province of Tver, for instance, the bishop required twenty priests that had been chosen as electors by the people to meet in his house and to take no part in electoral assemblies. He threatened that he would deprive them of their positions and also punish them in other ways if they did not vote for the extreme reactionary parties. Everywhere the priests were instructed by their superiors to preach from the pulpit that the people must not elect to the Duma "enemies of the sacred Faith and the Throne." In Voronege the Church functionary, Anastasius, thundered against "intellectual rebels." In Bolkhov the head priest urged his flock to choose unlearned men and true Russians, suggesting by the latter phrase members of the massacre organisations.

Where the priests did not wish to obey the ecclesiastical authorities they were persecuted and dismissed by the wholesale. A priest of the town of Salucce in the Government of Tchernigov, asked by his parishioners if there was any need of beating the Jews as some of the officials were instructing them to do, replied, "You must not listen if anyone advises you to do such a thing, even if the person that does it wears a uniform of the police. The Jew is useful to us; besides he must be pitied and not struck; he works for his family and, nevertheless, remains very poor; he has not enough to eat." A few days afterward the parishioners were surprised to learn that their priest had



A LIBERAL PRIEST, HIS WIFE, AND ASSISTANT

Those priests who are not tools of oppression, sometimes become leaders of the peasantry



been thrown into prison. Aroused by this news they made a collection and sent a telegram to Count Witte. Thirteen days afterward the priest was released, but on the order of the bishop he was excommunicated and deprived of his robes. Accompanied by an escort of Cossacks to protect themselves from the enraged populace, who knew how to appreciate this kind of priest, the clergy came to the village to make an inquiry and found nothing against him; but the order remained in force and the priest had to go to a hospital and leave his family without food or shelter.

So much for the "religious freedom" and the political freedom of the priest, matters of general interest to the whole population. The proposed Church Council is, on the other hand, so much a Church affair that it is best understood and must necessarily be exposed largely by the lower clergy themselves, without much assistance from the general public which during the centuries of the State Church has lost all interest and hope of participation in its administration. The village or white clergy, so called to distinguish them from the black clergy or monks that furnish the higher ecclesiastical authorities, is almost unanimously opposed to the new Church Council — because they know it is a fraud, but equally because they are to be given no voice whatever in its deliberations, although they are the only ones who could by any chance bring a new life and popularity to the Church. At a recent meeting of seventy-nine priests from all parts of the country, it was decided unanimously not to take part in this Council, even as guests, the humiliating position allotted to the white clergy. At the same time it was demanded that not only the white clergy, but also the people themselves, should be allowed active participation in the Council.

The white clergy's position, then, toward the official religious reforms, as well as that of the believers and clergy of all other sects and creeds, is wholly opposed to that of the Government. I except, of course, the very numerous cases of neutral and timid individuals who do not express any opinion on any subject. At the time of the October Manifesto a part of the white clergy explained it sympathetically to the people. They were soon seized and cast into prison, so that in many parishes no one was left to perform the religious ceremonies. In many

sections there were meetings of priests that decided it was high time the clergy should declare themselves in relation to the emancipation movement, and national organisations like the "League of Workers for Church Reform" were established. Moreover, congresses have been held of the various sects hoping to find some common basis for a sort of general Protestant Church. There was much agreement on many questions, and it was only a rather serious contention on infants' baptism that prevented some kind of a union.

Most significant of the spirit of rebellion has been the participation of the priests in the Duma. At last, in the third Duma, by the combined action of a Chinese election law, barbarous police threats, and the official Church, the Czar has secured a solid delegation of some forty more or less reactionary priests. In the first Duma, elected by the people, there were several radicals, while in the second half of the dozen priests elected were distinctly revolutionary. The Government has prosecuted six of them because of their political attitude and convicted five. The most revolutionary was the priest Brilliantov; he was accused with four others of having absented himself from the Duma when a resolution condemning political assassinations was being voted upon. When asked for an explanation of his action, he refused to give it or to leave the Social Revolutionary Party, of which he was, and still is, a member. Three others of the priests, Tichvinski, Archipov, and Kolokolnikov, were members of the Labour Group, and this membership was the accusation against them on the part of the Church, which rightly called the Labour Group a revolutionary organisation. On technical grounds the priests denied this latter accusation, but they did not deny their political tenets in general and they were all unfrocked.

Tichvinski, the most important of the three, wrote a well known letter to Metropolitan Antonius, explaining his political views.

I, a former reactionary and narrow-hearted conservative, have revised my views in the course of four years under the influence of the needs and sufferings of the people, who have placed their conditions before the priests; and I have put myself on the side of the interests of the people and of a legal state. Now according to the order of the Synod of

12th May, in the course of three days I must turn over to the opposite side "according to my conscience," change my convictions and join the reactionary monarchists or the independent reactionaries. We are not only asked formally to leave our party but according to conscience to change our convictions. I declare that I cannot change my convictions. My political opinions, all my economic views, my Christian orthodox standpoint, my activity in the past, are known to you. I stand disclosed before you and I have talked nothing secretly. These my convictions, my life, my activity and the conduct of my office, are known to the people who honour me with their confidence through my election to the Duma. How can I change my convictions without becoming a traitor to the people? Such a day would be the disgrace of my life.

The persecutions of these priests only began with their ecclesiastical punishment. They have been hounded from one end of the Empire to the other, exiled from this place to that and always prevented from undertaking any kind of fruitful work. Two who tried to study at universities were driven hither and thither. The outright revolutionist Brilliantov wrote a letter to the Social Democrats in the third Duma in which he describes his sufferings. Studying in the University of Tomsk, he was arrested and banished from Tomsk and forbidden to live in Moscow, anywhere near the Siberian railroad, in the towns of the Caucasus, and so on and so on. He chose Ufa as his dwelling place and was sent there on foot, but when he arrived he was put not in freedom but in solitary confinement. He complained bitterly over his treatment. He wrote, "On what grounds I came into solitary confinement I do not know. I know only that this little room only four feet long, the lack of walks, the perpetual half darkness of the room, have finally undermined my shattered health."

The Government did not suppress the revolutionary feeling among the priests by these persecutions. Especially noteworthy had been the continued denunciation of two very well known priests, both of high rank and national reputation, Father Petrov and the Archmandrite Michael. The latter kept up a continual series of brilliant letters to the radical press even after he was banished to a monastery on a dreary island of Lake Ladoga. Finally, he found a way out of his difficulties by voluntarily quitting the Church and joining the "old believers." Indeed, it was told me by Father Petrov that this was the

most practicable step for all the radical priests and would perhaps lead to a very important tendency in the revolutionary movement. The "old believers" are so Russian and so numerous that State policy requires that they be granted certain moderate rights. If the radical priests go over in considerable numbers to this church, an educated leadership now waiting will be supplied, and a new and powerful revolutionary force created. Archmandrite Michael denounced the proposed Church Council as a fraud before he quit the fold and fearlessly demanded a review of the judgments passed against the revolutionary priests of the first and second Dumas. He questioned whether the people of the Church had accepted their dismissal. So radical were his opinions that the papers in which they were printed were confiscated by the Government. But Michael could not be gagged.

The most striking clerical figure that has been developed so far in the course of the recent movement is Father Petrov, a figure of such importance that he promises not only to urge forward the coming religious transformation but also to furnish a very important leader for the revolutionary movement at large, since his political capacity and his power as a popular writer are as great as his influence as a preacher and writer of religious tracts. In fact, Father Petrov is a movement in himself. The author of a hundred religious, moral, political, and social pamphlets, with a combined circulation of more than ten million copies, he is master of a style so popular that it is said that the peasants read him with greater pleasure than they do Tolstoi. At the same time he has been the editor of the most popular newspaper that ever circulated among the Russian peasantry, and his name is perhaps as well known to the people of all the country as that of any living man.

Most interesting in the personal life of Father Petrov is the fact that he has been in contact with the whole of the Russian people from the peasantry to the court. For years the tutor of the families of two of the Grand Dukes, it is said, on the highest authority, that he was selected to become the future tutor of the Czarevitch, the heir to the throne. The present Queen of Greece, by birth a member of Russia's royal family, was such an admirer of his that she alone has circulated, it is

estimated, a million of his pamphlets. When I add to this that Petrov was elected to the second Duma from St. Petersburg as one of the small number of deputies elected by the capital, not as the member of any of the influential parties but as that very rare thing in the Dumas, an independent, we begin to realise the importance of the rôle he has played.

Not a pope's son, like most of the priests, he chose the clergy freely as his profession, having an ambition to fill the rôle of a regenerator of the true religious instincts of the people. Brought up in his father's grocery store in a village near St. Petersburg, he had every opportunity of observing the common people. Like Gorky, he became especially fond of tramps and outcasts. Feeling at the same time their misery and their humanity, he both loved them and thought that he was sent by God to deliver them from their suffering. When he taught later in an aristocratic school he saw, he assured me, that these tramps were better people than the highest aristocrats in the country.

A certain ecclesiastical law allows the students of the theological seminaries to preach. Taking advantage of this law Petrov often returned to his village to deliver impromptu sermons and was delighted to find that he was always able to interest his audience. In this very early period of his life he had already conceived the idea which it seems to me is his contribution to the present movement. He expressed it to me in these words: "Even Kant can be understood by the people." This assumption, though similar to Tolstoi's, is exactly the opposite to that of all the Socialist parties. Conceiving as they do the economic and political principles of the emancipation movement from a scientific standpoint, they are unable to bring them into popular language and very seldom succeed in clothing them in flesh and blood. Among such doctrinaires the opposite belief of Petrov has given him a tremendous importance. Almost alone among the important leaders he believes that the people understand all clear language and clear ideas even better than do the educated class.

In the theological seminary he was intelligent enough to be bitterly disappointed. Imagining in his simplicity that all mysteries would be explained to him there, he rather found that

in proportion as one immersed one's self in the theological studies, one was buried alive. However, students of the theological seminaries are no exception to the general rule for Russian students. Even they are imbued with the current revolutionary and Socialist ideas and know what independent thinking means. So far has this gone that recently nearly all the theological students of a certain province, after graduation, refused to go into the ministry and the whole province is short of preachers. Father Petrov then was able without much difficulty to form a small group of students to read history, literature and philosophy, and it was in this group, he told me, that he got an entirely different and broader conception of life. Among the influences that he fell under at this time he places second to none Ruskin and Carlyle. He was especially impressed with a story of Ruskin's who, seeing an announcement that prayer was to be said to God in a certain church between nine and eleven, asked "to whom do you pray before nine?" This expresses Petrov's fundamental religious feeling that all life should be prayer and that mere words were useless.

After graduation from the seminary Father Petrov went to preach in the slaughter-houses near St. Petersburg, where for six years he delivered eight to ten lectures a week, attaining a tremendous popularity among the peasants and working people. It was through the common people indeed that he was introduced to the upper classes. A servant in the family of the Grand Duke Paul heard of him and begged his master to have him give a private sermon. This was arranged and he was taken into the family of the Grand Dukes Paul and Constantine as teacher of their children. He lectured everywhere among fashionable schools and organisations, in the pages corps, in the Guards, and so on. He says he might have filled sixty hours a day.

Before he accepted this opportunity to work among the court circles, as a profound democrat he hesitated. It was only after long arguments that his comrades persuaded him to accept, since the fate of Russia was entirely in the hands of these people. But he soon found that he had made a mistake. "While the common people want light like grass wants the sun," he said, "the nobility are a separate race entirely; they cannot understand the wants of the people. They read willingly what I

wrote, but they admired only the figures of speech and phrases, in the same way as they would a pretty landscape painting or society poem. The children of the grand dukes and nobility cannot understand; they are taught from the first that they are superhuman and different from other people. One girl exclaimed to me once, 'How difficult it is to be human in the Court!' She had a true human instinct, but the teachers do not appeal to and awaken such higher instincts, but only the lower."

Father Petrov learned very much in the court. He met not only Russian but also foreign aristocrats. He found that everywhere the aristocracy feel that the people must be thankful to them, that Russia or any other country in their power is merely a private estate, that the masses should be glad to pick up what falls from their table, that the people owe everything to the aristocracy and the aristocracy nothing to the people. In 1904 he met the Grand Duke Sergius whom he found had read his book, "The Evangel as the Basis of Life." The murderous grand duke remarked: "You reformers are all dreamers; the people are all beasts; they only understand what is taught them with the fist and the 'nagaika.'" Petrov answered: "You said that to the Japanese and they replied with a still heavier fist. That is what the people will do to you."

Father Petrov withdrew from the court circles, but at the time of the October Manifesto was still professor in the theological and military academies. He soon saw it was impossible to continue even in this work. He thinks that the gulf is so wide between the people and the ruling class that it is impossible to stand with one foot on either side, and so he left the ruling class. During the year and a half that elapsed before the elections to the second Duma he occupied himself almost entirely with his writing and the editorship of his wonderfully popular paper, *God's Truth*. He attributes his success to the fact that he came from the people, that they know that his heart beats with them, that they understand that he knows their wants and is ready to give up his life if necessary in their behalf. Servants, cabdrivers, and other common people used to come to his office to ask not for *God's Truth*, but for "our" paper.

CHAPTER V

THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION

AFTER his election to the Duma from St. Petersburg in February, 1906, by an immense majority, Father Petrov was immediately banished to a monastery by the Holy Synod and returned only when the Duma was dissolved. He was dismissed then by the order of the Holy Synod from all the schools and colleges in which he had taught and was forbidden to preach in any church. However, his paper, *God's Truth*, attained enormous success among the masses of the people both of the cities and of the villages. I was assured by those able to judge that nothing ever written in Russia reached more directly to the heart of the people, and I was unable to find any illiterate cabdriver or peasant who had not heard of Father Petrov. When I asked the opinion of some common man about him I was always answered: "How could we fail to be pleased by what he writes; it is God's truth."

During a few months twenty-seven prosecutions were started against him with a view to depriving him of his robe and civic rights. On all occasions he was able to prove that neither he nor his writings had ever turned aside from Christianity. At last, in the beginning of 1908, he saw that the Government would condemn him to be unfrocked in spite of anything that he could do, and taking the advantage of the prestige of his robe before he was deprived of it he wrote a public letter to Russia and the world.

In order that this important letter should not be suppressed Father Petrov addressed it not only to the Holy Synod, but to the somewhat liberal Metropolitan of St. Petersburg, Antonius, and also mailed copies to all the ministers and to persons who would assure its publicity. Within a few days he met his punishment. He was deprived of his robes, the right of residence in St. Petersburg or Moscow for seven years, and of

most of the other privileges, such as they are, of the Russian citizen. Strong as are the denunciations of the Czar in this letter, Father Petrov is so popular in Russia and so known abroad that, as in the case of Tolstoi, the Government did not dare to go further. I give a large part of this very important letter, summing up as it does the situation of the Russian church and the attitude of a large majority of liberal Russians, whether priests or laymen, on the condition of the Church and the feeling of truly religious persons about the Czarism and the revolution.

YOUR HIGH EMINENCE, LORD ANTONIUS:

. . . The second accusation was founded on complaints against my work and speeches. From these complaints the ecclesiastical investigators drew up a long series of questions. To reply to all these questions would be easy for me and I could have closed the affair in this way, but such replies would not have satisfied the questions that I have put to myself.

The thing which our Holy Synod passed for the Orthodox Church and the composition of the Synod itself, can these be considered as at all the true church of Christ? Am I in accord at all points with the Synod and the Orthodox Church? If I differ, in what and upon what are the differences founded?

To reply to these questions that I have put to myself, I have preferred, instead of addressing myself to the ecclesiastical prosecutors, to send to Your Highness an exposition of my religious opinions and of the political opinions which result from them . . .

I am explaining my whole way of understanding the duty of the Church at the present moment. My conscience demands it. You will act as yours commands you to act.

We have to-day, after nineteen centuries of preaching, individual Christians, separate persons, but no Christianity; there is no Christian legislation; our customs and morals are no longer Christian; there exists no Christian government. It is strange to speak of the Christian world. The mutual relations of the various peoples are altogether contrary to the spirit of the Evangel; the most Christian states maintain millions of men for mass butcheries, sometimes of their neighbours and sometimes of their own citizens.

To justify these monstrous butcheries the very soul of the mystified population is sapped away. The same butcheries are erected into a science. They are the object of the military art, the art of killing. In what way are these relations of Christian people distinct from the relations of the people of pagan antiquity? Governments violate, states oppress, entire populations. Kings look at their countries as their property; at the people as their herds. They do not serve the people but they demand that the people serve them. They try to replace the will

of the nations by their own desires and even by their caprices. Every year they plunder the poor population of millions for their palaces, and such a state of affairs is called legal!

On the other hand, the demand of the people addressed to the king to recognise the rights of the nation, is a crime to be pitilessly punished. With what cruelty Christian Czars have made the blood of the people flow, when attempts have been made by the latter to find some relief for their sad destiny. What pitiless brutality there is in the punishment that they have let fall on countries already enough oppressed . . .

There is no Christian Czar and no Christian government. Conditions of life are not Christian. The upper classes rule the lower classes. A little group keeps the rest of the population enslaved. This little group has robbed the working people of wealth, power, science, art, and even religion, which they have also subjected; they have left them only ignorance and misery. In the place of pleasure they have given the people drunkenness; in the place of religion gross superstition; and besides, the work of a convict, a work without rest or reward. That which the upper class have taken either by force or by artifice they have called their sacred property. When the nobility had serfs the latter were very sacred property; at present some of them have taken possession of the land and this they call the sacred property. If the rich had been able to take the sky, the air, the sea, or the stars, they would still have called all this their sacred property. They squeeze out heavy rents for the maintenance of their idleness, and when the people, brought nearly to exhaustion by suffering, outraged in its highest feelings, speaks of rights, demands for its labour a part of their abundance, the rich classes send against it with cannons and bayonets its own brothers — only dressed up in the uniforms of soldiers and transformed by barrack drill into a machine that kills.

It that Christianity?

The true servant of the true Church and Christ, John Slatoust, said in discussing the question of the unequal distribution of wealth in society. "Every rich man is a criminal or the son of a criminal." Those whom he attacked rebelled at this declaration. He replied to them, "My speech puts you out of temper. You say to me, when will you cease to speak against the rich; I answer, when you cease to oppress the poor. What, you cry out, more thunders against the rich? Against your cruelty to the poor! You abuse without check your power over the poor and me, and I will never check my curses."

But the words of John Slatoust, like the words of several other fathers of the Church, were only rare rays of light which scarcely pierced the thick fog of satiety of the rich classes. The unequal distribution of wealth is being corrected by charity. An infinitesimal part of what has been taken away from them is given back to the disinherited, and this passes for a virtue! As to the crying misery of millions of working people alongside of the extraordinary opulence of the rich classes. the preachers say: "It has pleased God that it should be so. Where there

is light there is always shadow." Such preachings are a calumny of God . . .

Christian morality would have been limited and little developed if it had had no other end but the life and conduct of private persons without throwing light on the organisations, the rulers, the life and conduct of societies and states. "But that is politics," says the clergy; "our business is religion." . . .

True politics is in fact the art of the better organisation of life in society and the state; but is not the Evangel, with its doctrine of the Kingdom of God, the science of the better organisation of life, of society, and of the entire State? This being true the clergy cannot say that politics is the business of politicians; it cannot say that the labour question, the agrarian question, the question of the class and race hatred in the State does not concern them, for these are just the questions that do concern them . . .

But Christianity has become the State religion before the State has ceased to be pagan. How should we explain otherwise the fact that the influence of Christianity has not really been exerted on the laws of society and the organisation of the State? The Evangel, from the broad road of the organisation of the Kingdom of God in societies and states, has had to pass into the narrow path of personal virtues and the salvation of the individual. How has this happened? Christianity itself is accused. Defects are sought for in the doctrine of Christ; this is wrong, for it is the fault rather of the higher clergy which in spite of the triumph of Christianity has not been able to resist the seduction of power. It is not the clergy that has influenced the State, but on the contrary, it has borrowed from the State its external brilliance, its organisation, its means of action, its constraint and its non-spiritual punishments . . .

The Papistry is not the disease of the Roman clergy alone. All the Christian religions suffer from some form of Papistry. The Greek Church no less than the others. As in the West, the higher clergy aspire greedily for power, but it could not conquer the imperial power so mighty here in the East. And it did not even conceive such a notion; it directed all its greed to the interior of the church, pushed aside the lower clergy and the faithful and said to them: *L'Eglise, c'est moi!* And to enjoy without any obstacle from the Government a complete administrative power, the princes of the Church shared with the Government. They left to it sovereign power over society and the State, and they reserved for themselves the direction of the Church . . . The clergy governed the Church and submitted to the temporal authorities and served them as a docile tool . . . Whatever crimes the authorities accomplished, the clergy repeated invariably to the people: "Obey and submit; God requires it." Or still further, "All authority comes from God."

All over our country every day are proceeding executions by shooting and hanging. It is all done at the order of the power of the authorities. The hangman builds the gallows and throttles the victim with the rope. But it is not the hangman that kills. He is but an instrument connected

with the execution, like the gallows and the noose. It is the high-placed executioner who kills. The judge who passes the death sentence, the administrator who sanctions the sentence. It is the minister who covers the face of the country with the gallows, who sees in the gallows the support and upholder of his power — he it is who throttles. It is the sovereign power that throttles, the sovereign who appoints the hangman minister. A whole hierarchy of authorities strangles people already bound and solitary, already rendered harmless; in the place of giving justice it gives proof of an unrivaled, cowardly and cruel spirit of revenge.

Can one say that such authorities are placed there by God?

The ruling regular clergy, with its cold, heartless, bony fingers, has stifled the Russian Church, killed its creative spirit, chained the Gospel itself, and sold the Church to the Government. There is no outrage, no crime, no perfidy of the State authorities which the monks who rule the Church would not cover with the mantle of the Church, would not bless, would not seal with their own hands. What power would the voice of the Church possess were it raised in genuine Christian words! If it should speak them to the rulers and to the people, to revolutionists and to reactionaries, if it should speak to the whole country! Such words would become the voice of the eternal Gospel truths addressed to the conscience of the country. They would strike every heart, they would penetrate into every corner, they would chime above the thunders of revolution, above the clamour of execution, like the voice of a church-bell through the howling of the tempest.

When on January 22, 1905, the people, that immense, naïve child, went with ikons and crosses to beg the authorities for truth and justice, in answer to them was arranged a monstrous onslaught; when the bleeding heaps upon the square made the whole world shudder, the Synod approached the quivering mass of bodies not yet cool, stopped before them, and in a priestly message struck them with a vile and brutal libel. It declared that the murdered ones were not seekers of justice, that they were Japanese agents, bought by Japanese money. The Synod could not find one word of reproach for the murderers, one sigh for the victims — nothing but a libel. A libel signed by the Synod in the name of the whole Church.

In the Church the creative power of truth became withered, dried, and anæmic; separated from life, the thought of the Church was condemned to turn about in the world of abstract dogma and theological discussions. . . . God was reasoned about without being introduced into life itself. A sort of special Atheism was created, practical Atheism. Certainly in words and thoughts the existence of God was recognised, but life activity went forward as if it was not so, as if God was only an abstract word, a sound without meaning. An example of such practical Atheism is Pobiedonostzev, of sad memory, or rather the tendency of the life of the Church that has borrowed his name. This tendency was indeed not created by him for it existed before and after. He only put

strongly in relief this current of clerical life; it is the same morally anæmic, Byzantine spirit which drove Christianity from the Church and substituted itself in its place. . . . The principal aim of his Church was the same as that of the Papacy: to replace the Kingdom of God by the kingdom of the princes of the Church and the reigning monks. Separated by an asceticism, by their monk's mantle, from all the joys of the world, even the most pure, the reigning monks tried to find consolation in what they had repudiated — in their power over the world We have no Papacy but we have what is called correctly the Papacy of the Czar. With us even in the code (Vol. I, Chap. VII, Art. 42) the sovereign is called Lord of the Church, Lord even with a capital L. In the true Church the Lord is Christ. In the Papacy the chief of the state is the pope, and in the Russian Church it is the sovereign

The majority of the lower clergy is ignorant, poor, dulled; nobody occupies himself with its moral welfare. It is crowded by the reigning monks into a corner, it has its arms tied; it is deprived of the liberty to think, to speak and to act. They who are so near to the masses of the people, to the centre of life, they who see all its misery, the deprivation of justice from which the whole country suffers, who hear the ceaseless groans that rise from below, who are choked by the tears of the people, blinded by the sight of the frightful nightmare created all over the country by the impious violence of the reigning power, they have not even the right to speak of the sufferings of their flocks, not even the chance to cry out to the violators, halt!

Indeed, according to the opinion of the monks, who are at the same time reigning dignitaries of the Church, all that goes against the State goes against the Church, against Christ and against God. This is to reduce the great work of the salvation of humanity to the petty rôle of bodyguard to the temporal autocratic organization The Church is the universal union, the organisation of all humanity, above nations and states. For to the Church none of the existing organisations of the State are invariable, perfect, permanent, or infallible.

Such an organisation is the work of the future; expressing one's self in the language of the Evangel, it will be the future Kingdom of God. An organisation in which everything will be maintained not by external violence but by a common interior moral bond, in which there will be neither exploitation nor arbitrary government nor violence nor master nor workman, where all will support equally the burdens of life and all will profit equally from its good. This is the task of the Church, but the organisations which exist at present, whether they are autocratic or not, are worth nothing. Their only difference is in the degree of uselessness; one is more, another is less useful; yet our old expiring organisation is the worst of all that exists in the Christian world.

Of course this letter made it unnecessary for the Synod to carry to a finality its other prosecutions that contained such accusations as that, on a visit at Yasnaya Polyana he had asked

Count Tolstoi (excommunicated, it will be remembered, from the Orthodox Church), for his blessing on his work, and that during a visit in the Crimea he had spent most of his time with two Jews.

Father Petrov is more than the most formidable enemy, aside from Tolstoi, of the Russian State Church. He is an independent religious and political thinker and leader; in fact, the great interest of his standpoint is that he neither separates politics and religion, nor allows one to interfere with the other. In many countries he might be classed in spite of himself as a Christian Socialist, but he objects vigorously to this term. He says he is a Christian and a Socialist but that his Socialism and his Christianity are both unqualified. He wishes to be considered simply a Christian and not a Christian of any particular sect, objecting, therefore, even to the limitation of the social obligations of his Christianity implied by the term "Christian Socialist." He is a Socialist, differing from the others only in that he has arrived at precisely the same point by the religious path instead of the study of Marx or the indirect experience of the economic conflict. He does not wish to differentiate himself from other Socialists by qualifying himself as a Christian Socialist.

We might be tempted to compare him in some respects with Tolstoi; but the difference is profound. He is a great admirer of Tolstoi, for he says that the latter has done an incalculable service to Russia in reviving the interest in the Evangelists among educated classes at the very moment when Buchner, Darwin, and materialism were sweeping all before them. He shares Tolstoi's indifference to mere political forms, but he does not share his indifference to the organisation of the future state. Tolstoi confesses himself to be an anarchist in the philosophical sense. Petrov is a Socialist and hopes that the spirit of Christianity will not destroy but regenerate the State. Indeed, in one of his brochures he goes so far as to express a preference for the republican form of government which with Tolstoi meets almost the same contempt as does the Czarism itself. Like Tolstoi, Petrov is interested in the psychology of the ruling classes, and it is because he understands this psychology so well that he denounces this class. For these denunciations he ex-

pects to be considered wild, seditious, revolutionary, and criminal, just as those who denounced serfdom a generation ago were branded by these same terms of reproach.

Like Tolstoi, Petrov's attitude toward existing society is that of a revolutionist. "In other forms and with certain changed aspects," he says in a typical message, "the relation of the slave-driver and serf-holder to the lower strata of the people remains in force in our own day. The majority of people of our time who have privilege or power either through capital or noble birth, have not learned to understand that no one has the right to exploit another, to turn a man like himself into a tool as a means of promoting his own welfare, and that all privilege is not lawful and right, but unlawful, violent, unjust. All men are men. All have the same right of the recognition of their personality. Nature, which created man and the means of his existence, does not know of any selection and special favouritism."

But Father Petrov is not a revolutionist who places his sole hope on the regeneration of the individual, as does Tolstoi. He seeks rather a regeneration of both the Church and the State, his efforts being equally directed to remove the growing "contempt and hatred" of the people toward the clergy, and to introduce democracy and Socialism into the State. In his politics he has nothing in common with the moderates, just as he has perhaps nothing in common with the violent revolutionists. He felt bitterly toward the pusillanimous attitude of the Constitutional Democratic party in the second Duma, who in order to persuade the Czar not to dismiss the Duma were ready to concede everything to the Government. Petrov thought, on the contrary, that as long as the Duma existed it ought to have been worthy of its task, outspoken on every question and ready to submit to the Czar on none.

Father Petrov does not believe in the possibility of a peaceful political evolution in Russia. He believes that a period of great violence is inevitably approaching, since there is no hope of any spirit of progress in the Court or upper classes. The preachers in the Court he brands as men without principles or ideas, like the Vostorgov who has been mentioned, who is a leader in the organisation that is preparing the massacres. He con-

siders that the Government's so-called punishments dealt out by this time to literally millions of people are not in truth punishments in any true sense of the term, but mere revenge. He feels that the ministers have the instincts of hunting dogs, that the Government is not conducting its persecutions from any standpoint of State but merely as a war against an enemy without belligerent rights. He feels with the other revolutionists that the way in which the Government is conducting this campaign is not as humane as ordinary war and urges that The Hague Conference ought to interfere. It does not occur, he says, in modern countries that an officer outrages a captured girl, as recently happened in Russia. Petrov knows the court and his indignation is in proportion to his knowledge. He looks gloomily upon the approaching struggle, but is sure of the triumph of justice in the end, though only after great bloodshed. The people, he is confident, will not recede in the least degree from their revolutionary demands, based as they are on necessity.

Father Petrov looks more hopefully toward the expected spiritual regeneration. He realises that at the present moment the Church is losing adherents every day on account of its intimate connection with the infamous Czarism, but as soon as the least elements of democracy begin to appear during the course of the coming struggle he feels that there will be a rapid revolution in the Church also. The chief ground for his hope is that the village clergy will not only join in large numbers in the popular movement but will even become martyrs for the cause. He feels also that as soon as the least religious liberty is offered the whole mass of the peasantry will go over to the "old believers," who differ from the Orthodox Church chiefly in that they have no connection with the State.

He does not take so much interest in the sects as he does in the "old believers," because he has observed with Prince Hilkhov that the members of the sects are interesting themselves at the present time rather in politics than in religion. I agree with Father Petrov — that the majority of the Russian peasants will probably only reach the point of the "old believers." But I feel that the sects are the most advanced element of the Russian population, though not the most numerous, and I believe that their participation in politics will be as spiritual

as their religious development has been practical. Indeed I have met complaints from among their most revolutionary members that the Socialist parties were not sufficiently imbued with ideals, but too much interested in the mere questions of wages and rents and elections of a constitutional assembly. I believe that the chief religious movement and hope of a spiritual regeneration in the near future lies in the increasing spirit of self-assertion of these sects which promise a tremendously rapid growth as soon as the least real religious freedom has been won from the Government.

Let me remind the reader of a typical sect, that natural product of the Russian soil, the Dukhobors. To be sure, transferred to the strange soil of Canada, it has manifested itself in some peculiar forms, but in its original state in Russia it could not have failed to inspire any sympathetic observer. I am confident that this is a type of faith that will grow most rapidly among the peasants, and that as it grows the economic and political movements will receive a spiritual reinforcement that will make finally certain the victory of the reigning Socialist and democratic ideas.

The members of this faith cast aside all ceremonies and externalities. The only important dogma of their belief is the justification of God as "the spirit of truth." They recognise the Trinity but declare that it has a purely spiritual sense. By "the Mother of God" they understand the endless grace and bounty of God, which produces "the spirit of truth" in ourselves, which they call the Son of God. For the saving of the soul the belief in this purely spiritual Christ is necessary, but a belief without deeds is dead. God lives in the soul of man and He teaches men Himself. It is in us that Christ must be born, grow up, teach, be resurrected and carried to heaven. The Church and religious images are not recognised. The church, the Dukhobors say, is in ourselves and wherever two or three men gather together in the name of Christ.

The Dukhobors' faith is their only law in their daily lives; they apply their doctrines to their whole existence. Most important is their communal life; property is held in common, each one takes for his family according to its recognised needs. Their refusal to go in for military service is notorious. They

accept the most severe and cruel punishments liberally bestowed on them by the Russian Government, or a whole life-time in prison, rather than to kill their brother men. War they declare to be murder, contradicting flatly the idea of brotherly love.

Such evident purity of religious faith, such depth of social and moral principle in daily life, and such unconquerable courage in defending their practices, may prove after all the most insuperable obstacle that the Government has to meet. Among the Dukhobors and related sects a resistance may take the form of refusal to participate in the suppression of disturbances. Among the Russian Baptists (Stundists), who have millions of adherents, it is already taking the form of a religious warfare against the Government as determined and invincible as the religious wars of the English Puritans and Levellers against the king and his church, and in the same unconquerable spirit with which the Tyrolese Catholics or the Swiss Protestants defended their homes against their religious foes. The Czarism has conquered the bodies of its subjects; we doubt if it will ever be able to conquer their souls.

CHAPTER VI

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

In new song the old note of mournful meditation was absent. It was not the utterance of a soul wandering in solitude along the dark paths of melancholy perplexity, of a soul beaten down by want, burdened with fear, deprived of individuality and colourless. It breathed no sighs of a strength hungering for space; it shouted no provoking cries of irritated courage ready to crush both the good and the bad indiscriminately. It did not voice the striving elemental of the animal "instinct" for freedom, for freedom's sake, nor the freedom of wrong or vengeance capable of destroying everything and powerless to build up anything. In this song there was nothing from the old, slavish world.

It floated along directly, evenly; it proclaimed an iron virility; a calm threat. Simple and clear, it swept the people after it along an endless path leading to the far distant future; and it spoke frankly of the hardships of the way.—MAXIM GORKY, *Foma Gordeeff*.

I

THE struggle in which Russia is engaged is so desperate, the brave and intelligent people are at present so helpless, that the foreigner is almost incapable of grasping the full tragedy of the situation. We moderns can conceive tragedies of the individual. We are not accustomed to tragedies in which whole peoples are the heroes. In Russia a single class of men, put by circumstances in entire control of the destinies of the nation, has become so cold, so false, so dulled to all its higher interests, that our minds refuse to credit their actions. In other countries we do not have a ruling class with such utterly irresponsible power, and we have almost forgotten the depth of evil that still remains in mankind. Russia's rulers are to all appearances modern educated men that would pass anywhere for good Europeans or Americans, but they have been given a mastery over others, a right to govern others without their consent, and through this they have become like the tyrants of old.

"The debauched, idle and blasé men that compose the governing classes generally," says Tolstoi, "must find some goal for their existence, but this goal can only be the increase of their own glory. In all other passions the point of satiety is soon reached; only the passion for glory is unlimited." We have forgotten that it is a law of all history that men in a false position of power are bound to degenerate, that no man is good enough to govern another against the other's consent, and if he does so that he is bound to bring about both his own and that other's ruin. Unless we seize again this principle which lies at the bottom of all social life, we cannot hope to grasp one iota of the awful tragedy that faces the Russian people at the present moment.

It is just because its spiritual life has been deepened and intensified by great experience in the suffering of the whole nation, that Russia's message is able to stir the other countries; happier lands less experienced, living more superficially, have had no such insights into the evil that still lies buried in man, into the horrors that can be perpetrated in the present state of society, and into the heroic capacities that lie latent in us to enable us to fight even without success against a world of evil. It is not another society that Russians are learning to understand through suffering, but our own. We know capitalism, of soulless corporations that rob consumers, starve employees and corrupt the State. Russia knows that this same capitalism gives the Czar the money to build prisons for hundreds of thousands of his people, to buy the rifles and machine guns of the Cossacks and to hire an army of thugs — knows that this same capitalism is as ready to take profits directly from murder and plunder supported by murder as it is to grow rich through bought corporations, lawyers or legislators.

The Russian people have reasoned it out that modern capitalism will stop at no wrong, even that of the murder of whole peoples — they have experienced this illuminating truth in their own flesh and blood. They know that each individual capitalist has doubtless this or that moral code for his private life, but they know that the capitalists, all bound together by the bond of international finance, are ready to murder all mankind and secure higher interest rate. So there has been planted



DUMA REPRESENTATIVES

Elected by peasants Intelligence and combativeness are the rule rather than the exception

in Russia's heart a great and ennobling hatred; not a hatred of persons but of a system, a hatred raised to great social principles and ideas. Hatred against men brings the world no message. Such of Russia's victims as have been killed in a war of mere mutual hate, however just the cause for which they have died, however honoured by their companions in arms, will never be viewed by the world as mankind's martyrs, as world-heroes who "when we are born are straight our friends." Russia's martyrs have often died with their hearts filled with love not hatred, not for a party merely or even for a nation, but quite consciously for all mankind.

They died as victims of that capitalism which oppresses the whole race. Like the early Christians they died for the emancipation of humanity. Some, it is true, seek first a material emancipation for their fellow men, putting things spiritual in a second place; others merit Tolstoi's accusation that though sincere, they have an egotistic passion for leadership in the new cause; but most of those who go gladly to prison and exile and death go for the spiritual elevation of the races, for the ideal of a better society that is to produce better types of individuals than the world has yet seen.

II

The Russian people had already won their battle against the Czarism when the foreigners interfered and threw in their forces with those of the Czar — lending him 1,000,000,000 rubles, satisfied with 7 per cent. interest and making no conditions for what murderous purposes the money was to be employed.

The battle was won when the Czar was allowed to reach his hands into the vast treasury house of the international capital — and now, until he is cut off from the colossal subsidies that enable him to continue his murderous Government, the situation is desperate indeed. Cases are common in which despots have allied themselves with foreign powers. But this is new — this is the unique instance of all history, when foreign powers have each contributed something to support the oppressive government. There is hardly an important banking interest in France or Germany that has not contributed something to

the Czar's murder funds, and scarcely a prominent capitalistic institution of Austria and England that is not indirectly connected with it. Even America was tainted a few years ago.

The Russian people, I say, had won their struggle at the time of the first Duma when the foreign capitalists loaned 1,000,000,000 rubles to the despotic Government, pretending to assume that they thought the Czarism was becoming constitutional, but really well aware that it was absolutely irresponsible toward the people. The European military situation was only a part of the cause of this monstrous international pride. France and Germany, overloaded with military burdens and forced to subordinate their greatest social reforms to military necessities, are entirely depending on the position toward the other nations taken by the Czar's criminal Government. Before the last loan the immense sums of gold secured from France to make possible the perpetuation of the Czarism, were obtained largely on the ground that the money would go to supply arms to an enemy of Germany. The new crushing tax burdens for the rebuilding of the navy destroyed by the Japanese — burdens which make impossible any genuine reform inside of Russia in the near future — were levied to please the Czar's cousin, William II. of Germany, who wants to see another European fleet that might be used in an emergency against his rival, England. As long as the Russian Government remains despotic and half independent, it will engage, like every other despotism, in aggressive enterprises of one kind or another, if not in Turkey in Japan, if not in Japan then by pledging its army to this or the other power as mercenary troops. The last monster loan also was in part a sale of Russia's organised forces for murder. It will be remembered that large contributors to this loan, besides France, were also Austria and England, and other countries. In return for these immense sums the Russian Government, it appears, promised the world to work against Germany in the cause of international peace; it was a sort of international blackmail.

But the murderous Czarism probably gets more of the money of the international bankers by selling the natural resources of the impoverished country in the form of industrial privileges granted by the Government, or by means of high rates of inter-

est squeezed from the starving population, than it does as pay for its mercenary army.

For many years English, Belgian, and German money, as well as French, has been pouring into Russia's industries under the tutelage of the State, until the country is rapidly becoming like India, Egypt, Turkey or Persia, with both the Government and industries largely in the hands of foreign financiers. Already leading conservatives even have spoken of Russia's real parliament, the international bankers. There is a decided danger, indeed, that the country may in the not distant future become a sort of international protectorate, like China — unless in the meanwhile the Czarism is overturned.

The Russian people, in resisting the alliance between the foreign financiers and its Government, are fighting to prevent another effort of international capital to still further strengthen itself, to enlarge the territory of its "colonies" or "subject races," and by means of its vast income so secured to further corrupt the world's governments and maintain its power.

The Russian fight is in this sense a world fight indeed, but it is also a world movement in a more direct and much more spiritual meaning. It is a world struggle for modern or social democracy. The Russian movement is the only revolutionary movement of a whole people in our times. Russia is therefore the only country where, under the guidance of the best knowledge and the highest ideals of our period, a new foundation is being laid for the democracy of the future.

For whenever democracy has taken deep and permanent root it owes its first beginning to revolution, to open violent rebellion. This is notoriously true of France; it is true of England; it is true of the United States. That country which has had no revolution has had no real democracy. Many persons look at modern Prussia, where there has been no revolution, as possessing a semi-democratic government. Let such persons recall the principle of Bismarck when, as recently as 1863, he governed the country without the consent of the Landtag as it was governed centuries ago. There has been a constitutional deadlock, and as there has never been a revolution to put an end once and for all to the last vestiges of the old autocratic system, Bismarck could very reasonably claim that

in such cases when the new laws did not work it was necessary to return to the old. When the constitution fails to work in the United States the reactionary forces cannot turn back to the laws of George III., because the United States has had a revolution; nor do English judges revert in political questions to English institutions before 1688, nor the French to laws that existed before 1789. In these countries revolutions have cut off the line of retreat of reactionary forces. In every great contest between reaction and progress, then, progress has the advantage, for reaction can only obtain a foothold by basing its claims on the barbarities of the past. In supporting a profound revolutionary movement, then, the Russian people are laying the only possible basis for a new democracy. This democracy, struggling into being to-day, must be based on the world conditions of the present moment. It is evident that the problem before any great revolutionary movement in our time will be the great problem of the age — the social problem.

III

A revolutionary social movement in any one nation would be rich in lessons for every other. But the only countries that can really advance new and great solutions are the large countries — those that are powerful enough to be independent, that embrace such a variety of conditions and of peoples that their solution may be of a universal application. It is evident that countries like Germany or France, the slaves of constant terror of destructive war, or Great Britain, oppressed by the nightmare that one day she may be reduced to poverty by the loss of her control of the ocean, are not entirely free to undertake solutions of great social problems; they must give the first place in the policies of State and the expenditure of public money to problems of national defence. Russia, on the other hand, has long ago lost all terror of becoming a province of some other nation, just as the United States is under no necessity of maintaining either a large land force or a navy of the size of Great Britain's.

Russia, like the United States, is a self-sufficient country; more than a country, a world. Like the new world, the Russian

world forms an almost complete economic whole, embracing under a single government nearly all, if not all, climates and nearly all the raw products used in modern life; both countries are large exporters of agricultural products, both are devoted more to agriculture than to manufacturing industry. Both of these worlds are composed largely of newly acquired and newly settled territory; though both are inhabited by very many races, in each a single race prevails numerically and in most other respects over all the rest, and keeps them together as a single whole. As the result of the mixture of races and the recent settlement of large parts of both countries, their culture is international, world-culture, unmarked by the comparatively provincial nationalistic tendencies of England, Germany, or France. We may look, according to a great German publicist, Kautsky, to America for the great economic experiments of the near future and to Russia for the new (social) politics.

America is essentially a country of rapid economic evolution, while Russia is undeveloped, economically and financially dependent. America is the country of economic genius, a nation whose conceptions of material development have reached even a spiritual height. The great American qualities, the American virtues, the American imagination, have thrown themselves almost wholly into business, the material development of the country. Americans are the first of modern peoples that have learned to respect the repeated failures of enterprising individuals with a genius for affairs, knowing that such failures often lead to greater heights of success. They have learned how to excuse enormous waste when it was made for the sake of economies lying in the distant future. They can appreciate the enterprise of persons who, instead of immediately exploiting their properties, know how to wait, like some of our most able builders that, foreseeing the brilliant future of the locality in which they are situated, are satisfied with temporary structures and poor incomes until the time is ripe for some of the magnificent modern achievements in architecture, in which we so clearly lead. All three of these types of men we admire are true revolutionists, who prefer to wait, to waste, or to fail, rather than to accept the lesser for the greater good.

So it is with Russians in their politics. There seems no

reason for doubting that the near future will show that the political failures now being made by the Russians are the failures of political genius, that the waste of lives and property will be repaid later a hundredfold, and that the hopeful and planful patience with which the Russians are looking forward and working to a great social transformation promises the greatest and most magnificent results when that transformation is achieved. Already the political revolution of the Russian people, though not yet embodied in political institutions, is becoming as rapid, as remarkable, as phenomenal, as the economic revolution of the United States.

IV

As the Russians have to contend with world forces and are bringing about world results, it is no ordinary war or revolution in which they have engaged themselves. Already it has become a part of the social struggle of all Europe; if it lasts many years it must ultimately become a part of some future world upheaval of unprecedented magnitude, of new and widespread world revolutions and world wars. We are not so likely to deny the possibility that such events as the French Revolution and the world wars which accompanied it may occur again, as to be misled by a too close comparison between the present situation and that of 1789. Considered even as a world movement the French Revolution was a success, but it was also a failure, so it has come about that whenever we hear of revolutions we hear also of the inevitable "reaction that must follow revolution," and of the avenging "man on horseback."

Certainly there was a reaction in Europe soon after 1800; certainly Napoleon was of all men that ever lived *the* man on horseback. But were this reaction and this man on horseback results of the French Revolution? To answer this question we must first divide the revolution into two parts — the true revolution, the movement that embraced the whole of the nation, that resulted in the final overthrow of feudalism in France, and led to the calling of the Constitutional Assembly. In contrast to this we have the later Insurrection of Paris which resulted in the execution of the king — a measure by no means

approved of by the whole nation — and in the capture of the Legislative Assembly by the mob of Paris with the assistance of a few regiments of professional soldiers. Moreover, the Paris of 1792 was in a sense the tyrant over the nation. Modern capitals have no such power as did Paris then. It was this insurrection that produced the reign of terror and led ultimately to the inevitable reaction, not against the revolution, but against the insurrection.


The insurrection of Paris in 1792, not the Revolution of France in 1789, produced the terror — a reign of violence not against the Government, not from below, but by the Government itself against the captives in its power. There has been no single important example of such mob violence in Russia. The so-called "terror" does not consist in the execution by revolutionists, without risk to themselves, of persons within their power, but of heroic attacks on murderous officials that hold the community by the throat, attacks which almost always result in the instant death or execution of the revolutionists. Every political party in Russia is even opposed to capital punishment, not only for political but even for ordinary crimes. The Russian nation, far from being led to any reaction by terroristic deeds, looks at these executioners of the popular will as national heroes and martyrs in the same sense as were the early Christians that braved the wrath of Nero or Domitian.

There was, however, an international reaction against the French Revolution that put the nation under the necessity of granting military powers to Napoleon, that robbed the French people of a part of the victories they had won, and that long supported a reactionary government in the country itself. Napoleon would never have been created had it not been for the reactionary attacks of all the foreign powers of Europe on Republican France; he would never have been entrusted with the powers of a despot if France had not been under the desperate necessity of fighting a life and death battle for her very existence. It is literally true that England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia placed Napoleon on the throne and that they kept there one king or another for more than a generation afterward. Even Napoleon III. would have had no success in appealing to the imperialistic instincts of the country if it had not been for the

general movement and reaction of Prussia, Russia, and Austria, a sort of renewal of the Holy Alliance after 1848.

The reactionary countries of Europe were able to plant their despotic autocracies in France after the revolution because, leagued together, they were far more powerful than that nation. There are still reactionary countries in Europe. As we have shown, the Prussian Government is in some respects even behind her Russian neighbour. But the other nations of the world to-day, especially France, England, and the United States, will by no means be so far behind democratic Russia as the monarchies at the end of the eighteenth century were behind France. There is no power that can force the Russian people in self-defence to rely on a man on horseback. Nor is there any tendency amongst the Russians themselves to worship individuals to the exclusion of great principles. France had had the evil example of a feudalistic Catholic Church and its infallible pope. In Russia there is no pope and the Church has no prestige among the people. France had been engaged in wars with her neighbours uninterruptedly for many generations; to a certain degree she had learned the military spirit that could be used by Napoleon and the foreign oppressors. Russia has long ceased to expand territorially, and she possesses such a large part of the surface of the earth that the keenest ambition of her people is rather to hold and develop what they have than to gain more. Nowhere are the masses of the population so pacific as in Russia. Let us, then, not judge the Russian Revolution by the French. The reaction in France and the coming of Napoleon are both explained by the special conditions of the world at the time, and none of these conditions exist to-day.

In France, as in Russia, the more prosperous and privileged part of the middle classes, at first enthusiastic revolutionists, soon left the movement, but in neither country has this desertion been great enough to create a reaction. Carlyle shows how constitutionalism in France "in sorrow and anger" demanded martial law against the revolutionists and obtained it, an act that soon may be expected from the majority of the Russian constitutionalists and that is already supported by a large minority. This step, says the great historian, can be justified on one premise only — that "constitutionalism is of



MODERATE LEADERS OF THE FIRST DUMA

(The second from the left is Prince Tchakovskoi; the third, Roditchev the famous orator; the fourth, Prince Dolgorukov; the fifth, Morumtsev, President of the Duma)

God and mob assembling the devil, otherwise it is not so just." Like the Russian Constitutional Democrats, the august National Assembly, according to Carlyle, never really wanted riot. "All it ever wanted was riot enough to balance court plotting." In Russia, as in France, the people very soon learned the worthlessness of their moderate constitutionalist allies. "To them it was clear," writes Carlyle, "that Philosophism has baked no bread; that Patriot Committee men will level down to their own level, and no lower."

The Russian moderates have not carried with them in their retreat even as large a part of the population as did the French. Nearly all the unions of the professional classes which at first allowed themselves to be used by the President of the Union of Unions, Professor Milyoukov, for the purposes of the Constitutional Democratic Party, have cast this organisation off. From the first most of them refused to throw their weight in for any lesser measure than an assembly elected by an equal suffrage, while such as temporarily joined the moderate party have left in large numbers.

v

From the very first the intellectual leaders of the Russian people have been opposed heart and soul to the Czarism, and there is hardly one name of the first rank from the beginning that has not made every sacrifice, even to suffering imprisonment, exile, and death, in the struggle against it. Over a century ago Novikov, who founded the first newspaper and publishing house of importance and established scholarships and libraries all over the country, was imprisoned by Catharine II. until his death. Roditchev was similarly persecuted by the same monarch. Catharine said of him, "He is spreading the French plague (the Revolution), he is a rebel worse than Pugatchev, he praises Franklin." These were among the founders of Russian literature, since educated persons before this time wrote and even spoke almost exclusively in French. I need barely mention the later writers whose works and persecutions are known to everybody: Pushkin, Turgeniev, Gogol, Tchernchevsky, Dostoievsky, Tolstoi, Korolenko and Gorky; there

are also a dozen others equally well known to Russians as these, who have suffered as much.

Since the last generation educated and refined women have taken the same part in the movement as the men; in fact, they have been even more high-spirited, devoted, and consistent. It is not that the equality of women is a special feature of Russian civilisation, for Russian women until the emancipation movement had been perhaps even less prominent in literature, politics, and affairs than had the women of some other countries. It is that there began in Russia a generation ago the first life and death struggle of a nation, carried out on the very highest social principles. Into this struggle women plunged from the very outset and they have furnished a very considerable part of the martyrs to the cause. In the revolutionary movement of the '80s, in some of the big trials, often a fourth or a fifth of the prisoners were women of the educated and noble classes. Several of these women who have spent fifteen or twenty years in exile or solitary confinement have rejoined the revolutionary movement. Still more important, they and less active friends and admirers who were legion, have taught their children either to look up to or respect the revolutionists. As Russian children are already without any inbred love of the State or Church, they are ripe for the most complete sacrifices for the revolutionary movement.

I cannot even sum up the wholesale sacrifice made by hundreds of thousands of the young men and women students of Russia for the social liberty and equality of the whole Russian people and for Socialism the world over. I will only deny the reports that are being spread that there is any relaxation of this movement. It has been said that a certain part of the students are becoming less revolutionary, that the Government has been able to terrorise another part into submission. Both statements are entirely false. If the proportion of timid or naturally conservative students in the universities has somewhat increased, it is because tens of thousands of the brave are languishing in prison or exile. This year already the majority of the leading universities of Russia have been closed again on account of revolutionary student disturbances. A reactionary paper recently reported with glee the reopening of one of them — the

picture it drew of the reopening is sufficient to show its true significance: "The University is again open. At the doors there are standing policemen and sentinels with loaded guns; inside of the University is a company of soldiers and a large squad of police. The students have to show tickets on going in and to have them marked. The lectures are going regularly forward. It is to be noticed that there is no tearing about in the corridors, with cries, noises, and alarms, with the caps on the head. The strong measures have forced order. The revolutionists are foaming with rage." Let us not leave the picture without recalling the misery of these students who give up everything, present opportunities, their freedom, and their future careers, for the cause, who go about in the university towns in the terrible Russian winters without warm overcoats, who are ready to accept any sort of old clothes from anyone sufficiently sympathetic with the revolutionary movement to donate them in the name of the cause, who earn their living by any means, from shaving to giving lessons for two or three rubles a month.

There can be no question that the overwhelming majority of the educated class of Russia are devoted heart and soul to the revolution.

APPENDIX

NOTE A

THE BASIS FOR RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS

THE CZAR'S MANIFESTO OF OCTOBER 17, 1905. (OCTOBER 30,
1905 — WESTERN CALENDAR)

WE, NICHOLAS II., by God's Grace Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, Czar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, and so forth, announce to our loyal subjects: The disturbances and movements in our principal cities and numerous other places in our realm fill our heart with great and intense anguish. The happiness of the Russian Ruler is inseparably bound with the happiness of the people and the pain of the people is the pain of the Ruler. From the present conditions there may arise a deep national disturbance and danger for the integrity and unity of our empire.

The high duty of our mission as Ruler compels us to bestir ourselves with our whole might and power to hasten the cessation of these disorders that are so dangerous for the State.

While we have ordered the proper officials to take measures to allay the direct manifestations of disorder, riots and deeds of violence and for the protection of the peaceful population which is striving to quietly fulfil all of the duties imposed upon it, we have at the same time recognised it as indispensable in order to accomplish successfully the general measures for the calming of public life to give to the activity of the highest officials of the Government a unified direction. We oblige the Government to fulfil our unchangeable will as follows:

1. The population is to be given the inviolable foundation of civil rights based on the actual inviolability of the person, freedom of belief, of speech, of organisation, and meeting.

2. Without interrupting the elections already ordered for the State Duma and as far as the shortness of the time at our disposition for the calling of the first Duma allows — such classes

of the population which are now altogether shut out from the right of suffrage, are to be called to participate in the Duma, upon which the working out of the principle of universal suffrage will be left to the new legislative body.

3. As an unchangeable principle it is declared that no law can be put into effect without the consent of the Duma of the State and that the elected representatives of the population will be guaranteed the possibility of an effective share in the revision of the legality of the commands of officials appointed by us.

We rely on all true sons of Russia to reflect concerning their duty to the Fatherland to work together for the cessation of the present unheard of disturbances of order, and to place all their powers along with ourselves at the disposal of the Cause of the restoration of order and peace in the Fatherland. Given at Peterhof on the 17th October, 1905, in the eleventh year of our reign.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

NOTE B

THE REPLY OF THE FIRST DUMA TO THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE MAY, 1906

YOUR MAJESTY:

In a speech addressed to the representatives of the people it pleased your Majesty to announce your resolution to keep unchanged the decree by which the people were assembled to carry out legislative functions in coöperation with their Monarch. The State Duma sees in this solemn promise of the Monarch to the people a lasting pledge for the strengthening and the further development of legislative procedure in strict conformity with constitutional principles. The State Duma, on its side, will direct all its efforts toward perfecting the principles of national representation and will present for your Majesty's confirmation a law for national representation, based in accordance with the manifest will of the people, upon principles of universal suffrage.

Your Majesty's summons to us to coöperate in a work which shall be useful to the country finds an echo in the hearts of all the members of the State Duma. The State Duma, made up of representatives of all classes and all races inhabiting Russia, is united in a warm desire to regenerate Russia and to create within her a new order, based upon the peaceful coöperation of all classes and races, upon the firm foundation of civic liberty.

But the State Duma deems it its duty to declare that while present conditions exist such reformation is impossible.

The country recognises that the ulcer in our present régime is in the arbitrary power of officials who stand between the Czar and the people, and seized with a common impulse the country has loudly declared that reformation is possible only upon the basis of freedom of action and the participation by the nation itself in the exercise of the legislative power and the control of the executive. In the Manifesto of October 17,

1905, your Majesty was pleased to announce from the summit of the throne a firm determination to employ these very principles as the foundation for Russia's future, and the entire nation hailed these good tidings with a universal cry of joy.

Yet the very first days of freedom were darkened by the heavy affliction into which the country was thrown by those who would bar the path leading to the Czar; those who by trampling down the very fundamental principles of the imperial Manifesto of October 17, 1905, overwhelmed the land with the disgrace of organised massacres, military reprisals, and imprisonments without trial.

The impression of these recent administrative acts has been felt so keenly by the people that no pacification of the country is possible until the people are assured that henceforth arbitrary acts of officials shall cease, nor be longer shielded by the name of your Majesty; until all the ministers shall be held responsible to the representatives of the people and that the administration in each step of State service shall be reformed accordingly.

Sire: The idea of completely freeing the Monarch from responsibility can be implanted in the mind of the nation only by making the ministers responsible to the people. Only a ministry fully trusted by the majority of the Duma can establish confidence in the Government; and only in the presence of such confidence is the peaceful and regular work of the State Duma possible. But above all it is most needful to free Russia from the operation of exceptional laws for so-called "special and extraordinary protection," and "martial law," under cover of which the arbitrary authority of irresponsible officials has grown up and still continues to grow.

Side by side with the establishment of the principle of responsibility of the administration to the representatives of the people, it is indispensable, for the successful work of the Duma, that there should be implanted, and definitely adopted, the fundamental principle of popular representation based on the coöperation of the Monarch with the people, as the only source of legislative power. Therefore all barriers between the Imperial power and the people must be removed. No branch of legislative power should ever be closed to the inspection of the representative of the people, in coöperation

with the Monarch. The State Duma considers it its duty to state to your Majesty, in the name of the people, that the whole nation, with true inspiration and energy, with genuine faith in the near prosperity of the country, will only then fulfil its work of reformation, when the Council of State, which stands between it and the throne, shall cease to be made up, even in part, of members who have been appointed instead of being elected; when the law of collecting taxes shall be subject to the will of the representatives of the people; and when there shall be no possibility, by any special enactment, of limiting the legislative jurisdiction of the representatives of the people. The State Duma also considers it inconsistent with the vital interests of the people that any bill imposing taxes, when once passed by the Duma, should be subject to amendment on the part of any body which is not representative of the mass of tax-payers.

In the domain of its future legislative activity the State Duma, performing the duty definitely imposed upon it by the people, deems it necessary to provide the country, without delay, with a strict law providing for the inviolability of the person, freedom of conscience, liberty of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, convinced that without the strict observance of these principles, the foundation of which was laid in the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, no social reform can be realised. The Duma also considers it necessary to secure for all citizens the right of petition to the people's representatives. The State Duma has further the inflexible conviction that neither liberty nor order can be made firm and secure except on the broad foundation of equality before the law of all citizens without exception. Therefore the State Duma will establish a law for the perfect equality before the law of all citizens, abolishing all limitations dependent upon estate, nationality, religion and sex. The Duma, however, while striving to free the country from the binding fetters of administrative guardianship and leaving the limitation of the liberty of the citizen to the independent judicial authorities, still deems the application of capital punishment, even in accordance with a legal sentence, as inadmissible. A death sentence should never be pronounced. The Duma holds that it has the right to proclaim, as the

unanimous desire of the people, that a day should come when a law forever abolishing capital punishment here shall be established. In anticipation of that law the country to-day is looking to your Majesty for a suspension of all death sentences.

The investigation of the needs of the rural population and the undertaking of legislative measures to meet those wants will be considered among the first problems of the State Duma. The most numerous part of the population, the hard working peasants, impatiently await the satisfaction of their acute want of land and the first Russian State Duma would be recreant to its duty were it to fail to establish a law to meet this primary want by resorting to the use of lands belonging to the State, the Crown, the royal family, and monastic and Church lands; also private landed property on the principle of the law of eminent domain.

The Duma also deems it necessary to create laws giving equality to the peasantry, removing the present degrading limitations which separate them from the rest of the people. The Duma considers the needs of working people as pressing, and that there should be legislative measures taken for the protection of hired labour. The first step in that direction ought to be to give freedom to the hired labourer in all branches of work, freedom to organise, freedom to act and to secure his material and spiritual welfare.

The Duma will also deem it its duty to employ all its forces in raising the standard of intelligence, and above all it will occupy itself in framing laws for free and general education.

Along with the aforementioned measures the Duma will pay special attention to the just distribution of the burden of taxation, unjustly imposed at present upon the poorer classes of inhabitants; and to the reasonable expenditure of the means of the State. Not less vital in legislative work will be a fundamental reform of local government and of self-government, extending the latter to all the inhabitants upon the principles of universal suffrage.

Bearing in mind the heavy burden imposed upon the people by your Majesty's army and navy, the Duma will secure principles of right and justice in those branches of the service.

Finally, the Duma deems it necessary to point out as one of

the problems pressing for solution the long-crying demands of the different nationalities. Russia is an empire inhabited by many different races and nationalities. Their spiritual union is possible only by meeting the needs of each one of them, and by preserving and developing their national characteristics. The Duma will try to satisfy those reasonable wants.

Your Majesty: On the threshold of our work stands one question which agitates the soul of the whole nation; and which agitates us, the chosen and elected of the people, and which deprives us of the possibility of undisturbedly proceeding toward the first part of our legislative activity. The first word uttered by the State Duma met with cries of sympathy from the whole Duma. It was the word amnesty. The country thirsts for amnesty, to be extended to all those whose offences were the result of either religious or political convictions; and all persons implicated in the agrarian movement. These are demands of the national conscience which cannot be overlooked; the fulfilment of which cannot be longer delayed. Sire, the Duma expects of you full political amnesty as the first pledge of mutual understanding and mutual agreement between the Czar and his people.

NOTE C

THE FIRST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S DECLARATION OF REVOLUTION

THE VIBORG MANIFESTO. JULY, 1906

TO THE PEOPLE:

The Duma has been dissolved by the Ukase of the 8th of July. You have elected us as your representatives; you have elected us and you have given us instructions to struggle for land and liberty. According to your instructions and to our duty we have drawn up these laws to assure liberty to the people. We have demanded the resignation of irresponsible ministers who transgress the laws with immunity, suppressing freedom.

But first of all we wished to formulate a law relative to the distribution of land to agricultural labourers, a law which demanded the division for this purpose of the lands belonging to the Crown, the monasteries and the clergy, and the expropriation of private estates. The Government considered this law as inadmissible, and when the Duma again presented its resolution in a more urgent manner on this subject of forced expropriation the Duma was dissolved.

The Government promises to summon a new Duma in seven months. Russia will have then to remain for seven long months without a people's assembly at a moment when the population finds itself a few steps from ruin and when industry and commerce are tottering. When all the country is filled with a feverish agitation and when the ministers have definitely shown their incapacity to do justice to the popular needs.

During the seven months the Government will act arbitrarily and will fight against the popular movement to obtain a pliant and obedient Duma. If it should succeed, however, in completely suppressing the popular movement the Government will not convoke the Duma at all.

Citizens, rise for the defence of your rights to a popular assembly which are being trampled under foot and for the defence of the Duma. Russia must not remain a single day without popular representation. You have the means of procuring this representation. The Government has without the consent of the representations of the people no right to levy taxes on the people nor to call the people into military service. Consequently, now that the Duma has been dissolved, you are fully justified in giving neither money nor soldiers. If, however, the Government should contract loans to procure an income, these loans contracted without the consent of your popular representatives are null and void. Russian people will never recognise them and it will not feel itself called upon to repay them. As a consequence until the popular representatives are called together do not give a kopeck to the throne, nor soldiers to the army. Be firm in your refusal. No power can resist the united and inflexible will of a nation.

Citizens, in this obligatory and inevitable struggle your representatives will be with you.

NOTE D

ONE OF THE CZAR'S CONFESSIONS

THIS secret document, one of the many of which the revolutionists have stolen a copy, shows how Russia gets her best, most accurate and irrefutable knowledge of the true character and statesmanship of her Czar. The marginal remarks were written by the Czar's own hand. The report, it will be noticed, was issued just before the close of the Manchurian war.

Report of the Controller of the State for the year 1904. Dated 6th August, 1905 N 741.

1. The Controller has noticed that the number and quantity of the materials, ammunition, provisions, etc. in the Army Corps do not correspond to the standards set by the law. The Controller of the State proposes to ask the Minister of War to give an account of this matter. It is necessary
2. The projectiles manufactured in the Perm workshops according to the specifications of the Krupp Company have shown a poor quality during the trials. Sad but true
3. The ammunition of the 5th and 6th Siberian Corps are altogether exhausted. In one of the travelling cars they have not been renewed since the campaign of 1877-78. Difficult to believe
4. In the 4th Corps the winter shoes are in frightful condition; the soles are made from chips of wood covered with strips of leather. This is disgraceful; how many legs have been frozen as a result?
5. The financial results of the activity of the State workshops in the Urals are very disappointing, the quantity of their product is insufficient and their qualities do not correspond to the needs of the Ministry of War. It is time to organise the State workshops of the Urals in a manner to render them useful to the State
7. The construction of the railways of the State demands enormous sums. The principal cause: The contractors give their rights to other persons, receiving 20 to 40 per cent. for having conceded them. (This article was twice underlined by the Czar)

9. The Controller thinks that the management of the State railways gives insufficient results because the members of the Central Administration who receive high salaries are not interested in the increase of the railway revenue. This is the way it seems to me too. He proposes to divide the salaries into two parts, first, a constant, second, varying according to the increase of the railways.



“BORZOI” stands for the best in literature in all its branches—drama and fiction, poetry and art. “BORZOI” also stands for unusually pleasing book-making.

BORZOI Books are good books and there is one for every taste worthy of the name. A few are briefly described on the next page. Mr. Knopf will be glad to see that you are notified regularly of new and forthcoming BORZOI Books if you will send him your name and address for that purpose. He will also see that your local dealer is supplied.

ADDRESS THE BORZOI
220 WEST FORTY-SECOND STREET
NEW YORK



UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



AA 000 493 110 1

